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TYING MEETS THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: 
FAREWELL TO THE CHIMERA OF FORCING 
ALAN]. MEESEt 
No. I 
Tying contracts-agreements conditioning the sale of one, "tying" 
product upon an agreement to purchase a second, "tied" product-
are endemic in the modem economy.1 Firms that sell copying rna-
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1 See STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 273 (1993) ("Tying ar-
rangements (or 'tied sales') occur when a seller conditions the purchase of one good 
(1) 
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chines often seek to require their customers to purchase from them 
service or paper.2 Automobile makers condition the sale of cars upon 
agreements by dealers or customers to purchase spare parts or op-
tional equipment exclusively from the manufacturer.3 Computer 
companies require purchasers to buy software or peripheral equip-
ment,4 and software firms require purchasers to buy hardware as well.5 
Examples could be multiplied without end. 
Tying contracts are not a modem phenomenon; each of the ex-
amples just mentioned has parallels at least sixty years old.6 Despite 
or service on the buyer's purchase of another good or service."); see also Northern Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). 
2 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 457-58 
(1992) (discussing copier manufacturer's requirement that purchasers buy services in 
order to obtain necessary replacement parts); Erwin A. Blackstone, Restrictive Practices 
in the Marketing of Electrofax Copiers and Supplies: The SCM Corporation Case, 23 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 189, 191 (1975) (describing requirement that customers purchase paper 
as a condition of receiving copier). 
• See Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 471 
(3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) (evaluating requirement that car buyers purchase sound 
systems from Chrysler instead of independent sellers); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 
858 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1988) (scrutinizing requirement that dealers purchase 
spare parts kits from the manufacturer in order to receive automobiles); Mozart Co. v. 
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1344 (9th Cir. 1987) (scrutinizing re-
quirement that, in order to retain franchise, dealers agree to purchase only genuine 
Mercedes-Benz spare parts or parts expressly approved by Mercedes-Benz); Heatrans-
fer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir. 1977) (evaluating re-
quirement that dealers purchase air conditioners from Volkswagen); see also Paul E. 
Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (W.D. Tenn. 
1995) (entertaining claim that Caterpillar conditioned the sale of its machines upon 
dealers' agreements to purchase spare parts from it and not from independent sell-
ers). 
• See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 
1996) (evaluating requirement that purchasers of Digital computers buy Digital oper-
ating systems as well); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (approving consent decree that prohibited Microsoft's practices that induced 
manufacturers of personal computers to require purchasers to use Microsoft operating 
systems). 
5 SeeA.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(evaluating a computer company's policy of selling its software with a licensing agree-
ment that required the purchaser to use that software only on the company's comput-
ers); Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(considering "whether Data General's refusal to license its ... operating system soft-
ware except i:o purchasers of its [computers] is an unlawful tying arrangement"). 
6 See IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 132-34 (1936) (evaluating require-
ment that lessees of tabulating machines purchase IBM punch cards or pay a 15% 
increase in rental price); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1912) (evaluating 
requirement that purchasers of mimeograph machines purchase supplies from the 
manufacturer); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641, 642 (7th Cir. 
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the ubiquity and long tradition of such contracts, however, the Su-
preme Court has never settled upon a coherent approach to distin-
guish benign ties from those that are harmful. Instead, almost since 
the enactment of the Sherman Act, the Court has swung from one 
extreme to another.7 Initially holding that all such agreements are 
legal,8 the Court soon reversed course, suggesting that any tie that 
foreclosed a significant amount of commerce in the tied product was 
unlawful.9 About three decades later, however, the Court appeared to 
limit this rule to ties imposed by monopolists,10 only to change its 
mind again just five years later, when it held that any tying agreement 
obtained by a firm with only the slightest market power is "per se" 
unlawful. 11 
More recently, the Court has reached a sort of middle ground be-
tween some of the more extreme approaches it has taken in the past. 
Although purporting to retain the per se rule against ties, the Court 
has added new conditions to its invocation, the most important of 
which is the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the seller pos-
sesses market power over the tying product of the sort necessary for 
liability in other antitrust contexts.12 In maintaining this middle posi-
1935) (scrutinizing requirement that GM dealers purchase, sell, and use only GM 
parts), affd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). 
7 See generally Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust 
as History, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1985) (describing the Court's conflicting 
ideologies regarding tying arrangements). 
8 See A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 35-36; cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 
U.S. 32, 59-67 (1918) (finding a tying agreement lawful). 
9 See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457 (1922). 
10 See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605, 611 (1953). 
11 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958) (disavowing lan-
guage in Times-Picayune to the effect that monopoly power is necessary to a finding of 
per se illegality); see also Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 
497, 501-04 (1969) (concluding that U.S. Steel had sufficient economic power for an 
illegal tying contract, even though it did not "have a monopoly or even a dominant 
position throughout the market"); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 & n.4 
(1962) (holding that possession of copyright, without more, creates sufficient eco-
nomic power to "appreciably restrain free competition" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
12 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) 
(concluding that tying arrangements are illegal "when the seller has some special 
ability-usually called 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he 
would not do in a competitive market"); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (equating the "economic power" necessary for a 
finding of a per se illegal tie with monopoly power-"the ability of a single seller to 
raise price and restrict output" (internal quotation marks omitted)); infra note 43 and 
accompanying text (discussing cases in the lower courts that equate "economic power" 
in tying context with monopoly power). 
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tion, however, the Court has failed to articulate any coherent theory 
governing the antitrust treatment of ties. 13 It has not, for instance, 
provided a principled explanation for its conclusion that tying con-
tracts meeting the requirements for per se condemnation are "in 
restraint of trade. "14 Moreover, the Court has fastidiously avoided the 
question of whether defendants can justify," by way of an affirmative 
defense, otherwise per se illegal ties.15 Finally, the Court has failed to 
articulate a complete framework for analyzing ties that do not merit 
per se treatment.16 Lower courts, then, are left to grapple with such 
issues themselves and, not surprisingly, reach divergent conclusions.17 
Despite the incoherence of the Court's position, the current equi-
librium appears to be a stable one. Although the Court has re-
sponded to calls to relax per se rules in other contexts/8 it has 
15 See Kramer, supra note 7, at 1051 ("Neither the majority nor the concurrence [in 
Jefferson Parish] was entirely successful in its attempt to establish a coherent test for 
judging the legality of tying arrangements."). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see Thomas C. Arthur, FareweU to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning 
the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 266, 311 (1986) (calling Jefferson Parish a 
"Jekyll and Hyde" opinion, in which two "antitrust personalities struggle for domi-
nance"); Diane Wood Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five Decisions in Search of a Theory, 
1984 SUP. Gr. REV. 69, 134-35 (claiming that the majority opinion in jefferson Parish was 
"internally inconsistent" and "wanted to have it both ways"). 
15 See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the role, if any, 
of affirmative defenses is still an open question in the Supreme Court). 
16 The Court has, on at least two occasions, stated that ties that do not merit per se 
treatment should be scrutinized pursuant to the Rule of Reason, under which courts 
assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a contract is, on balance, anticompetitive. See 
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29-31; Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 500; see also infra note 57 
and accompanying text. The Court has not, however, explained how such scrutiny 
should be structured. See Kramer, supra note 7, at 1057-59 (describing various ques-
tions left open by the Rule of Reason analysis performed in Jefferson Parish). 
17 The courts have split on the market power issue, compare Town Sound & Custom 
Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 482-85 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) 
(asserting that market power is unnecessary for proof of illegal tying under the Rule of 
Reason), and Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 796-98 (1st Cir. 1988) 
(Breyer,].) (same), with Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 
761 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,].) (stating that "substantial market power is an 
indispensable ingredient" when a tying contract is challenged under the Rule of Rea-
son), as well as the affirmative defense issue, compare Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Dis-
tribs., Inc., 806 F.2d 953, 957-58 (lOth Cir. 1986) (refusing to entertain affirmative 
defense to per se illegal tie), with Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 
F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (entertaining businessjustification defense to per 
se illegal tie). 
18 These other contexts include group boycotts, compare Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 285 (1985) 
(narrowing the class of group boycotts deemed unlawful), with Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding that group boycotts are per se 
unlawful), and horizontal restraints, compare Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 
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expressly rejected the call to jettison the per se rule where ties are 
concerned/9 and applied the rule in its most recent decision on the 
subject.20 Given the current membership of the Court and the doc-
trine of stare decisis, one would expect the Justices to continue to 
occupy this middle ground.21 
The oscillation that has led to the equilibrium reflected in Mod-
ern tying doctrine is understandable, at least in part. Over the years, 
the Court has been presented with two radically different paradigms 
for evaluating tying contracts, paradigms that have appeared in briefs, 
articles, books, and lower court opinions. Under the long-standing 
"Traditional" approach, all such agreements would be deemed illegal 
per se, except, perhaps, in those few instances in which the seller 
could prove that the tie is absolutely necessary to achieve a legitimate 
objective that outweighs the ha& it produces.22 Under the second 
approach, advanced by the so-called Chicago School of antitrust 
analysis,23 courts would either declare all tying contracts legal or, at 
U.S. 1, 11, 17 & n.27 (1979) (scrutinizing horizon.tal price fixing ancillary to legitimate 
joint venture under the Rule of Reason), with United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 
U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (holding that horizontal geographic restraints ancillary to legiti-
mate joint venture are per se illegal). 
19 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-10 (rejecting call to abandon the per se rule for 
tying arrangements). 
20 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,462 (1992). 
21 See, e.g., Edward A. Fallone, Neither Liberal nor Laissez Faire: A Prediction of Justice 
Ginsburg's Approach to Business Law Issues, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 279, 280-81 
(predicting that Justice Ginsburg will take a moderate approach to antitrust ques-
tions); William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modem Antitrust, 44 EMORY LJ. 
1, 51-53 (1995) (arguing that Justice Breyer will apply "some set of intermediate prin-
ciples" to antitrust questions). 
22 By "Traditional" approach I mean the conception of antitrust law that domi-
nated the academy and the courts before the Chicago School began to make inroads 
in the 1970s. The classic articulation of the Traditional position is found in Donald F. 
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 
59 (1958), which argued that all tying contracts should be deemed per se unlawful. 
Variations on the same theme include Joseph P. Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying 
Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Ana~sis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285-86 (1980) 
(asserting that all tying contracts should be presumed anticompetitive, subject to 
assertion of a carefully scrutinized defense); S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Federal Anti-
trust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139, 
1181 (1952) (same); W. David Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler Tie-in Doctrine, 25 ANTITRUSf 
BULL 671, 672 (1980) [hereinafter Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler Tie-in Doctrine] (same); 
see also W. David Slawson, A New Concept of Competition: Reana~zing Tie-in Doctrine After 
Hyde, 30 ANTITRusr BULL. 257, 258-59 (1985) [hereinafter Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in 
Doctrine] (asserting that tying arrangements "invariably reduce competition to some 
extent, whether or not the tying seller possesses any substantial monopoly power"). 
25 By "Chicago School" I mean the approach to antitrust analysis first taken by a 
cadre of academics and judges associated in one way or another with the University of 
6 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 146: 1 
the most, subject them to scrutiny under the Rule of Reason.24 Be-
cause the version of the Rule of Reason advocated by Chicagoans is so 
demanding, requiring a party who challenges a tie to prove that the 
seller possesses market power in both the tying and tied product mar-
kets,25 there would be little practical difference between such 
"scrutiny" and a rule of absolute legality.26 
Although the battle between these two camps has been raging for 
over three decades now, there is no indication that either side will 
persuade the other to change its position. This gridlock should sur-
prise no one. Mter all, Chicagoans and Traditionalists, as well as 
Chicago, including Robert Bork, Aaron Director, Frank Easterbrook, Douglas 
Ginsburg, and Richard Posner. See general~chard A. Posner, The Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979). Of course, not all members of the 
Chicago School are associated with the University of Chicago; nor have all antitrust 
scholars associated with the University of Chicago subscribed to the Chicago School 
approach. 
The Traditional approach rejects the Chicago School's view that efficiency is the 
central goal of antitrust law. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A 
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140, 1146-55 (1981) (taking the Traditionalist 
position that "the selection of efficiency as the only appropriate touchstone of anti-
trust policy is not indicated" by the statutory language or legislative history of the 
Sherman Act); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust 
Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 232-40 (1995) (discussing criticism of Chicago School). 
24 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 32-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that 
tying contracts should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANrrrR.UST PARADOX, 380-81 (1978) (suggesting that ties be deemed per se legal); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 182 (1976) ("The prohibition against tie-ins 
ought to be radically curtailed, and in the absence of a general prohibition of system-
atic price discrimination eliminated."); Tyler A. Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se 
Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REv. 1235, 1237 (1980) (suggesting that 
tying should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); Keith K. Wollenberg, Note, An 
Economic Analysis of Tie-in Sales: Re-examining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REV. 737, 
756 (1987) (advocating Rule of Reason analysis). 
25 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37-41 (O'Connor,]., concurring); Will v. Compre-
hensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.); 
Wollenberg, supra note 24, at 758-59. It should be noted that the Rule of Reason 
approach advocated by the Chicago School in this context differs substantially from 
that currently employed by the courts. Under the approach now in vogue, a plaintiff 
need not establish the existence of market power in either the tying or tied product 
markets in order to prevail under the Rule of Reason. See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom 
Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 482-85 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane); 
Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 796-98 (1st Cir. 1988). But see Digital 
Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(Easterbrook,].) (holding that "substantial market power is an indispensable ingredi-
ent" when a tying contract is challenged under the Rule of Reason). 
26 Cf William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
933, 936 (1987) (arguing that the current Rule of Reason rubric governing vertical 
restraints is virtually a rule of per se legality). 
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their judicial counterparts, approach antitrust questions from radi-
cally different premises. To Chicagoans, for instance, "consumer 
welfare"-usually defined as "allocative efficiency"-is the only objec-
tive of the antitrust laws, and thus the sole normative criterion for 
evaluating trade restraints.27 Under this approach, a trade restraint or 
merger is deemed reasonable so long as its benefits outweigh its costs, 
even if it results in higher prices for consumers.28 To Traditionalists, 
by contrast, antitrust laws promote a whole host of values, economic, 
social, and political, that cannot be encapsulated in an economic 
rubric such as "allocative efficiency" or "consumer welfare," however 
defined.29 
27 The classic articulation of this position appears in BORK, supra note 24, at 72-89; 
see, e.g., id. at 89 ("[T)he case is ovenvhelming for judicial adherence to the single goal 
of consumer welfare in the interpretation of the antitrust laws."). There are many 
elaborations. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and 
the "Com= Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661, 662-73 (1982) (arguing 
that the Sherman Act is sufficiently open-ended to accommodate changed readings 
suggested by advances in economics); Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986) (defending the Chicago School's efficiency-based ideol-
ogy); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1247-51 
(1993) (suggesting that the Sherman Act could be read to invite changed readings in 
light of new economic theories). For an argument that the allocative efficiency ap-
proach is the one that is most in tune with modern Supreme Court precedent, see 
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 567-70 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,]., dissent-
ing in part). 
28 See BORK, supra note 24, at 82-89; Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust 
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18, 18-21 (1968) (arguing that 
many mergers enhance allocative efficiency despite increased prices); infra note 102. 
This approach, of course, constitutes the adoption of a "Kaldor-Hicks" benchmark to 
govern the appropriateness vel non of economic regulation. Under this framework, a 
practice is not condemned if those who benefit from it could compensate those who 
are harmed, and still have wealth left over. See J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social 
Income, 7 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 105 (1940); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Econom-
ics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); see also Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 239-40 (1985) 
(discussing the adoption of the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency by the Chicago 
School). 
29 See David W. Barnes, Revolutionary Antitrust: Efficiency, Ideology, and Democracy, 58 
U. CIN. L. REv. 59, 60-61 (1989) (describing the "non-efficiency" goals of antitrust laws 
as "the satisfaction of intangible aspirations, for an appropriate distribution of wealth, 
for economic opportunity, security, and choice, and for political freedom"); William]. 
Curran III, Beyond Economic Concepts and Categories: A Democratic Reftguration of Antitrust 
Law, 31ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 349, 349 (1987) (suggesting that efficiency-based court deci-
sions "deny life and conceal our collective humanity ... , destroying justice and de-
mocracy"); Fox, supra note 23, at 1140-42, 1146-55 (discussing the Traditionalists' goals 
for antitrust laws, including "dispersion of economic power and easing of access to 
markets" (footnote omitted)); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A Sullivan, Antitrust-
Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 936, 942-44, 970 (1987) ("The antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competi-
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Moreover, even if the debate is confined to economic values, Tra-
ditionalists are quick to point out that the static allocative efficiency 
standard employed by Chicago is not the only metric for gauging the 
economic consequences of a practice.3° Furthermore, unlike Chica-
goans, Traditionalists approach non-standard contracts such as ties 
"inhospitably," and thus are more likely to cop.clude that such agree-
ments are anticompetitive, even when judged under the allocative 
efficiency standard applied by the Chicago School.31 Finally, Tradi-
tionalists are more likely to see economic value in the competitive 
process itself, even where static models might suggest that a practice 
will not result in competitive harm.32 Two arguments that begin from 
tion as a process, to curb coercive or exploitative market behavior, and to preserve an 
environment conducive to rivalrous behavior among competitors."); Edwin]. Hughes, 
The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why it Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 
265 (1994) (explaining that the Traditionalists' primary goal is "to remedy what they 
assert to be various forms of damaging and unfair competition"); Robert Pitofsky, The 
Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1051 (1979) (asserting that the 
Chicago School's approach neglects several vital "political values" of antitrust law); see 
also infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
30 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 28, at 239-40 (arguing that the efficiency model 
ignores real-world conditions); Rudolph]. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 
1990 DUKE LJ. 263, 303-05 & n.164 (noting tpat there are "serious difficulties" with 
equating economic efficiency and wealth maximization, and taking issue with Richard 
Posner's attempts to justify efficiency as a basis for antitrust law); see also Robert H. 
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAsTINGS LJ. 65, 82-93 (1982) (exploring the efficiency 
justification); supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
'
1 See Stanley Robinson, 1968 N.Y. ST. B.A ANTITRUST L. SYMl'. 29 ("I approach 
[vertical] restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in 
the tradition of antitrust law." (introducing and quoting Donald Turner)); see also 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 715 
(1982) (discussing inhospitality tradition); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 
GEO. LJ. 271, 272-73 (1987) (same); supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
'
2 See Fox, supra note 23, at 1169 (describing the "competition as process" justifica-
tion for antitrust law); William K. Jones, Concerted Refusals to Deal and the Producer Interest 
in Antitrust, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 73, 81-82 (1989) (criticizing recent Supreme Court deci-
sions under the Rule of Reason); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. 
Image Technical Services, Inc.-Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 
759, 760 (1994) (suggesting that the Court in Eastman Kodak found an antitrust viola-
tion based on "the legitimacy and process values of antitrust"). The conflict between 
Traditionalists and Chicagoans on this point is exemplified by the dispute in the case 
law over whether the unfair exclusion of a competitor from the market, absent a show-
ing of an anticompetitive effect, violates the Sherman Act. Compare Fishman v. Estate 
of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 532-38 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that defendant "monopolized" 
a market that could support only one firm), with id. at 563-77 (Easterbrook,]., dissent-
ing in part) (arguing that the replacement of one monopolist with another cannot 
injure competition, even if the means of replacement are unfair), and Brunswick 
Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (same); 
compare also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (finding a 
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such different premises, it seems, cannot "end up" in the same 
place.33 
The gridlock that currently characterizes the debate and resulting 
jurisprudence about ties is not, in fact, inevitable. Instead, that 
gridlock stems from the Chicago School's insistence that a static, 
price-theoretic model is the sole lens through which to evaluate the 
economic origins and consequences of tying arrangements.34 The 
application of this model to the real world, characterized as it is by 
product differentiation and transaction costs, seems to confirm the 
Traditionalists' assumption that all tying contracts-even those that 
Chicagoans deem beneficial-are the result of "forcing," that is, the 
use of market power to coerce their acceptance. 
Indeed, although Chicagoans seem implicitly to take issue with 
the Traditionalist assumption that all ties are the result of forcing, 
they concede, in fact, assert, that most such contracts are the result of 
economic coercion. This general agreement with Traditionalist as-
sumptions about the origin of such contracts leaves the proper anti-
trust treatment of ties highly dependent upon purely normative 
premises about the ultimate goals of the antitrust laws. More pre-
cisely, once it is conceded that such contracts are usually the result of 
forcing, Chicago's favorable attitude toward them depends upon an 
indifference to the presence of such coercion, as well as the assump-
tion that allocative efficiency is the sole criterion for evaluating trade 
restraints generally. Because Traditionalists are unwilling to abandon 
their normative hostility toward both coercion and the allocative-
efficiency standard, any attempt by Chicagoans to convince them to 
renounce their support for a per se rule is destined to fail. Moreover, 
although the Supreme Court, like Chicagoans, has rejected the Tradi-
tionalist assumption that all ties are imposed by market power, it has 
also rejected Chicago's normative premises in this context several 
group boycott to be per se illegal, without regard to competitive effect, because it 
excluded one merchant from the market), with Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. 
Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (finding 
that conspiracy to eliminate a single competitor, without more, cannot violate the 
antitrust laws). 
,., Cf. Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 137-39 (suggesting that antitrust cases decided 
in 1984, includingJ~er.son Parish, reflected the tension between conflicting visions of 
antitrust law). 
54 See Posner, supra note 23, at 928 (stating that the chief distinction of the Chi-
cago School of antitrust analysis is that it views antitrust questions solely through the 
"lens of price theory"); see also Jacobs, supra note 23, at 228-30 (elaborating on the 
price-theoretic foundations of Chicago School analysis). 
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times. As a result, it is highly unlikely, particularly in light of the doc-
trine of stare decisis, that Chicagoans will be able to convince the 
Justices to jettison the Modern version of the per se rule. 
The Chicago approach, however, does not supply the only alter-
native to that adopted by the Traditionalists. The "New Institutional 
Economics" ("NIE"), which explicitly incorporates transaction costs 
and product differentiation into its mode of analysis, provides a far 
more robust account of the economic origins of tying contracts than 
either the Chicago or the Traditional approach.35 Specifically, the 
NIE suggests that a significant proportion of tying contracts are a 
form of voluntary partial integration designed to overcome various 
types of market failure that result from high transaction costs and the 
complementarity between tied and tying products. Moreover, far 
from involving the coercive forcing that Traditionalists attribute to 
these contracts, and about which Chicagoans are indifferent, such 
integration can occur through a process of contract formation that 
does not involve any exercise of market power. 
Of course, the mere fact that the NIE provides the most complete 
account of the economic origins of tying contracts d~es not, ipso 
facto, require the abandonment of the Traditional approach or a 
change in Modern doctrine. It is conceivable, for instance, that the 
normative premises on which Traditionalists rely still require hostility 
towards ties even in the face of the new learning. Moreover, it seems 
possible that considerations of stare decisis compel the Supreme 
Court to adhere to its current middle ground, even if the NIE ex-
plains the origin of tying contracts more completely than previous 
accounts did. In short, the NIE might be a boon to economists, but 
less useful for lawyers and judges working with a statute passed in 
1890 and interpreted countless times by a Court loathe to reverse 
itself yet again. 
Close analysis, however, demonstrates that the NIE does, in fact, 
require rejection of the Traditional approach, as well as the aban-
donment of Modern doctrine. Although Traditionalists claim to ab-
jure reliance upon rigid economic assumptions in favor of a strictly 
normative approach, their approach to ties, as well as that taken by 
current law, is in fact based upon purely economic premises. Surpris-
ingly, proponents of the NIE have failed to recognize its implications 
55 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 1HE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 1-42 
(1985) (describing historical development and distinguishing features of the NIE); 
R.H. Coase, TheNatureoftheFirm, 4ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386,386 (1937). 
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for these premises and, thus, for Traditional or Modem tying doc-
trine. As shown below, however, the NIE lays the groundwork for a 
far more powerful critique of these approaches than that leveled by 
Chicago-a critique that does not depend upon price theory or the 
controversial normative premises that inform the Chicago School 
approach. By demonstrating that tying contracts can and often do 
arise absent the exercise of market power, the NIE undermines the 
economic foundation for the Traditional hostility toward such con-
tracts. This foundation, ironically, rests in part upon the sort of 
"blackboard economics" that Traditionalists are quick to ascribe 
(correctly, in some cases) to Chicagoans, and that the Supreme Court 
recently rejected in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,36 
a decision applauded by Traditionalists. 
More precisely, the NIE refutes the Traditional presumption that 
all tying contracts are necessarily "forced" on purchasers through 
some exercise of market power, as well as the presumption underly-
ing Modem doctrine to the effect that ties obtained by firms with 
significant market power are necessarily the result of such forcing. By 
undermining these purely economic premises of the Traditional and 
Modem approaches, the NIE vitiates the justification for the per se 
rule against ties, in its Traditional or Modem form. Thus, even if one 
adopts the normative premises underlying the Modem and Tradi-
tional approaches to the effect that the antitrust laws should view 
"coercive" contracts with hostility, the NIE vindicates the general ap-
proach-Rule of Reason treatment-advocated for so long by many 
members of the Chicago School. 
Finally, unlike the rationale for change advanced by Chicagoans, 
a change premised on the application of the NIE is consistent with 
the doctrine of stare decisis. Although adoption of the Chicago ap-
proach would require the Court to reject long-held normative prem-
ises about the purposes of the antitrust laws, the NIE merely calls on 
the Court to revise tying doctrine in light of a new understanding of 
the way in which such agreements can be formed. Indeed, refusal to 
reform current law in light of the NIE would leave the Court continu-
ally reaffirming a rule that has no economic basis, thus undermining 
its own credibility and that of antitrust law generally. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I traces the develop-
ment of the Traditional approach to ties as well as that approach's 
ss 504 U.S. 451, 474-78 (1992) (holding that an apparent absence of market power 
in the primary tying market did not require summary judgment for the defendant). 
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influence on Modern doctrine and, in so doing, documents the fail-
ure of the price-theoretic Chicago response. Part II begins by draw-
ing lessons from Chicago's failure and offers a different paradigm-
the New Institutional Economics. This paradigm, it will be seen, sug-
gests that ties can constitute partial vertical integration unrelated to 
any exercise or expectation of market power. Part III applies this 
insight to the economic assumptions that underlie the Traditional 
approach as well as current law. Mter a demonstration that these 
assumptions are false and that the Traditional and Modern versions 
of the per se rule should be abandoned, the Article makes sugges-
tions regarding the reconstruction of tying doctrine. 
I. THE GREAT DEBATE: CHICAGO TAKES ON THE 
TRADITIONALISTS (AND LOSES) 
Because the New Institutional Economics is of relatively recent 
vintage, it has had little occasion to influence antitrust law.37 Courts 
fashioning tying doctrine, then, have been compelled to choose be-
tween two competing approaches-Traditional and Chicago School. 
In order to understand Modern doctrine and the implications that 
the NIE might have for it, it is necessary to consider the Traditional 
approach, Chicago's response, and the reaction of the Supreme 
Court to these alternate frameworks. Such a consideration will both 
shed light on the failure of the Chicago approach and suggest criteria 
that any new paradigm for approaching tying arrangements must 
meet. 
A. The Traditional Approach to Ties: Constructing 
the Chimera of Forcing 
The Traditional view of tying contracts is relatively straightfor-
ward. By conditioning the sale of one product (the tying product) on 
an agreement to purchase a second product (the tied product), the 
seller uses its economic power over the tying product to "force" cus-
tomers to take an unwanted tied item, thus gaining an "unearned" 
'
7 As shown below, the NIE traces its origins to an article published by Ronald 
Coase over sixty years ago. See Coase, supra note 35; see also infra notes 201-11, 220-24 
and accompanying text. According to Coase himself, however, this article has been 
"much cited and little used." R.H. COASE, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Re-
search, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 57, 62 (1988). Only recently have 
Coase's ideas on the subject been widely appreciated and applied. See WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 35, at 2-12 (tracing the rise of the NIE). 
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advantage over competing sellers in the market for that product.38 
Such an exercise of power, Traditionalists say, can take two forms. 
First, the seller can simply refuse outright to sell the tying product 
separately, instead offering the tying product only as part of a 
"package" with the tied product. 39 Second, the seller can offer to sell 
the tying product separately at a prohibitive price, providing a dis-
count on this price to those consumers who agree to purchase the 
tied product as well.40 Each form of coercion, of course, is indistin-
guishable from the other. After all, an outright refusal to sell the 
tying product separately is no different from an "offer" to sell it sepa-
rately at an infinite price and thus identical to an offer to sell it sepa-
rately at a prohibitive price. 
Indeed, Traditionalists generally assume that all ties are, in fact, 
the result of some exercise of market power and thus coercive 
"forcing." Put another way, Traditionalists assume that without some 
market power, no firm can obtain agreement to such a contract. One 
scholar, for instance, states that "if there indeed is a tie, the defendant 
must have had market power to impose it, and must have used that 
power."41 Others, although purporting to distinguish between 
ss See WilliAM H.S. STEVENS, UNFAIR COMPETITION 75 (1917); Bauer, supra note 
22, at 287 ("The traditional judicial objection to tying arrangements is that they may 
foreclose competitors of the seller from opportunities to make sales of the tied prod-
uct. The seller uses the leverage of the tying product to obtain sales in the tied prod-
uct market, thereby excluding its competitors on grounds unrelated to the inherent 
qualities of the tied product." (footnote omitted)); Turner, supra note 22, at 59-61. 
s
9 See Bauer, supra note 22, at 292, 332-33. 
40 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969) 
(arguing that ties are imposed through a reduction in the price of the tying product 
that induces the purchaser to agree to purchase the tied product as well); Turner, 
supra note 22, at 67, 75 (arguing that there is no distinction, for tying purposes, be-
tween an outright refusal to deal and reducing the price of the tying product in order 
to "coerce" acceptance of the tie); see also Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and Economic Ap-
praisal of the "New" Shennan and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE LJ. 293, 322-24 (1954) (same). 
•• Bauer, supra note 22, at 332; see also CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TuRNER, 
ANrrrR.usrPOUCY 157 (1959) ("[T]ying implies some market power on the part of the 
seller practicing it. ... The power frequently arises because of legal monopoly enjoyed 
by the seller in the tying good-a patent or a copyright-but it need not. Some power 
in the market for the tying product will suffice, whatever its basis.");jOHN PERRY 
MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 199 (1941) (same); LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ, FREE EN-
TERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 171 ( 1952) (same); STEVENS, supra note 38, at 
55 (same); Bauer, supra note 22, at 334-35 ("Absent some market power, sellers could 
never impose a tie-in at all."); William B. Lockhart & Howard R Sacks, The Relevance of 
Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, 65 HARV. L. REv. 913, 945-46 (1952) ("[T]he supplier imposes a tying ar-
rangement on others, not because his version of the tied product is superior, but 
because he has a strong position in the controlled product industry .... [M]arket 
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"voluntary" and "coercive" ties, assume that any tie memorialized in a 
written contract is coercive,42 an assumption that still animates current 
43 law. Indeed, Professor Donald Turner, one of the most cogent ex-
ponents of the Traditional approach, posited three possible explana-
tions for ties: (1) imposition through "power over the tying product, 
however slight"; (2) a preference by buyers for a package sale; or (3) 
superiority of the "tied product 'on the merits."'44 Only the first ex-
planation, he argued, could account for contractual tying require-
ments, as no contract would be necessary if buyers "preferred" a 
package sale or if the tied product was superior.45 Thus, he con-
control over the controlled product enables him, within limits, to force upon the 
market his version of the tied product as well."); Slawson, Reanalyzing Ti~in Doctrine, 
supra note 22, at 259 (stating that the existence "of monopoly power ... is demon-
strated by the tie-in itself'). But cf. Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through 
Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 547 (1985) ("It is not, however, obvious that market 
power should be central to the courts' inquiries in [tying analysis] because the degree 
of extant market power may not facilitate determining which among competing ex-
planations for observed behavior is the most plausible."). 
More recently, Professor Slawson seems to have retreated from his earlier assertion 
that market power is necessary to impose a tie, noting that, even in a perfectly com-
petitive market, a seller could induce acceptance of such a tie via a below-cost dis-
count. See W. David Slawson, Excluding Competition Without Monopoly Power. The Use of 
Tying Arrangements to Exploit Market Failure, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 476 (1991) 
("Monopoly power is not only not necessary, it is not even relevant to how difficult or 
easy it is to impose a tie-in, or to how attractive the offer of the tie-in will be to buy-
ers."). But cf. id. at 461-62 (asserting that the logic of Northern Pacific Railway Co., that 
the existence of a tie itself establishes monopoly power, is "unassailable"). Such a 
discount, of course, is indistinguishable from the "coercion" involved when market 
power is used to impose a tie. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Professor 
Slawson does not, however, consider the possibility, central to the argument here, that 
no such discount is necessary to obtain agreement to a tying contract. See supra note 
22. 
42 See, e.g., EARL W. KINTNER, 2 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 250-51 (1980) ("Under 
the traditional approach, a contract provision requiring the buyer to purchase the tied 
product in order to secure the tying product is sufficient proof of coercion. It remains 
well established that the mere presence of a contractual provision, absent actual en-
forcement, is sufficient. Coercion is present by virtue of the contractual power to 
enforce the tie-in."). 
<! SeeTic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions, Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1416-17 (11th Cir. 
1987); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1231-32 
(W.D. Tenn. 1995) (dicta}; Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 
(N.D. Cal. 1984), affd, 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). 
" Turner, supra note 22, at 60-61. 
'
5 See id.; see also Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 
(1953) ("[A]ny intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choos-
ing buyers to select it over others, anyway."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 
U.S. 293, 306 (1949) ("If the manufacturer's brand of the tied product is in fact supe-
rior to that of competitors, the buyer will presumably choose it anyway."); WarrenS. 
1997] 7YING DOCTRINE AND THE NIE 15 
eluded, any contract conditioning the sale of one product on an 
agreement to purchase another is necessarily forced on the purchaser 
through the exercise of market power.46 Indeed, even some commen-
tators affiliated with the Chicago School seem to adopt, if only implic-
itly, the same assumption.47 
In evaluating tying contracts, then, Traditionalists-who have 
long criticized Chicagoans for relying too heavily upon doctrinaire 
economic models48-themselves begin with the purely economic as-
sumption that every tying agreement is forced on the purchaser 
through an exercise of market power. Of course, the mere exercise 
of market power is not inherently suspect: A firm with a monopoly, 
for instance, is free to charge whatever the market will bear.49 Accord-
ing to Traditionalists, however, such forcing or "leverage" is inher-
ently coercive, and has several interrelated negative consequences of 
Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Anarysis After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfec-
tions, 62 ANTITRusr LJ. 263, 285-86 (1994) (noting that purchasers may "recognize 
through their purchases the efficiencies generated by the packaged marketing of two 
products"); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 41, at 946 (stating that if "the requirements 
contracts [were] beneficial ... buyers [would] agree to the contracts without the use 
of a tying device"); infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. 
~6 See Turner, supra note 22, at 62-63; see also KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 41, at 
157 ("[T]ying implies some market power on the part of the seller practicing it."). 
47 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 24, at 175-76 (noting that the benefits of "imposed" 
tie must be weighed against costs); WardS. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the 
Leverage Problem, 67YAU. LJ. 19, 20 (1957) ("To sell or lease one commodity, the tying 
product, advantageously on condition that it be used with another commodity, the 
tied product, requires the existence of monopoly power-in economic theory, the 
ability to control supply."). 
48 See, e.g., Curran, supra note 29, at 361-65 (criticizing the adoption of economic 
reasoning in antitrust law); John J. Flynn, Legal Reasoning, Antitrust Policy and the Social 
"Science" of Economics, 33 ANTITRusr BULL. 713, 714 (1988) (stating that even though 
"law is dependent upon a number of disciplines (including economics) for in-
sights ... the current attempt to make one school of economic thought the exclusive 
means for determining the relevance, meaning and application of both the rules and 
the facts of legal disputes is a serious mistake"); Eleanor M. Fox, The Future ofthePerSe 
Rule: Two VISions at War with One Another, 29 WASHBURN L. REV. 200, 206 (1990) 
(contrasting Chicago School's supposed excessive reliance on a "minimalist model as 
scientific truth" and "microeconomics" with Traditionalists' reliance upon "law"); 
Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 835, 841 (1987) ("Most antitrust issues, in short, are political in nature; they are 
not matters on which consensus can be achieved by turning them over to techno-
crats."). 
~9 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) ("[T]he law 
draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely enhancing the 
price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on 
competition in the market for a tied product, on the other."). 
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an economic and political variety.5° First, leverage can assist the seller 
in obtaining a monopoly over the tied product, thereby enhancing its 
profits.51 Second, such leverage forecloses competitors of the seller 
from access to those customers governed by the agreement, thereby 
short-circuiting the competitive process, a result that offends eco-
nomic as well as social and political values served by head-to-head 
competition.52 Third, independent of any effect on competition, such 
contracts coerce consumers into making choices they would not oth-
erwise make, thereby lowering their utility. 53 · Fourth and finally, such 
leverage can enhance the seller's power over the tying product by 
raising barriers to entry into the tying product market. Specifically, 
when the tying product can only be used in conjunction with the tied 
product, the use of a tying contract to eliminate independent sources 
of the tied product can prevent entry by sellers of the tying product 
who are not able to enter the tied product market. 54 
50 See Jean Wegman Bums, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 
379, 414-16 (1991) (arguing that the negative consequences include injuries to a 
buyer's freedom of choice and disruption of competition in the tied market); Page, 
supra note 21, at 35-38 (same). 
51 See Turner, supra note 22, at 62 (stating that a major purpose of a tie is the re-
straint of competition in the tied product). 
52 See Ross, supra note 1, at 279 (arguing that, in high technology markets, a rule 
"[r]equiring the sale of the tying product alone will stimulate further innovation by 
rivals" and noting that the Traditional approach reflects "Madisonian concerns about 
discretionary power"); STEVENS, supra note 38, at 75-76 (arguing that tying contracts 
disadvantage "more efficient" sellers of the tied product); Fox, supra note 23, at 1189 
(stating that "traditional antitrust values that protect access to markets on the basis of 
merits, not leverage, are exceedingly strong"); Kurt A Strasser, An Antitrust Policy for 
Tying Arrangements, 34 EMORY LJ. 253, 283-84 (1985) ("[T]hese arrangements can 
interfere with the populist goal of preserving individual entrepreneurial opportu-
nity."); see also United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 458 (1922) 
(stating that the coercion inherent in ties limits the opportunities of sellers of the tied 
product); cf. Fox & Sullivan, supra note 29, at 960-61 (discussing economic benefits of 
process-oriented approach to antitrust law). 
" See Ross, supra note 1, at 279 n.28 ("[L]ack of free choice also offends populist 
conceptions inherent in the antitrust law."); Bauer, supra note 22, at 299-302 (stating 
that an "effect of all tie-ins is the deprivation of the buyer's free choice"); Slawson, 
Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 264 ("[T]ie-ins reduce competition by 
limiting buyers' options."); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 
32, 63 (1918) (noting the government's argument that ties limit the freedom of pur-
chasers); Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer 
Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661, 667 (1982) (noting that the injury from tying 
contracts described by Traditionalists is akin to that of a tort). 
54 See DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 201 (1958); Bauer, supra 
note 22, at 288 (stating that "[b]arriers to entry are raised by increasing the probability 
that the company will have to enter" the tying and the tied markets). 
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Now, Traditionalists do not (quite) assert that each and every ty-
ing contract poses the dangers outlined above. Instead, they 
(grudgingly) admit that some tying contracts, on balance anyway, 
might be beneficial.55 This concession, one might think, would pre-
vent the adoption of any per se rule against such agreements. Mter 
all, antitrust courts ordinarily do not declare a class. of contracts per se 
unlawful unless the agreements in question are the sort which "would 
always or almost al·ways tend to restrict competition and decrease out-
put."56 Proof that some ties are beneficial would therefore seem to 
require rejection of a per se rule, in favor of analysis of tying contracts 
pursuant to the Rule of Reason, under which courts carefully assess, 
on a case-by-case basis, whether the harm produced by a particular 
contract out\veighs its benefits.57 Still, Traditionalists advocate the 
adoption of a per se rule against all such contracts, arguing that any 
benefits associated with them can ordinarily be achieved through 
means less restrictive of competition. 58 At the very most, they concede 
55 See Bauer, supra note 22, at 324-27 (advocating four exceptions to the per se 
rule); Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 275-76 (approving of pur-
ported judicial recognition of affirmative defenses to otherwise per se illegal ties); 
Turner, supra note 22, at 63-64 (discussing the "two possible [legitimate] interests of 
consequence" of tying). 
56 Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (quoting 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
289-90 (1985) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979))); 
see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279 (1997) ("Per se treatment is appropri-
ate '[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict 
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.'" (alteration in original) 
(quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)) ). 
57 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 & n.15 
(1977) (describing Rule of Reason analysis); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 
246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918) (same); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2, 32-36 (1985) (O'Connor,]., concurring) (arguing that a per se rule for 
tying contracts should be rejected in favor of a Rule of Reason approach); Town 
Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 482-95 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en bane) (analyzing a tie under Rule of Reason when the plaintiff did not 
make out a per se violation). 
58 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) 
("[T]ying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be 
achieved in some less restrictive way .... "); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 
293, 306 (1949) (rejecting "the protection of goodwill" as a justification for ties, 
"because specification of the type and quality of the product to be used with the tying 
device is protection enough"); Bauer, supra note 22, at 324-27 (noting that "[t]ying 
arrangements rarely yield competitive benefits"); Louis B. Schwartz, Potential Impair-
ment of Competition-The Impact ifStandard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the 
Standard if Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 26-27 (1949) (arguing 
that instead of tying arrangements to protect goodwill, "the seller [can] insist[] that 
replacement parts meet his standards of efficiency, without prejudicing competition 
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that all ties should be deemed "per se" unlawful, subject to proof by 
the seller that benefits of the tie outweigh any anticompetitive effects, 
proof that is subject to a rigorous "less restrictive alternative" re-
• 59 qmrement. 
This Traditional approach to tying contracts has influenced the 
Supreme Court in varying degrees over the years. At one time, for 
instance, the Court appeared to have adopted, in its entirety, the 
Traditional view of the economic origin of such contracts. In Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States, for instance, the Court stated: "In the 
usual case only the prospect of reducing competition would persuade 
a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of the supply of 
the tying device, whether conferred by patent monopoly or otherwise 
obtained, could induce a buyer to enter one."60 The Court did not 
cite any judicial authority for this proposition or explain what it 
meant by "usual case," that is, whether it believed there to be 
"unusual" cases in which a firm can obtain an agreement to a tie 
without exercising market power. The Court did, however, cite a 
Note in the Columbia Law Review that reached conclusions that gener-
ally track those of the opinion and thus shed light on the Court's 
thinking. 51 That Note, relying upon an economist's statement that all 
tying contracts, whether beneficial or not, are "imposed" through 
some exercise of market power, asserted that the ability to induce 
agreement to a tie was "generally dependent on the market dominance 
of the seller."62 This "generality," according to the Note, was limited 
by two exceptions: First, those instances where, despite a lack of na-
by requiring that the parts be bought from him"); Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, 
supra note 22, at 275-76; see also Kaplow, supra note 41, at 542 ("[P]rice discrimination, 
and many other objectives, can often be pursued as well or better without tying ar-
rang~ments."}. 
59 See Bauer, supra note 22, at 337 (noting that if "a seller can show that the use of 
tying arrangements would produce specific benefits that outweigh any harm to com-
petition, the ties should be permitted"); Oppenheim, supra note 22, at 1181 (arguing 
that all ties should be presumed unlawful, subject to proof by "clear and convincing 
evidence that the beneficial economic effects outweigh the tying clause clog on actual 
or potential competition"); Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 
693-95 (suggesting that a tie-in arrangement is permissible if it satisfies the Rule of 
Reason by its "public benefit[s] outweigh[ing] the restraint's competitive harm"); see 
also Fox, supra note 23, at 1189 n.179, 1190 n.182 (asserting that a tie is justifiable if it 
promises benefits to consumers and a less restrictive alternative is unavailable). 
60 337 U.S. at 306 (emphasis added). 
61 See id. (citing Note, Section 3 of the Clayton Act-Coexisting Standards of Legality?, 49 
COLUM. L. REV. 241, 246 (1949)). 
62 Note, supra note 61, at 246 & n.40 (emphasis added) (citing MILLER, supra note 
41, at 199). 
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tional market dominance, the seller "occupied an important market 
position in a particular locality," thereby inducing acceptance of the 
tie; and second, those instances where the seller's "competitors also 
make it their practice" to adopt such contracts.63 The first exception, 
of course, is no exception at all, but instead a recognition that some 
amount of market power less than that provided by a monopoly will 
suffice to impose a tie.64 Similarly, the second exception does not 
seem to contemplate formation of a tying contract without market 
power, but instead apparently assumes that the uniformity of contrac-
tual terms suggests a collective exercise of market power by all market 
participants. This assumption is akin to the assertion by some courts 
and judges that a seller possesses unequal bargaining power for pur-
poses of determining whether a contractual clause is unconscionable 
if all firms in an industry adopt the same standard terms. 65 
Mter Standard Oi~ the Court appeared to back away, if only 
slightly, from the extreme assertion that all ties are the result of an 
exercise of market power. In several subsequent cases, the Justices 
seemed to suggest that market power was, in fact, an independent 
requirement, although relatively easy to prove.66 By the mid-1970s, 
63 Id. 
6< CJ. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956) 
(recognizing that product differentiation can confer market power that falls short of 
illegal monopoly power). 
65 See, e.g., O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 155 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Ill. 
1958) (Bristow,]., dissenting) (stating that tenants had no choice but to sign a lease 
containing a provision included in the leases of all area landlords); Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A2d 69, 87 (NJ. 1960) (finding that"gross inequality of 
bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile industry is thus 
apparent" when almost all car dealers require that purchasers sign the same standard-
ized warranties); see also Craswell, supra note 53, at 680 (discussing the similarity be-
tween objections to ties and objections to purportedly "unconscionable" contractual 
provisions). Indeed, there appears to be a powerful symbiosis between the views of 
Legal Realists on unequal bargaining power in contract law and the definition of 
coercion in antitrust law generally. See Page, supra note 21, at 11-23. The remarks of 
one scholar capture the Realist approach to bargaining power nicely: "Standard con-
tracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful 
industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of 
their own making upon a vast host of vassals." Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,640 (1943). 
66 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969) 
(suggesting that the "proper focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to 
raise prices"); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) ("The very 
existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of defen-
dant's great power .... "). Indeed, some have suggested that these decisions, particu-
larly Fortner Ent~es, established that the mere existence of a tie requires a finding of 
economic power. See Craswell, supra note 53, at 671 ("[A]t one time, the Supreme 
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the Court appeared to tighten up this requirement, rejecting the im-
plication of some earlier cases that the mere existence of a tie created 
a presumption of economic power.67 In Jefferson Parish, the Court 
made this departure explicit, holding that there could be no danger 
of forcing unless the seller possessed market power, power that had to 
be proven independendy.68 The Court, however, also adopted the 
converse assumption, namely, that the existence of such power, without 
more, establishes that it has been employed to "force" the tie.69 In-
deed, that is the avowed purpose of the market-power inquiry in the 
tying context: to determine whether the tie has been obtained by 
means of"forcing."70 
Although the Court has wavered in its acceptance of Traditional 
economic assumptions, it has steadfastly agreed with the purely nor-
mative premises that inform the Traditional approach.71 Indeed, 
while the Jefferson Parish Court confirmed the departure from the 
Traditionalist assumption that all ties result from forcing, it simulta-
neously adhered to longstanding precedent to the effect that forcing, 
Court seemed to indicate that the fact that the seller was able to insist on a tie was 
itself sufficient evidence of market power."); cf. Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 518 (White, 
J., dissenting) ("I question that buyers' acceptance of the tie-in-the simple fact that 
there are customers-will always suffice to prove market power in the tying product."). 
The better view, I think, is that these cases stand for the proposition that the existence 
of a tie establishes a rebuttable presumption that market power is present. See 
Kenneth W. Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower nor a 
Lender Be", 1969 SUP. Gr. REV. 1, 25-26 (arguing that a close reading of Fortner Enter-
prises suggests that a tie does not, ipso facto, establish economic power). 
67 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (mere 
existence of the tying contract is insufficient to establish "the kind of economic power 
which Fortner had the burden of proving ... to prevail in this litigation"); see also supra 
notes 12, 17 and accompanying text (detailing evolution of market-power require-
ment). 
68 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-18 (1984);seealsoPage, 
supra note 21, at 64-65 ("Plainly, the Court no longer accepts the view that vertical 
relationships are inherently coercive."); cf. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 438 (1920) 
(Brandeis,]., dissenting) ("[W)hat approximately equal indhidual traders may do in 
honorable rivalry, may result in grave injustice and public injury, if done by a great 
corporation in a particular field of business which it is able to dominate. In other 
words, a method of competition fair among equals may be very unfair if applied where 
there is inequality of resources."). 
69 See]effersonParish, 466 U.S. at 15-18. 
70 See id. at 26 ("The question remains whether this arrangement involves the use 
of market power to force patients to buy services they would not otherwise purchase."); 
Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 504 (suggesting that the "proper focus of concern is whether 
the seller has the power to raise prices"). 
71 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POUCY 352 (1994) (noting that 
tying law is largely concerned "with the freedom of dealers or other purchasers to 
make individual business judgments"). 
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where present, establishes a violation itself, without regard to the exis-
tence of any competitive harm.72 While some lower courts entertain 
affirmative defenses to such "per se" illegal contracts, others take the 
position that "per se" means what it says, that is, that no justifications 
are permitted.73 The latter position seems more in line with Supreme 
Court precedent, including some language in Jefferson Parish itself. 74 
72 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15 (stating that per se condemnation is 
"appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable"); id. at 12-14 (noting that when 
forcing occurs, tying arrangements have been found unlawful); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) ("[Tying contracts] deny competitors free access 
to the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying require-
ments has a better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in 
another market."); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 
(1953) ("By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a 
seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied' prod-
uct's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market."); see also 
Page, supra note 21, at 63-64 (stating that "Justice Stevens' Jefferson Parish account of 
coercion in tying arrangements reflects the orthodox intentional vision"). 
75 See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 
468,477 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane) (asserting that even per se illegal tying contracts are 
subject to affirmative defenses); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz ofN. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 
1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (entertaining business-justification defense); cf. Alan J. 
Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Con-
tracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. Ill, 113-14 (1996) (critiquing current standards governing 
assertion of "franchise goodwill" affirmative defense to otherwise per se illegal fran-
chise tying contracts). But see Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs., Inc., 806 F.2d 953, 
957-58 (lOth Cir. 1986) (holding that affirmative defenses are not available to per se 
illegal tie); Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); Ringtown 
Wilbert Vault Works v. Schuylkill Mem'l Park, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 823, 827 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 
1986) (same). 
u See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25-26 n.42 ("We have also uniformly re-
jected ... 'goodwill' defenses for tying arrangements."). Contrary to the assumptions 
of some scholars, see, e.g., Baker, supra note 24, at 1257; Grimes, supra note 45, at 285 
n. 72; Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 275, the Supreme Court has 
never endorsed the assertion of such defenses. In asserting that the Court has sanc-
tioned such a defense, these authorities have relied upon the Supreme Court's per 
curiam decision in Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. United States, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), which 
affirmed the decision in favor of the United States in United States v. Jerrold Electronics 
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The United States did not cross petition in 
Jerrold; that is, it did not seek relief greater than it had obtained in the lower court. 
Instead, it simply defended the lower court's decision that the tie was no longer justi-
fied under the circumstances of that case, and that an injunction should therefore 
issue. See Motion of the United States to Affirm at 1-fJ, Jerrold Electronics (No. 631). 
Thus, the United States did not question the lower court's language to the effect that 
the tie had initially been justified as a means ofhelpingjerrold Electronics break into 
a new market. See id. at 7-8. The question whether the tie had, at one time, been 
justified, was thus not before the Court. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE§ 6.35, at 363 (7th ed. 1993); see also 10 PHILLIP E. A.REEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST 
LAW t 1760bl, at 359 (1996) ("On the defendant's appeal, the Supreme Court sum-
marily affirmed the judgment below and thus did not say whether the lower court 
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B. Chicago~ Response 
The Chicago School's response has been effusive. In academic 
articles, legal briefs, and judicial opinions, various scholars and judges 
who associate themselves with the Chicago School have long criticized 
the Traditional approach, as well as the middle ground currently 
staked out by the Supreme Court. Each of these criticisms, like the 
Chicago approach in general, flows from the usual Chicago School 
normative premises as well as a rigorous application of a price-
theoretic model to explain and evaluate the origins and effects of 
ties. 75 Price theory, of course, is the economics of undergraduate 
textbooks: Firms produce homogenous products (there is no prod-
uct differentiation), consumers possess perfect information, and 
transaction costs are not present.76 Employment of this model, in 
tum, constitutes a form of so-called "partial equilibrium welfare 
analysis," under which the harms flowing from a contract-the crea-
tion or enhancement of market power-are weighed against its bene-
fits-static efficiencies that reduce the cost of producing a product or 
• 77 
service. 
rightly approved the defense during the earlier period."); cJ. Arthur D. Austin, The 
Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 88, 116-18 
(arguing that the holding in Jerrold Electronics was based in part on a finding that only 
one product was involved, so that there could be no "tie" in the first place). 
75 See BORK, supra note 24, at 117 (arguing that "(t]here is no body of knowledge 
other than conventional price theory that can serve as a guide to the effects of busi-
ness behavior upon consumer welfare"); Posner, supra note 23, at 928 ("[Chicago 
School] conclusions resulted simply from viewing antitrust policy through the lens of 
price theory."); see also Jacobs, supra note 23, at 228-29 (describing price-theoretic basis 
of Chicago School approach). But cJ. Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Verlical Restraints: 
A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UClA L. REV. 143, 155-58 (1997) (arguing that, where 
vertical restraints are concerned, Chicago prescriptions do not depend upon price 
theory). 
76 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-12 
(1985) (describing the assumptions of price-theory model); Jacobs, supra note 23, at 
228 n.42 (describing assumptions of the price-theoretic model on which Chicagoans 
rely). One member of the Chicago School has vigorously defended the use of simpli-
fied models for antitrust analysis: 
What's wrong with models that contain 'unrealistic' assump-
tions? ... Newton's model of gravitation assumes a perfect vacuum. There 
aren't any perfect vacuums in this universe, but the model is still pretty use-
ful ... even though Einstein showed it to be wrong. Newtonian dynamics, 
flawed as they are, give very good approximations for practical use by people 
sending Voyager 2 to Neptune or baseballs to homeplate. 
Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1706. 
77 See BORK, supra note 2~, at 107 (illustrating the "[e]ffects on consumer welfare 
of a merger that restricts output and cuts costs"); WIUlAMSON, supra note 35, at 367-68 
(describing the dominance of this approach in economic analysis of antitrust law); 
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A consideration of each critique, and its relation to the Tradi-
tional approach, will reveal the limitations of the Chicago approach 
and suggest why, where tying arrangements are concerned, the Chi-
cago School has failed to win over either the Traditionalists or the 
Supreme Court. Unlike the Traditionalists, who view coercion with 
suspicion, Chicagoans see such "forcing" as, at best, a source of effi-
ciency gains and, at worst, competitively neutral. Indeed, instead of 
directly challenging the Traditionalist assertion that all ties are 
"forced" on purchases through the coercive exercise of market power, 
Chicagoans apparently assume that the presence or not of such coer-
cion is irrelevant, an assumption that rests on highly contestable 
normative assumptions about the goals of the antitrust laws. By fail-
ing to offer a theory of the formation of tying contracts-even those 
that are beneficial-that does not involve coercion, Chicagoans have 
left their conclusions vulnerable to changes in normative assumptions 
about the purposes of the antitrust laws as well as invocations of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Any attempt to unseat the per se rule, it 
seems, will require a different approach from that offered by Chicago. 
1. You Cannot Exercise Market Power Twice 
The most oft-repeated response to the Traditional approach flows 
from the microeconomic truism that no firm, even if it has market 
power, can exercise that power twice. As Judge Learned Hand once 
remarked, "substitutes are available for almost all commodities, and 
to raise the price enough is to evoke them. "78 Even a monopolist, 
then, cannot set an infinite price for its product. Instead, it will raise 
its price until, at the margin, the revenue foregone due to further 
increases and resulting lost sales is greater than that gained as con-
sumers pay higher prices for those items still purchased.79 
This truism in tum forms the basis for the following argument. 
Assume that a monopolist is charging its profit-maximizing price. 
Assume further, as Traditionalists do, that tied products are 
"unwanted." If this is the case, imposing a tie is equivalent to a price 
increase, an increase that, other things being equal, would leave the 
Arthur, supra note 14, at 361-62 (describing possible application of this model in the 
Rule of Reason context); Wesley J. Liebeler, Comments, 28 J.L. & ECON. 335, 335-36 
(1985) (asserting that "the rule of reason ... attempts to balance the gains from in-
creased efficiency against the losses from increased market power"); see also POSNER, 
supra note 24, at 8-22. 
78 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,426 (2d Cir. 1945). 
79 SeeGEORGEJ. STIGLER, THETHEORYOFPRICE 195 (3d ed.1966). 
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monopolist pricing above its profit-maximizing price.80 In order to 
impose a tie, then, and still maximize profits, a monopolist must 
charge a lower price for the tying product than it otherwise would, 
thereby forgoing a portion ofits monopoly profits.81 
The "recognition" that a seller must reduce the price of the tying 
product in order to induce acceptance of a tie is not new to Tradi-
tionalists. Mter all, the gravamen of their complaint is that ties are 
imposed through the exercise of market power, an exercise that in-
volves offering the tying product at a price below the monopoly price 
in order to induce acceptance of the tie.82 Indeed, one could say that, 
contrary to the suggestion of Chicagoans, Traditionalists have been 
practicing price theory all along!83 What is ·new, however, is the nor-
mative conclusion that Chicagoans draw from this recognition. Ac-
cording to Chicagoans, such an "imposition" of a tying 
arrangement-although coercive in the sense that it involves an exer-
cise of market power-is a zero-sum game, from the perspective of 
both monopolist and consumer. To "impose" a tie, the firm must 
price the tying product below the monopoly price level, thereby 
"convincing" purchasers to take the (unwanted) tied product as well. 
Any "harm" to consumers flowing from the purchase of the tied 
product at an inflated price is exactly offset by the benefit of purchas-
ing the tying product at a discount off the monopoly price.84 More-
over, even if a monopolist succeeds in obtaining a monopoly in the 
market for the tied product, it is not clear what it would gain. For, if 
the tying and tied products are complements, a firm with a monopoly 
over one can obtain all the monopoly profits possible.85 
80 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, at 217 (asserting that "a seller in competition 
could not impose an unwanted second product on a buyer unless the seller compen-
sated the buyer for taking the product"); Posner, supra note 23, at 926 ("A tie-in ... is 
not a rational method of obtaining a second source of monopoly profits .... "). 
81 See BORK, supra note 24, at 372-74; Posner, supra note 23, at 926 ("[A]n increase 
in the price charged for the tied product will ... reduce the price that the purchaser is 
willing to pay for the tying product."); see also Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, Inc., 858 F.2d 
792, 795 (1st Cir. 1988) (same). 
82 See supra notes 3840 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. 
84 See Ross, supra note 1, at 279 ("A policy focused on efficiency would not be 
concerned that consumers were forced to buy a product from one seller, so long as 
they were not paying a monopoly price."); Burns, supra note 50, at 418 (same); Page, 
supra note 21, at 62 ("Under the Chicago view, ... the limitation of a distributor's 
freedom [worked by a tying arrangement] is not coercive because it is inherently 
compensated."). 
85 See BORK, supra note 24, at 373 ("The tying arrangement ... is obviously not a 
means of gaining two monopoly profits from a single monopoly."); POSNER, supra note 
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Accordingly, although the Chicago School certainly concedes that 
it is possible to use monopoly power to impose a tie through "coercive 
forcing," it maintains that such imposition cannot lead to increased 
profits for firms and cannot harm consumers.86 The "harm" associ-
ated with such "coercion" is thus entirely illusory. Chicagoans con-
cede that some firms might misperceive their own self interest and 
attempt leverage strategies that are destined to fail; others might-as 
Traditionalists argue-seek power over the tied product simply for 
the sake of doing so.87 Yet even though such strategies involve coer-
cion, they are, to Chicagoans, of no concern to the antitrust laws.88 A 
"per se" rule designed to outlaw a practice that does not help mo-
nopolies or harm consumers does not make much sense.89 
2. It's Really Price Discrimination (and That's a Good Thing, Too!) 
If, as Chicagoans assert, tying cannot be a method of enhancing 
monopoly profits through leverage, why are there so many tying con-
tracts? If there is no additional monopoly profit to be gained, why do 
firms expend time and effort obtaining and enforcing such contracts? 
Do firms generally misunderstand their own self interest, and there-
fore pursue such profits despite the futility of doing so? Or do tying 
contracts serve some other, perhaps beneficial, purpose that, like 
most contracts, advances the interes~ of both parties? Having de-
bunked the assertion that tying leads to the "extension" of monopoly 
power, it was incumbent on the Chicago School to offer an alternative 
explanation of such contracts. 
24, at 173 (stating that "in the absence of price discrimination a monopolist will obtain 
no additional profits from monopolizing a complementary product"). 
86 See Posner, supra note 23, at 926, 929 (stating that the increased price will even-
tually raise the price of the service above the competitive level). 
87 See MILLER, supra note 41, at 202 (describing the various motives for instituting 
tying contracts and noting that "[f]irst, there are such non-financial motives as the 
desire for power"). 
88 See BORK, supra note 24, at 249 ("[A]ntitrust does not exist as a means for federal 
courts to review and revise managementjudgments about efficiency."); William F. 
Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Anao•sis, 76 
YALE LJ. 267, 318 (1966) ("[N]o justification occurs to me ... for using the antitrust 
laws to assure that private economic interests are correctly perceived."); see also Parts & 
Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner,]., 
dissenting) (arguing that antitrust should not bother penalizing a firm that attempts 
to adopt "suicidal" tying contracts in a competitive market). 
89 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 24 (1984) 
("Unless there is a link between the antitrust injury and the defendant's profit, there is 
no need for judges to impose a sanction."). 
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To Chicagoans, the answer was simple: Ties are most likely vehi-
cles through which a firm uses price discrimination to fully exploit its 
market power.90 Assume for a moment that a firm has a monopoly. 
Although the firm will be able to sell its product above the competi-
tive price, not all consumers will be willing to pay the same price for 
it. Some, so-called "marginal" customers, view other products as close 
substitutes and have relatively elastic demands for the product in 
question.91 Others are so-called inframarginal customers, who, be-
cause they view other items as poor substitutes for the product sold by 
the monopolist, have an inelastic demand for it, and thus will pay a 
higher price for it.92 Moreover, even those consumers who might be 
willing to pay a high price for some of the monopolist's product will 
be willing to pay less and less for additional units of it.93 
If the monopolist in question had perfect information, it could 
"price discriminate," that is, charge different prices to different cus-
tomers: high prices to those with inelastic demands and low prices to 
those with elastic demands.94 If, however, the monopolist could not 
distinguish "elastic" from "inelastic" consumers, or if arbitrage would 
defeat such an arrangement, it would be compelled to set one price 
for its product, thereby forgoing some of the profits theoretically 
available from its position.95 
90 See BORK, supra note 24, at 376-78 (describing how tie-ins may be used to accom-
plish price discrimination); Aaron Director & Edward Levi, Law and the Future: Trade 
Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956) ("[Coercive] restrictions ... would not 
be sensible except as a means of price discrimination."); Posner, supra note 23, at 926 
("A tie-in makes sense only as a method of price discrimination .... "); George J. 
Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. Gr. REv. 152, 
155 (hypothesizing that block-booking movies is a vehicle for price discrimination); see 
also Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Eco-
nomic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 196 n.129, 197-98 (1954) (noting that a tie-
in "seems to be aimed" at two things, one of which is price discrimination). 
91 See James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a 
Workable Standard, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 697, 739-45 (1995) (discussing the distinction 
between marginal and inframarginal consumers). 
92 See id.; see also United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1284 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (Posner,].). 
93 This, of course, is simply a manifestation of the law of diminishing marginal 
utility. See STIGLER, supra note 79, at 51-52. 
94 See OLIVER E. WilliAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND AN. 
TITRUST IMPUCATIONS 11-12 (1975). This assumes, of course, that arbitrage is not 
possible, that is, that elastic customers cannot resell their low-priced purchases to 
inelastic customers. See id. at 12. 
95 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, at 342 ("Even the monopolist charging its non-
discriminatory profit-maximizing price does not make. all the money theoretically 
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Tying, however, often provides a means for overcoming the in-
formational barriers to price discrimination. When the tied product 
is a complement of the tying product that is used in varying propor-
tions with it, purchases of a tied product will often be positively corre-
lated with the buyer's intensity of demand for the tying item.96 By 
reducing the price of the tying product to induce acceptance of the 
tie, and then pricing the tied product above cost, the monopolist can 
ensure that those purchasers with more intense demands for the tying 
product in effect pay more for it.97 The monopolist's profits will rise, 
as more consumer surplus is extracted from purchasers.98 
To the casual observer, this line of argument-the mainstay of the 
Chicago position-might fall a bit flat. Even if tying contracts do not 
leverage a monopolist's power into the market for the tied product, 
this alternative explanation, that tying contracts help wring extra 
profits out of consumers, does not seem too palatable either.99 The 
Chicago argument is not as weak as it might first sound, however. 
Readily conceding that price discrimination transfers wealth from at 
least some consumers to producers, Chicagoans quickly point out that 
it can also increase output and thus enhance allocative efficiency.100 
By charging different prices to different customers, the monopolist 
will face a marginal revenue curve coextensive with its demand curve, 
thus inducing it to produce the same output that would obtain in a 
perfectly competitive market.101 Thus, Chicagoans conclude, tying 
possible from its position."); see also WIWAMSON, supra note 94, at 12 (explaining how 
arbitrage could defeat a price-discrimination scheme). 
96 For instance, a customer's purchase of copy paper might be positively correlated 
with its intensity of demand for a copying machine. See also POSNER, supra note 24, at 
173-74 (employing example of computer and punch cards). 
97 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 71, at 378-79 (employing example of mimeograph 
machine and paper); POSNER, supra note 24, at 173-74 (employing example of com-
puter and punch cards). 
98 See sources cited supra note 97. 
99 Even Judge Posner admits this, before launching into a long defense of the 
Chicago position. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 176 ("To identify a practice as a form 
of price discrimination is not to commend it in most people's eyes."). 
100 See BORK, supra note 24, at 396-98 (explaining why output would be greater 
under price discrimination than under nondiscrimination); Posner, supra note 23, at 
926, 928 (noting that "price discrimination brings the monopolist's output closer to 
that of a competitive market and reduces the misallocative effects of monopoly"). 
101 See ARMEN A ALCHIAN & WilliAM R ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: 
COMPETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 250-56 (1983); JOAN ROBINSON, THE 
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECf COMPETITION 188-95 (1933) (comparing monopoly output 
when one price is charged to monopoly output under price discrimination); 
WILUMfSON, supra note 94, at 11 (stating that the "discriminating monopolist" will 
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arrangements should be applauded; outlawing such agreements will 
often lead to diminished output and a reduction in society's total 
wealth. Any redistribution of the extra profits garnered through 
price discrimination should be left to the political process.102 
Traditionalists are not overwhelmed by the Chicago analysis for 
three independent reasons. First, even if the antitrust laws have a 
solely economic content, and trade restraints are to be judged simply 
according to their static, microeconomic effects, there is no reason 
that allocative efficiency should be the sole criterion for judging such 
effects.103 If anything, that concept should be irrelevant to the inter-
expand output); see also BORK, supra note 24, at 396-97 (agreeing with joan Robinson's 
conclusion that output may be greater under discrimination). 
102 Robert Bork notes that: 
[I] t seems clear the income distribution effects of economic activity should be 
completely excluded from the determination of the antitrust legality of the 
activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift in income distribution does 
not lessen total wealth, and a decision about it requires a choice between two 
groups of consumers that should be made by the legislature rather than by 
the judiciary. 
BORK, supra note 24, at 111; see alsoBork, supra note 90, at 197-98 (arguing that vertical 
integration that leads to price discrimination is not objectionable because "the objec-
tion to monopoly is not that some people make too much money. It is that monopoly 
leads to a misallocation of society's resources through a restriction of output. In many 
cases, when a monopolist price-discriminates he tends to increase his output .... "). 
10
' As an additional argument, some outside the Chicago School have suggested 
that price discrimination through tying should be condemned because "direct at-
tempts at price discrimination are illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act." Kaplow, 
supra note 41, at 522. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994), however, does 
not forbid price discrimination as such, but only price discrimination that tends sub-
stantially to lessen competition. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993). As one Traditionalist has noted, "[t]his kind of 
price discrimination [through tying] is unrelated to the kind of conduct covered by 
the Robinson-Patman Act." Bauer, supra note 22, at 294 n.37; see also Baker, supra note 
24, at 1259 (noting that the Robinson-Patman Act "does not purport to make all price 
discrimination illegal"). 
Indeed, to the extent that the Robinson-Patman Act is a carefully constructed leg-
islative response to price discrimination, it might reflect a conscious legislative deter-
mination not to outlaw the sort of price discrimination represented by tying. See West 
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("[T]he purpose of a statute 
includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave alone."); 
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) ("Deciding what 
competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objec-
tive is the very essence of legislative choice-and it frustrates rather than effectuates 
legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary 
objective must be the law."). Such an argument would have special force with respect 
to the Robinson-Patman Act to the extent that it represents a special interest transfer 
from one group of businesses to another. See Chicago Prof) Sports Ltd. Partnership v. 
National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that courts 
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pretation of a statute passed before neoclassical economics-and with 
it, the concept of allocative efficiency-was widely understood by 
American economists, let alone legislators.104 At a minimum, Tradi-
tionalists say, the Sherman Act was designed to prevent contracts or 
combinations that redistribute income from consumers to produc-
ers.105 Price discrimination, it seems, does just that, leaving some con-
sumers worse off than they would have been absent the 
arrangement.106 Just as a merger that increases output but leads to 
higher prices should be condemned because it leaves some consum-
ers worse o:ff/07 so too, Traditionalists say, should a practice that, al-
though allocationally efficient, redistributes consumer surplus to 
should construe statutes driven by special interests "narrowly, with beady eyes and 
green eyeshades"). 
IO< See Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & EcQTiomics, and the Courts, LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 181, 207-08 & n.140. According to Professor Kaplow, in 1890, 
economists did not understand the concept of allocative efficiency and deadweight 
loss that informs the Chicago School's prescriptions. Although the concept had ap-
peared in French as early as 1844, it was not even potentially available to Americans 
until the publication of Alfred Marshall's Principles of EcQTiomics in 1890. See F.M. 
Scherer, The Posnerian Haroest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE LJ. 974, 977 n.20 
(1977) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 24) (discussing the entrance of a "deadweight 
welfare-loss triangle" into American economics); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, at 268-307 (1991) (tracing the rise of 
neoclassical economics in relation to antitrust law). Even some members of the Chi-
cago School concede this historical point. As Judge Easterbrook has said: "[I] tis silly 
to attribute to Congress in the late nineteenth century a precognition of the neoclas-
sical analysis of imperfect competition .... Not until the 1930s did the economic 
profession claim to have a partial equilibrium model of monopoly and oligopoly." 
Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1702. Of course, it is just this "partial equilibrium 
model" that informs the prescriptions of the Chicago School. See BORK, supra note 24, 
at 107; Williamson, supra note 28, at 21 (diagramming this model). 
105 See generaUy Joseph F. Brodley, The EcQTiomic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987) (arguing that effi-
ciency and consumer welfare theories are distinctly different); Lande, supra note 30, at 
93-96 ("Congress condemned trusts and monopolies because they had enough market 
power to raise prices and 'unfairly' extract wealth from consumers .... "). 
100 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1703 (noting the tension between antitrust 
policy designed to protect consumers from overcharges and policy designed to in-
crease output). 
107 See Lande, supra note 30, at 94 (arguing that practices that lead to higher prices 
for consumers should be unlawful, even if they ultimately create wealth). 
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producers.108 Although this approach relies upon a controversial 
method of reading statutes, it has had a powerful sway.109 
Second, as suggested earlier, Traditionalists would quarrel with 
the antecedent premise that static analysis is the only possible yard-
stick with which to judge the purely economic effects of a restraint. 
Instead, they assert that there is a competing yardstick based uot sim-
ply on static effects, but also upon the value of the competitive proc-
ess itself.110 This process, they say, leads to more dispersed economic 
decisionmaking, and with it, more innovation and progress.111 Tying 
contracts, Traditionalists say, even if adopted "solely" for the purpose 
of price discrimination, short-circuit this process by employing coer-
cive economic power to preclude independent sellers from compet-
ing in the market for the tied product.112 
108 See Bauer, supra note 22, at 302-03 (arguing that antitrust law should not be 
value-free and should prefer the interests of consumers over producers); see also 
Brodley, supra note 105, at 1033-36 ("[T]o hold that producers perform a civic duty 
when they systematically take from buyers the entire economic surplus is an Orwellian 
result that no democratic government could long sustain."). 
109 To be precise, Traditionalists appear to believe that judges lack authority to 
reach results that were not specifically contemplated by the framers of the Sherman 
Act. See Hughes, supra note 29, at 273-74 ("To assume that Congress was driven by 
abstract academic theories is difficult, but to suggest that Senators and Representatives 
were somehow psychic in anticipating the hypotheses and formulas that would later 
develop is absurd."). However, even the most forceful proponents of an original 
meaning approach to interpretation have rejected the assertion that judges are always 
bound to reach the same results specifically contemplated by the drafters of enact-
ments. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 62 n.1 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the definition of a "reasonable" period of detention could 
change with changing technology); Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the scope of constitutionally 
permitted libel actions can change in light of modern circumstances); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349, 359-60 (1992); Antonin 
Scalia, VermontYankee: TheAPA, theD.C. Circuit, andtheSupremeCourt, 1978SUP. Cr. 
REv. 345, 381-82; see also Lessig, supra note 27, at 1211-50 (providing various exam-
ples). 
More importantly, perhaps, the Supreme Court has rejected this approach to read-
ing the Sherman Act. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731 
(1988) (refusing to give pre-1890 treatment of particular restraints dispositive effect in 
the Sherman Act context); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977) (overruling a prior decision based on a new understanding of the economics of 
vertical arrangements); see also Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) 
(stating that the definition of "restraint of trade" laid down when the "state of society" 
was different is not inflexible). 
no See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
m See Ross, supra note 1, at 279; Fox, supra note 23, at 1169 (arguing that competi-
tion leads to technological progress). 
"
2 See Fox, supra note 23, at 1189 ("[T]raditional antitrust values that protect 
access to markets on the basis of merits, not leverage, are exceedingly strong."); Fox & 
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Third, and equally important to Traditionalists, is the failure of 
Chicagoans to consider the implications of price discrimination for 
the social and political values they say are protected by antitrust law.113 
Bypassing the competitive process through coercive forcing does 
more than stultify innovation and hard competition, it aJso offends 
noneconomic values such as autonomy and the decentralization of 
economic power.114 Thus, even if, over the long run, the purely eco-
nomic effects of price discrimination are benign, the coercion 
through market power that is necessary to accomplish it is not. Such 
coercion forces buyers to forgo purchasing products that they other-
wise would, and forecloses potential sellers from the market for the 
tied product, thus offending democratic values.115 
Here again, Chicagoans and Traditionalists do not necessarily 
disagree about the economic origins of tying contracts: Traditional-
ists seem perfectly willing to accept the assertion that most ties are 
examples of price discrimination.116 The Chicago assertion that ties 
are "merely" price discrimination falters not because it is bad eco-
nomics, but because it depends upon a controversial premise about 
what the antitrust laws are supposed to accomplish. It concedes that 
forcing is present and that ties are employed to wring extra profits out 
Sullivan, supra note 29, at 945 (noting "how the perfectly discriminating monopolist 
(relabeled 'rent-seeker') increases output by forcing tie-ins"); Kaplow, supra note 41, at 
521 n.24 (noting that tying arrangements motivated by price discrimination might 
have collateral anticompetitive effects); cf. Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler Tie-in Doctrine, 
supra note 22, at 688-90 (recognizing potential harmful effects of tie-ins even though 
they are used for "benign" purposes). 
m See supra notes 52-53. 
114 See Ross, supra note 1, at 279 ("Requiring the sale of the tying product alone 
will stimulate further innovation .... "); Fox, supra note 23, at 1179-90 (embracing the 
competitive process); Strasser, supra note 52, at 283-84 (asserting that tying interferes 
with the goal of "individual entrepreneurial opportunity"); see also Richard E. Day, 
Exclusive Dealing, Tying, and Reciprocity-A Reappraisa~ 29 OHIO ST. LJ. 539, 577 (1968) 
(" [T]he argument that this use of tying as a [price discrimination] device may benefit 
the buyer (particularly the small user) as well as the seller ignores the fact that com-
peting sellers would thereby be foreclosed from the tied product market, contrary to 
judicial policy."). 
115 See Ross, supra note 1, at 279 & n.28 (arguing that a prohibition of ties furthers 
Madisonian values and prevents coercion of buyers); Bauer, supra note 22, at 300.02 
(arguing that tying deprives buyers of "free choice"); Fox, supra note 23, at 1188-90 
(arguing that protecting entrepreneurial opportunity does not threaten consumers 
and should inform the interpretation of antitrust law); Strasser, supra note 52, at 283-
84 (arguing that tying arrangements inhibit the political goal of self-policing markets). 
116 See Bauer, sufrra note 22, at 294 (stating, without disagreeing, that "[e]conomists 
assert that the most frequent objective of tying arrangements is to effect price dis-
crimination"); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, at 229-33 (suggesting that ties 
adopted by franchisors should be presumed as vehicles for price discrimination). 
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of consumers through price discrimination, and assumes that such 
coercion is not objectionable and that price discrimination is a good 
thing. These assumptions, in tum, depend upon the assertion that 
"allocative efficiency" is the sole standard against which trade re-
straints are to be measured. This purely normative premise, of 
course, cannot be "proven" through microeconomic analysis.117 
Until the Traditionalists (or at least the Supreme Court) adopt in 
full Chicago's single-minded focus on allocative efficiency, the cur-
rent gridlock, and the per se rule, will survive this primary Chicago 
argument, that "forcing" is not harmful and that ties are really 
(beneficial) price discrimination. Such adoption does not appear 
imminent. Where price discrimination is concerned, the Supreme 
Court has sided squarely with the Traditional approach, holding sev-
eral times that price discrimination through tying is to be con-
demned.us Even President Reagan's Antitrust Division, long excori-
ated for elevating allocative efficiency above other criteria for evaluat-
ing trade restraints, ug did not do so in practice. In the merger con-
text, for instance, the Antitrust Division concluded that efficiencies 
were not a cognizable defense to mergers that facilitated the exercise 
of market power.120 Although the Division did state that it would con-
117 See Sanford M. Litvack, Government Antitrust Policy: Theory Vemts Practice and the 
Role of the Antitrust Division, 60 TEX. L. REv. 649, 658 (1982) (arguing that mere proof 
that ties are efficient has not and cannot, by itself, establish their legality); cf. Day, 
supra note 114, at 577 (noting that the efficiency argument fails to consider the effect 
of a tie on sellers closed out of the market for the tied product). 
118 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984) (noting 
that tying contracts "can increase the social costs of market power by facilitating price 
discrimination, thereby increasing monopoly profits over what they would be absent 
the tie"); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 617 (1977) 
("If, as some economists have suggested, the purpose of a tie-in is often to facilitate 
price discrimination, such evidence would imply the existence of power that a free 
market would not tolerate."); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 478-79 (1992) (holding summary judgment improper because the 
plaintiff had presented evidence that a tie was a vehicle for price discrimination); 
Page, supra note 21, at 64 & n.297 (noting the majority's recognition in jefferson Parish 
that ties could be vehicles for price discrimination, as well as the Court's condemna-
tion of such tying arrangements). 
119 See, e.g., John]. Flynn, "Reaganomics" and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential 
Critique, 1983 UTAH L. REv. 269 (1983) (attacking the Reagan Antitrust Division for 
overreliance on the neoclassical approach). 
120 See Department of Justice Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger 
Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) t 13,103, at 20,551, 20,554 Uune 14, 1984) 
("[E]fficiencies do not constitute a defense to an otherwise anticompetitive 
merger .... "); FTC Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) t 13,200, at 20,901, 20,904 Uune 14, 1982) ("[T]he Commission believes that 
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sider efficiencies when exercising its prosecutorial discretion, it ap-
parently rejected the allocative efficiency criterion for evaluating such 
transactions.121 If these and other strong proponents of the Chicago 
School approach have backed away from their assertion that only 
allocative efficiency matters/22 it seems unlikely that advocates will be 
able to persuade the Supreme Court to ignore stare decisis and re-
verse its purely normative judgment that ties that are vehicles for 
price discrimination ought to be condemned.123 
3. What Market Power? 
The a.Ssertion that forcing is not harmful and that ties are most 
likely vehicles for price discrimination and not "leverage" assumes, if 
only for the sake of argument, that the firm that has "imposed" the tie 
has market power. Leverage, after all, is only possible if one has a 
lever, and price discrimination is a strategy that only a firm with mar-
ket power can entertain.124 Hence, when the Chicago argument that 
ties are "merely" examples of price discrimination failed to dislodge 
the Traditionalist position, at least in the courts, Chicagoans turned 
there are too many analytical ambiguities associated with the issue of efficiencies to 
treat it as a legally cognizable defense."). 
121 See American Med. Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 218-19 (1984) (stating that efficien-
cies are only cognizable as a defense when they result in lower prices to consumers); 
see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.0 (1997), available in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) '113,104, at 20,569, 20,573-13 (Apr. 8, 1997) (same). 
121 See Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1702-04 (conceding that Congress did not 
understand the concept of allocative efficiency and arguing that Congress's goal all 
along has been the protection of consumers from high prices); Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
Rationalizing Antitrust: A Rejoinder to Professor Armentano, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 329, 331 
(1990) (arguing that collusion through the exercise of market power may result in 
deadweight losses and transfers of wealth from consumers to producers, and thus may 
be subject to antitrust regulation). Indeed, in distinguishing between an antitrust 
policy based solely on allocative efficiency and one based on assuring low prices to 
consumers, Judge Easterbrook gives price discrimination as an example of a practice 
that would be legal under the former regime but suspect under the latter. See 
Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 1703. 
123 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9 ("It is far too late in the history of our antitrust 
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an 
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.'"); id. 
at 32 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Whatever merit the policy arguments against this 
longstanding construction of the Act might have, Congress, presumably aware of our 
decisions, has never changed the rule by amending the [Sherman] Act."); cf. Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972) (refusing to overrule the longstanding interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act in light of congressional acquiescence). 
124 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 71, at 379 ("A seller must generally have market 
power in order to price discriminate."). 
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to a fallback argument seemingly designed to limit the damage done 
by the Court's tying jurisprudence. If leverage is really the problem, 
Chicagoans complained, then, at the least, plaintiffs should have to 
prove that the seller does in fact have market power over the tying 
125 product. 
At one time, this argument would have been warmly received. In 
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, the Court equated the 
economic power necessary for a "per se" tying violation with monop-
1 rn o y power, at least under the Sherman Act. Shortly thereafter, how-
ever, it repudiated this position, holding that sufficient "economic 
power" is produced by any departure from perfect competition, evi-
denced, but not quite established, by the very existence of the tie.127 
Soon, the "market power" sufficient to establish a per se violation was 
found in the strangest places: copyrights, credit, and trademarks, just 
to name a few. 128 The assertion that a real showing of substantial 
market power was necessary to invoke the unforgiving machinery of 
the per se rule seemed destined to fail. 
Destiny or not, however, the argument succeeded, at least tempo-
rarily. First (and tentatively) in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter-
prises, Inc. (Fortner II) 129 and then (less tentatively) in Jefferson Parish, 
the Court seemed to hold that, in order to establish a per se violation, 
a plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had market power of the 
125 See POSNER, supra note 24, at 172 (noting that a shortcoming of the traditional 
theory is "the failure to require any proof that a monopoly of the tied product is even 
a remotely plausible consequence of the tie-in"); Dam, supra note 66, at 19 (asserting 
that ties cannot be harmful unless the defendant possesses market power in the mar-
ket for the tying product); Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 19-23 ("A court should loo"k 
at the practices alleged by the plaintiff and ask whether the defendant or defendants 
have market power."). As counsel for the United States and petitioners, respectively, 
in Jefferson Parish, William Baxter and Frank Easterbrook made this argument. See Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-14,Jefferson Parish (No. 82-1031) (arguing 
that market power must be proved and must be proved for the appropriate market); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16,Jefferson Parish (No. 82-1031) (same). 
126 345 u.s. 594, 611-13 (1953). 
127 See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958);see also Fortner 
Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969) (rejecting asser-
tion that complete power over the tying product is necessary to establish a per se 
violation); supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
128 See, e.g., Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. at 503-04 (holding that favorable credit terms 
suggest economic power); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962) 
(finding that copyright confers economic power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 
F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a trademark, along with a demonstrated 
power to impose a tie-in, establishes market power). 
129 429 u.s. 610 (1977). 
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sort that is required for liability in other antitrust contexts.130 Indeed, 
in Jefferson Parish, the Court appeared to resurrect the Times-Picayune 
"monopoly" standard, which had been interred in Northern Pacific 
Railway Co.131 At least that is how many lower courts have read the 
decision.1s2 Chicago, it seemed, had won a major victory and a victory 
based on price theory to boot-or so its Traditionalist opponents 
h ISS thoug t. 
At best, however, this victory was only a partial one. Although 
proof of significant market power had become a necessary condition 
for liability, it had remained a sufficient one as well. Once a plaintiff 
proved the existence of such power, "forcing" was conclusively pre-
sumed, and the tie declared illegal.134 Thus, the victory left no hope 
for those ties that, although competitively neutral or even procom-
150 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 n.43 (1984) 
("Moreover, in other antitrust contexts this Court has found that market shares com-
parable to that present here do not create an unacceptable likelihood of anticompeti-
tive conduct."); Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620-22 (indicating that seller's power to raise 
prices or put pressure on creditors could establish the existence of market power); see 
also Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 126 (arguing that Fortner II redefined the type of 
"economic analysis" necessary to find a per se violation); William K. Jones, The Two 
Faces ofFortner: Comment on a Recent Antitrust Decision, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 41 (1978) 
("Hopefully, under the impetus of [Fortner II], allegedly unlawful tying arrangements 
will be given closer scrutiny to determine whether they truly represent the exploitation 
of a position of economic power in the tying product."). 
191 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26 n.43 (noting similarity to situation presented in 
Times-Picayune); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451, 464 (1992) (relying upon monopolization cases for definition of"market power" 
in tying context). 
192 See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 
468, 478-81 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 
F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that no illegal tie-in exists if the buyer is 
not forced to purchase the second product); Greene County Mem'l Park v. Behm 
Funeral Homes, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1276, 1287 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that a 43% 
share of the market was insufficient as a matter of law to establish power over the tying 
product); see also Breaux Bros. Farms, Inc. v. Teche Sugar Co., 21 F. 3d 83, 86-87 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that a 17.5% market share was insufficient to establish "market 
power" as defined in jefferson Parish). But see Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 
F.2d 1336, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that copyright confers economic power). 
1
" See, e.g., Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 258-59 (arguing 
that tie-ins reduce competition to some extent regardless of the seller's possession of 
any substantial monopoly power). 
lst See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17 ("When the seller's share of the market is 
high ••. or when the seller offers a unique product that competitors are not able to 
offer ... the Court has held that the likelihood that market power exists and is being 
used to restrain competition in a separate market is sufficient to make per se condem-
nation appropriate."). Some lower courts, of course, continue to entertain certain 
"affirmative defenses" to this so-called per se violation. See supra note 73. 
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petitive, were purportedly "imposed" by firms that happened to pos-
sess market power.135 For a movement that believed that firms be-
come big, and thus obtain market power, because they are efficient, 
and that ties should, at most, be scrutinized under the Rule of Rea-
son, this result could not have been too heartening.136 
Even this partial victory would prove fleeting, resting as it did on 
controversial economic and normative premises. As an initial matter, 
Chicago's victory in Jefferson Parish was bottomed on economic reason-
ing that could only satisfy zealous devotees to the sort of blackboard 
economics that animates price theory.137 By requiring proof of a large 
share of a properly defined market, the Court (and the Chicago pro-
ponents of the approach) seemed to have had in mind the type of 
market full of producers of undifferentiated products ordinarily 
found in economics textbooks.138 For it is only in such an environ-
ment that a firm like the defendant in Jefferson Parish, with a thirty 
percent share of the market, could lack the market power necessary 
to induce or "force" consumers to take a tie. 139 
Most markets, of course, do not even approximate this ideal, but 
instead are characterized by a significant degree of product differen-
tiation.140 Indeed, and ironically, the Chicago School initially called 
attention to the importance of product differentiation in antitrust 
analysis. While one hand of th~ Chicago School was g~nerating anti-
trust prescriptions premised upon price-theoretic models that as-
sumed no product differentiation, the other hand was demonstrating 
that many practices deemed anticompetitive by Traditionalists were, 
in fact, vehicles through which products could be differentiated or, at 
1
ss Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) (stating that even 
dominant firms should be allowed to compete vigorously). 
1
s
6 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 14, at 142 (asserting, under the rationale of 
Jefferson Parish, that the Court "can continue to monitor business behavior as it 
chooses"). 
1
s
7 Cf. Kaplow, supra note 41, at 537 (decrying overreliance by Chicagoans on 
"textbook economics" in their approach to ties). 
1
ss See STIGLER, supra note 79, at 176-90 (describing the theory of perfect competi-
tion); sources cited supra note 76 (describing assumption of price theory that products 
are homogenous). 
159 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29 (finding that a 30% market share does not 
confer market power). 
Ho See United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956) 
("As the producers of a standardized product bring about significant differentiations 
of quality, design, or packaging in the product ... competition becomes to a greater 
or less degree incomplete .... "); Keyte, supra note 91, at 701 ("In nearly all market 
situations ... each product has some attribute that distinguishes it from other prod-
ucts and makes it more or less attractive to consumers."). 
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least, through which preexisting differences could be communicated 
141 R al . . 142 l . . . 143 to consumers. es e pnce mamtenance, exc us1ve temtones, 
and advertising144 were all described by Chicagoans as (desirable) 
methods of meeting consumer demand through the differentiation of 
products.145 In fact, this line of attack was so persuasive that it led the 
Supreme Court to reverse its one-time hostility to exclusive territo-
141 See Meese, supra note 75, at 161-63 (arguing that the Chicago approach to dis-
tributional restraints embraces the existence of product differentiation). 
142 See POSNER, supra note 24, at 148-50 (describing a dealer-service theory of resale 
price maintenance); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 86 (1960). 
145 See Richard A Posner, Antitntst Policy and the Supreme Court: An Ana0>sis of the 
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger, and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 282, 292-93 (1975) (describing benefits of restricted distribution arrangements 
such as exclusive-sales territories); Richard A Posner, The Next Step in the Antitntst 
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: PerSeLegality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 6 (1981) (same). 
144 See BORK, supra note 24, at 314-20; Posner, supra note 23, at 930-31 (stating that 
the benefits of advertising and making a better product are "indistinguishable"); 
Lester G. Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964) (describing 
the importance of advertising in enhancing competition). 
145 Some scholars have failed to grasp the link between product differentiation and 
some Chicago School prescriptions. They have continued to assert that aU Chicago 
School prescriptions assume perfectly competitive markets. Professors Flynn and 
Ponsoldt, for instance, have stated that "[t]he 'free rider' argument [in favor of verti-
cal restrictions] assumes the rationality of the proponent of the restraint in a perfectly 
competitive market." John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Juris-
prudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Ana0>sis in the Reso-
lution of Antitntst Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1144 (1987) (footnotes omitted); see 
also John]. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 112542 (1986) (decrying purported 
reliance of the Chicago School upon "neoclassical" economic models that assume the 
existence of perfect competition). This is simply false. Proponents of the Chicago 
approach to resale price maintenance and exclusive territories, for example, explicitly 
assume two departures from perfect competition: first, that the manufacturer is sell-
ing a differentiated product, and second, that transaction costs prevent firms from 
directly controlling a distributor's behavior. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 148-50 
(putting forth the Chicago theory of resale pricing); Meese, supra note 75, at 162-66; 
Telser, supra note 142, at 87 ("[A] necessary condition to a manufacturer's use of 
resale price maintenance is that he must possess some degree of monopoly control 
over the price of the product because his product is differentiated in economically 
relevant respects from competing products."). See generally WilliAMSON, supra note 35, 
at 2, 12 (describing distinction between "neoclassical" and "transaction cost" econom-
ics). 
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ries, 146 and to curtail severely the ability of terminated distributors to 
hall al . . 147 c enge res e pnce mamtenance. 
As proponents of the Chicago approach necessarily concede, 
product differentiation leads to market power, which in tum gives 
firms the ability to induce customers to take tied products that they 
do not want.148 Of course, there is market power, and then there is 
market power. The only gas station in a neighborhood has some 
market power, because most customers will pay a small premium to 
purchase gasoline close to home.149 A firm that owned all the gas 
stations in the city, however, would have a lot more market power. 
Moreover, for most antitrust purposes, such as whether the firm was 
guilty of monopolization or whether it should be allowed to merge 
with a station in an adjoining neighborhood, we should consider only 
the latter firm to possess market power in any legally relevant sense.150 
(We would not, for example, say that two gas stations had merged to 
monopoly in a market defined to include only two adjoining neigh-
borhoods.) That conclusion is not based upon an abstract principle 
holding that one sort of power really is market power in a technical 
economic sense and that the other is not. It is instead based upon a 
judgment about the costs and benefits of intervening to prevent small 
price increases that flow from mergers in localized "markets."151 Just 
as the definition of the relevant market depends upon the nature of 
the antitrust problem presented, so too, one could argue, does the 
146 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) 
(overruling the per se rule articulated in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
u.s. 365 (1967)). 
147 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,762-64 (1984). 
148 See Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-14,Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (No. 82-1031) (asserting that market power gives 
firms the ability to force ties on consumers); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, 
Jefferson Parish (No. 82-1031) (same); see also Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for 
Perfect Competition: Kodak and Non-Structural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33-36 
(1994) (conceding that product differentiation leads to some market power); 
Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 
J.L. & ECON. 345, 357 (1985) (same). 
149 See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON.J. 41,44 (1929). 
150 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 
(1956) (opining that an isolated filling station does not possess a monopoly within the 
meaning of section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
151 See Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guide-
lines, 1983 DUKE LJ. 514, 538-39 & n.76 (arguing that the process of market definition 
is structured so as to avoid costly intervention in cases in which price increases are only 
moderate or transitory). 
1997] TYING DOCTRINE AND THE NIE 39 
threshold above which a certain share of the market should be 
deemed "market power."152 
If, then, the question in the tying context is whether a firm has 
sufficient market power to induce a purchaser to agree to take a tied 
product as well, it is not obvious that "mere" product differentiation 
should not be deemed sufficient evidence that the seller is, in fact, 
capable of "forcing." In other areas of antitrust law, courts and agen-
cies have begun to recognize that product differentiation can confer 
nontrivial amounts of market power, even if the firm involved has well 
below a fifty percent share of the relevant market.153 Although such 
market power does not constitute "monopoly power" of the sort that 
152 See Phillip Areeda, Market Definition and Horizontal Restraints, 52 ANrrrR.usr LJ. 
553, 583-84 (1983). This, of course, is exactly the type of distinction courts draw be-
tween merger cases and monopolization cases. Two firms, each with 20% of a prop-
erly defined market, can merge without any fear that the entity created will, in the 
future, be deemed capable of "monopolization" under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(finding that a 55% market share does not constitute a monopoly); United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (expressing doubt whether 
64% share can constitute a monopoly and finding that 33% share certainly could not). 
Yet the very same merger would be clearly illegal under section 7 of the Clayton Act if, 
for instance, it took place in an otherwise concentrated market, a factor that would 
militate against a finding that the new entity was a monopoly for the purposes of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that a merger which created a new entity, with a 26% share of an 
otherwise concentrated market, violated section 7); Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 
2.0.3.0, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,558-62 (1992); cf. International Distribution Ctrs., Inc. 
v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that the presence of 
strong competitors suggests an absence of monopoly power for purposes of section 2). 
This is not the result of some statutory schizophrenia, but instead a reflection of 
the different types of market power that are relevant in each context. Under section 2 
of the Sherman Act, we care about one firm's ability to raise prices or restrict output; 
under section 7 of the Clayton Act, we are concerned that, as markets become more 
concentrated, "independent" firms will more likely engage in tacit collusion. See 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964) (stating that section 7 
aims to prevent mergers that lead firms to adopt "parallel policies of mutual advan-
tage"); Hospital Corp. of Am., 807 F.2d at 1390 (same). Similar distinctions are drawn in 
the Rule of Reason context, in which the appropriate measure of market concentra-
tion depends upon the theory of liability asserted. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. 
v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using single-firm market 
shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to evaluate claim that ancillary restraint 
would facilitate the exercise of market power). 
153 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2.21, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41,560 ("A merger 
between firms in a market for differentiated products may diminish competition by 
enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price of one or both 
products above the premerger level."); Roscoe B. Starek III & Stephen Stockum, lW!at 
Makes Mergers Anticompetitive?: "Unilateral Effects" Ana~s!S Under the 1992 Merger Guide-
lines, 63 ANrrrRusr LJ. 801, 806-09 (1995) (describing how product differentiation 
can become a source of market power). 
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can lead to liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, there is no a 
priori reason that it cannot constitute "market power" for purposes of 
tying doctrine. As Traditionalists have long pointed out, a very slight 
decrease in the price of the tying product may be enough to induce 
or "force" a purchaser to accept a tie, thereby coercively foreclosing 
competing sellers of the tied product from the market.154 A firm with 
a small amount of market power-the ability to price slightly above 
the competitive level-can employ such a pricing strategy and still 
remain profitable. 
There are, of course, arguments to the contrary. The ability to 
differentiate products, through trademarks and the like, encourages 
firms to produce different and, hopefully, better products in the first 
place.155 We should not, the argument might go, "penalize" those 
firms that create attractive products by suddenly deeming them capa-
ble of forcing, thus subjecting them to liability for tying.156 Such a 
penalty might discourage firms from innovating in the first place, 
thus destroying future wealth for the sake of preventing present forc-
ing-forcing that is, by definition, localized to a small subset of con-
. I k 1s1 sumers m a arger mar et. 
This response, however, highlights the second weakness in Chi-
cago's interpretation of the reasoning of Jefferson Parish, and in the 
movement's approach to ties generally. The assertion that the bene-
fits of innovation outweigh the harms associated with coercive forcing 
depends upon an allocative-efficiency approach to weighing these 
154 See Kaplow, supra note 41, at 526 ("If different brands or different outlets 
are ... rather close substitutes, it would cost next to nothing to induce a customer or 
supplier to deal with one firm rather than another."); Turner, supra note 22, at 61 
(stating that it takes "very little power to induce buyers to enter into" a tying arrange-
ment). 
155 See William M. Landes & Richard A Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987). 
156 As Judge Easterbrook has put it: "Sellers may strive to differentiate their prod-
ucts from others in order to compete for the custom of patrons with slightly different 
needs or tastes. It would be perverse to tum this ordinary attribute of the competitive 
struggle into a source of illegality." Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 
665, 673 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Paddock Publications, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 
103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook,].) ("[A] market in which the creators of 
intellectual property (such as the New York Times) could not decide how best to market 
it for maximum profit would be a market with less (or less interesting) intellectual 
property created in the first place."); Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 430 (Hand, J.) 
("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins."). 
157 See Arthur, supra note 148, at 33 (describing how nonstructural market power in 
"atomized markets" cannot be substantial enough to justify antitrust regulation). 
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costs and benefits.158 Adoption of Traditionalist criteria, by contrast, 
could lead to a different result. Moreover, the response apparently 
concedes that ties are the result of coercive forcing and does not sug-
gest that tying itself is a beneficial practice, or even a competitively 
neutral one. Further, if tying is, in fact, a harmful practice, it is not 
clear why preventing it should be deemed a "penalty" for otherwise 
procompetitive conduct, or why such a "penalty" would deter that 
conduct. Mter all, nothing about a rule against tying prevents a firm 
that appends its trademark to a "better mousetrap" from charging all 
that the market will bear for its new invention.159 Indeed, given the 
Chicago School's argument that tying cannot add to a firm's market 
power, a prohibition on the practice can only reduce returns to inno-
vation if it prevents price discrimination, which, of course, Modem 
doctrine and Traditionalists condemn.160 If product differentiation 
leads to the ability to "force" -and it does-it is not clear what is lost 
through a rule that treats such differentiation as "market power" for 
tying purposes. Absent some theory that suggests that no forcing is, 
in fact, occurring or, at least, that forcing produces some benefits, 
Chicago's interpretation of Jefferson Parish-like the argument that 
ties are "merely" price discrimination-is based upon controversial 
normative premises and is, it seems, likely to unravel. 
Some would say that the unraveling began in the Supreme 
Court's very next tying case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv-
ices, Inc. 161 There, several independent providers of post-sale copier 
repair services claimed that Kodak had engaged in per se illegal tying 
by conditioning the sale of replacement parts upon an agreement by 
its customers to purchase maintenance only from Kodak. The Court 
held that, for purposes of the per se rule, Kodak had market power 
(indeed, a monopoly) in a market defined to include not all photo-
158 Professor Arthur, for instance, employs Oliver Williamson's tradeoff model in 
concluding that the benefits of product differentiation outweigh any harms associated 
with the exercise of what he calls "nonstructural market power," including the kind of 
power that results from product differentiation. See id. at 15-20. That model, in turn, 
assumes that a practice is "efficient" if its benefits outweigh its costs, even ifit leads to 
higher prices for consumers. See Williamson, supra note 28, at 21 (depicting the 
tradeoff model); see al50BORK, supra note 24, at 107-15 (same). 
159 See jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) (stating that 
the Sherman Act would not be violated if a seller simply tries to maximize its return in 
the tying product market). 
160 See Kaplow, supra note 41, at 522-24 (casting doubt on the desirability of price 
discrimination). 
161 504 U.S. 451 (1992); see also id. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority opinion is inconsistent with]effcrsan Parish). 
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copiers, nor even just Kodak photocopiers, but those Kodak photo-
copiers purchased by consumers who had made investments specific 
to those copiers and, in addition, had been ill-informed about the 
contracts they had entered, which did not prohibit such tying.162 
There was no evidence in the record suggesting that Kodak's copiers 
did anything different from those manufactured by its competitors.163 
Still, the Court held that, even though Kodak had less than a twenty-
five percent share of the market for photocopiers, it could be deemed 
to possess market power sufficient to invoke the per se rule against 
tying.164 In so doing, the Court focused heavily upon the various de-
partures from an ordinary price-theoretic model that characterized 
the market in question.165 Such departures included high transaction 
costs and high costs of switching from one product to another. These 
costs, the Court concluded, gave Kodak the power profitably to raise 
prices vis-a-vis those unsophisticated customers who formed the basis 
for its market definition.166 
Eastman Kodak does not address directly the question whether 
mere product differentiation, without more, could confer market 
power for purposes of the per se rule. Instead, the holding of the 
case is limited to those special instances of differentiation involving 
the high transaction costs that result from the combination of imper-
fect information and specific investments.167 Still, several commenta-
tors-some of them critical of the decision-have noted that the 
opinion is flatly inconsistent with the broad interpretation of Jefferson 
Parish advanced by the Chicago School.168 One scholar, for instance, 
162 See id. at 477-79. 
163 Indeed, the Court assumed that "competition exists in the equipment market" 
at the initial point of sale. Id. at 466 n.10; see also Arthur, supra note 148, at 43-44 
(documenting Kodak's lack of power in any copier market). 
164 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477-79. 
165 See id. at 474-77 (concluding that consumers may not be able to satisfy their 
information needs); cf. Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Infarma-
tion Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 193, 200 ( 1993) 
(noting that the result in Eastman Kodak depends upon the existence of information 
costs). 
166 SeeEastmanKodak, 504 U.S. at475. 
167 See id. at 471-78; Lande, supra note 165, at 198 (discussing Eastman Kodak's focus 
on imperfect information). 
163 See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 148, at 54-56 (noting that under Eastman Kodak, 
nonstructural power is sufficient to establish market power, an idea previously rejected 
by Jefferson Parish); Fox, supra note 32, at 760 (casting Eastman Kodak as a "chink in the 
armor of the allocative efficiency model"); Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through 
Imperfect lnfarmation: The Staggering Implications ofEastman Kodak v. Image Technical 
Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 Mo. L. REV. 336, 356-59 (1993) 
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argues that Eastman Kodak's rationale may require a finding that all 
sellers of differentiated, durable goods possess market power.169 If so, 
the decision would signal a retreat by the Court to the pre-Jefferson 
Parish days, when trademarks or copyrights-even the existence of the 
tie itself-were deemed presumptive evidence of such market 
power.170 Perhaps, then, Chicago's attempt at damage control via the 
market-power requirement has failed, and the Traditional version of 
the per se rule will soon be revitalized. 
Despite these predictions, it is quite possible that Eastman Kodak 
will ultimately be limited (as many lower courts have limited it) to 
situations in which buyers have made investments specific to the tying 
product and are thus "locked-in" to the use of it. 171 Even if inter-
(opining that the two cases "cannot be reconciled"); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Reflections on 
Easunan Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Continued Confusion Regarding 
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Jurisprudence, 69 WASH. L. REV. 101, 153 (1994) 
(asserting that Eastman Kodak reflected a movement away from the Chicago School 
approach). 
169 See Jacobs, supra note 168, at 364-66 (arguing that "lower courts might well 
extend Kodak to cover all market failures that satisfy the 'difficult and costly' standard," 
like differentiated products). 
170 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. In this connection it should be 
noted that, although purporting not to question Jefferson Parish, the Court, in holding 
that a single brand of a product can constitute a market, cited with approval two deci-
sions issued before Jefferson Parish that had employed a decidedly non-Chicago ap-
proach to the market power inquiry. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482 n.31 (citing 
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, AG., 553 F.2d 964, 981 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding 
that Volkswagen possessed monopoly power in the market for air conditioners for 
Volkswagens); In re General Motors Corp., 99 F.T.C. 464, 554, 584 (1982) (finding 
market power over GM parts)); if. Jacobs, supra note 168, at 357 ("The approaches of 
Kodak and Jefferson Parish to the role of informational imperfections in market power 
analysis cannot be reconciled."). 
171 See, e.g., PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811 (6th Cir.) 
(circuit-board components and repair services), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997); 
United Farmers Agents Ass'n v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 F.3d 233, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(policyholder information); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 
756, 760-61 (7th Cir. 1996) (computer equipment); Lee v. Life Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 14, 20 
(1st Cir. 1994) (university education); Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, 
Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 1993) (software support service). Indeed, in Digital 
Equipment Cmp.,Judge Easterbrook even suggested that this aspect of Eastman Kodak is 
essentially dicta, insofar as the parties did not dispute that Kodak's failure to disclose 
its change in policy could constitute an antitrust problem. See Digital Equip. Cmp., 73 
F.3d at 762. In this connection, it should be noted that one of the academic articles 
on which the Eastman Kodak Court purported to rely actually concluded that the anti-
trust laws are not the proper vehicle for addressing the kind of ties involved there. See 
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473 (citing Craswell, supra note 53, at 676); see also Queen 
City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming 
dismissal of tying claim by franchisee because franchise contract disclosed the exis-
tence of the tie); Meese, supra note 73, at 152 n.l87 (suggesting that state and federal 
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preted this narrowly, the decision has eroded the (already limited) 
scope of the victory achieved by Chicago in Jefferson Parish. Not only 
will firms with high market shares be subject to the per se rule, but so 
will firms with low market shares that attempt to induce ties after cus-
tomers have made investments specific to the tying product.172 This 
latter class will encompass many purchasers of complex equipment, as 
well as franchisees. 173 The market-power screen, and the unrealistic 
price-theoretic model on which it is based, is simply not up to the task 
of significantly eroding the Traditional approach to ties. 
4. Procompetitive Benefits 
Often, Chicago School challenges to Traditional results take a 
two-track approach: first, a showing that the practice does not pro-
duce anticompetitive effects as often as Traditionalists assert and, 
second, an explanation as to why the arrangement is, in fact, gener-
ally procompetitive.174 One would expect the same in the tying con-
text, that is, an argument that tying generally is not anticompetitive, 
coupled with an explanation of its various beneficial effects. Gener-
ally, however, this type of argument has not been forthcoming. 175 
Instead, various messengers of the Chicago School have placed an 
provisions mandating disclosure of information to prospective franchisees may render 
Eastman Kodak inapplicable to the franchising context). 
172 See, e.g., Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(suggesting that, in light of Eastman Kodak, mainframe computers may constitute a 
separate market for tying purposes even though they compete with smaller machines 
at the time of purchase); Virtual Maintenance, 11 F.3d at 666-67 (remanding in light of 
Eastman Kodak for a finding as to whether the plaintiff had established the existence of 
a derivative aftermarket). 
175 See Allen-Myland, 33 F.3d at 198 (mainframe computers); Virtual Maintenance, 11 
F.3d at 662 (computer systems); Fox, supra note 32, at 766 (stating that, if Eastman 
Kodak is taken at face value, "[f]Ioodgates would open for franchisees to sue fran-
chisors"); George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Fun?: Reflections on the Kodak 
Case, 62 ANTITRUST LJ. 177, 185-88 (1993) (describing possible application of Eastman 
Kodak to franchise context). 
174 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 24, at 280-96 (analyzing this approach in the context 
of resale price maintenance and vertical market division); POSNER, supra note 24, at 
147-66 (employing this approach with respect to restricted distribution). 
175 Cf. Bauer, supra note 22, at 304 ("[T]he best that defenders of tying arrange-
ments can offer is that they usually have no anticompetitive effects."); Kenneth J. 
Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be The Tie?", 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 76 (1991) ("The Chicago economists have been strangely silent in explaining the 
tying provisions' existence, which they agree could provide no economic benefit."). 
Indeed, one respected antitrust scholar, in discussing the Chicago response to the 
Traditionalist approach, does not even mention any assertion by Chicagoans that ties 
produce procompetitive benefits. See Page, supra note 21, at 62-69. 
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extraordinary emphasis on the first track, while ignoring the second 
track or treating it only as an afterthought. Moreover, even when 
considering the possible procompetitive'benefits associated with ties, 
Chicagoans have confined their analysis to those benefits relevant to a 
price-theoretic model. Such a model does not explain how, absent 
market power, a seller can induce acceptance of a tying contract, but 
instead seemingly takes the existence of coercive forcing as a given 
and argues that, despite this coercion, ties are beneficial. Since this 
conclusion ultimately depends upon the same controversial norma-
tive premises that inform Chicago's conclusions that ties are not anti-
competitive, it has not proved convincing to Traditionalists or the 
courts. Instead, Traditionalists have mustered serious responses to 
which Chicagoans have not replied. 
Typical of this phenomenon is Judge Posner's treatment of ties in 
his influential monograph on antitrust law. In thirteen pages of dis-
cussion on ties, 176 he devotes less than one page to the virtues of such 
contracts.177 In so doing, he offers no realistic method for distinguish-
ing between ties that are beneficial and those that are not. Instead, 
after explaining why ties generally cannot be anticompetitive, he sug-
gests that there might be alternative explanations, such as price dis-
crimination and protection of goodwill.178 Whether a particular tie is 
one or the other is apparently to be ascertained by looking at the 
"purpose" of the arrangement, determined in part by whether the 
conditions for price discrimination are present.179 Such a "purpose" 
analysis has generally been eschewed in other antitrust contexts/80 
and Judge Posner offers no reason why it should be embraced here. 
As already shown, the assertion that price discrimination is a 
"benefit" is inconsistent with the Traditional normative premises that 
have been incorporated into Modern doctrine. Moreover, Judge 
Posner's discussion of the goodwill justification offers no explanation 
of how, absent coercive forcing, firms can persuade purchasers to 
agree to ties. Indeed, he apparently adopts, if only for the sake of 
argument, the price-theoretic assumption that ties are "imposed" 
176 See POSNER, supra note 24, at 171-84. 
177 See id. at 171, 181 (arguing that tying arrangements are not exclusionary and 
actually enhance goodwill). 
178 See id. at 171-81. 
179 See id. at 174-76. 
180 See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 233 (1918) 
("Where ... the necessary effect of an agreement or combination is unduly to restrict 
competitive conditions, the purpose or intention of the parties is immaterial."). 
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through an exercise of market power, but goes on to argue that a 
showing (however made) that a tie has been "imposed" for goodwill 
purposes should establish its legality, because procompetitive benefits 
will (almost) always outweigh any anticompetitive effects associated 
with the arrangement.181 The argument supporting this assumption, 
however, rests upon decidedly Chicago School premises about the 
purposes of the antitrust laws. Any possible concerns about the com-
petitive process are ignored, as are any social or political values that 
might be implicated. Instead, the only detrimental effect to be cred-
ited is the possibility of gaining market power in the market for the 
tied product, and the question is characterized simply as involving a 
balance between these anticompetitive effects, on the one hand, and 
any reduction in costs occasioned by adoption of the tie, on the 
other.182 This, of course, is a classic price-theoretic partial-equilibrium 
welfare analysis of the sort ordinarily reserved for mergers or other 
horizontal restraints, an analysis that is only necessary if one assumes 
the presence of some anticompetitive effects in the first place.183 
The limitations of judge Posner's argument become even clearer 
if one focuses on his treatment of less restrictive alternatives. To 
Judge Posner, the existence of a quality-control justification ipso facto 
establishes that the procompetitive effects of the tie predominate. 
Traditionalists, by contrast, grudgingly concede that ties can serve 
quality-control objectives, but also claim that less restrictive alterna-
tives can serve the same purposes as outright ties, such that there is 
I d. 
181 See POSNER, supra note 24, at 176. 
182 As Judge Posner puts it: 
It might seem that the cost savings from a tie-in imposed for the purpose 
of protecting the manufacturer's good will ought to be balanced against the 
costs in reduced competition resulting from the exclusion of the independent 
producers of the tied product. But, if so, the balance will almost always be in 
favor of upholding the good-will defense, since, as suggested earlier, the ex-
clusion of independent sales of the tied product just for use with the tying 
product is unlikely to have any competitive significance in the market for the 
tied product. 
•ss See, e.g., WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 369 (describing the influence of the 
"partial equilibrium welfare economics model" on antitrust analysis); Liebeler, supra 
note 77, at 335-36 (advocating an economic approach to antitrust analysis); 
Williamson, supra note 28, at 21 (describing the effects of a merger on resource alloca-
tion in a partial-equilibrium context); see also Williamson, supra note 31, at 272-73 
(distinguishing between static, cost-oriented efficiencies associated with price theory 
and those efficiencies associated with a transaction-cost analysis). 
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no harm done by a per se rule.184 Judge Posner has no effective reply 
to this point He simply notes that, if other means of protecting 
goodwill were as effective, the parties presumably would have adopted 
them.185 This ignores, however, the possibility that the tie has been 
"forced" upon the purchaser through market power for some purpose 
other than quality control. Although Judge Posner does suggest that 
less restrictive alternatives are less effective, he makes no attempt to 
convert this intuition into an effective reply to the Traditionalist as-
sertion that any lost effectiveness is more than offset by the benefits 
realized through elimination of the forced tie.186 Indeed, one 
thoughtful scholar sympathetic to the Traditional approach asserts 
that he is unable to comprehend Judge Posner's argument on this 
score.
187 The only possible explanation is in the Chicago School's 
assumption that coercion itself is of no independent concern, such 
that the advantages of a more effective tie are unambiguous.188 There 
are certainly better arguments in response to the Traditionalist reli-
ance upon less restrictive alternatives. At a minimum, this reliance is 
inconsistent with the role of such alternatives in other antitrust con-
texts.189 Yet, by resting his own argument upon controversial norma-
18
' See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 
41, at 543 (arguing that cost savings from ties can be "minuscule at best" and using 
mM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), as an example). 
185 See POSNER, supra note 24, at 175 (making this point with reference to the mM 
case). 
186 See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court seemed to 
adopt the Traditionalist reasoning when, in Standard Oil, it stated that less-restrictive 
alternatives are usually "protection enough" for the goodwill of the seller, given that the 
coercion inherent in the tie is so much more objectionable than any additional costs 
associated with the specification alternative. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 
U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (emphasis added); see also Baker, supra note 24, at 1251 
(discussing the less restrictive alternative standard). Although Professor Baker-
unlike Judge Posner-recognizes the nature of this Traditionalist argument, he does 
not provide an effective response to it. See infra notes 301-53 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating several flaws in the Traditionalists' reliance on less restrictive alterna-
tives). 
187 See Kaplow, supra note 41, at 543. 
188 See Page, supra note 21, at 45-46 ("Coercion, in Chicago terms, ... should drop 
from the analysis."). 
189 In the Rule of Reason context, for instance, less restrictive alternatives are only 
relevant to the extent that they are as effective as the challenged restraint at imple-
menting the procompetitive objective in question. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. 
Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting the plaintiff's 
burden to demonstrate that the same benefits could have been achieved by less re-
strictive measures). Similarly, in the merger context, the presence of a less anticom-
petitive transaction is only relevant to the extent that the transaction will achieve the 
same efficiencies as the one under scrutiny. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.0 
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tive premises, including the assumption that forcing presents no 
harm independent of some enhancement of market power, Judge 
Posner has failed to make these arguments. 
I do not mean to single out Judge Posner for any special criticism 
here; there is more criticism to go around within the Chicago School. 
Robert Bark, for instance, adopts an even less convincing stance than 
Judge Posner. In discussing the goodwill defense, he also places 
heavy emphasis on the inadequacy of less restrictive altematives.190 
Yet, he does not explain why such inadequacy should, ipso facto, es-
tablish a tie's legality, even within the context of Chicago School 
premises. Further, like Judge Posner, he makes no attempt to explain 
how, absent coercion, such contracts arise. When discussing the for-
mation of requirements contracts, he simply argues that the existence 
of such contracts suggests the presence of some cost-saving effi-
ciency. 191 Indeed, in an earlier work concerning vertical distributional 
restraints, Judge Bark conceded that such agreements should be con-
doned regardless of whether distributors could be said to have volun-
.1 d th 192 tan y agree to em. 
Similarly, in urging the Jefferson Parish Court to reject a per se rule 
for tying, President Reagan's Justice Department devoted one and 
one-half pages of a twenty-eight page brief to a discussion of the pro-
competitive effects of ties. 193 That discussion took an explicitly price-
theoretic approach, claiming that package sales frequently reduce the 
cost of distribution.194 These static, cost-based efficiencies, of course, 
(1997), available in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'I 13,104, at 20,569, 20,573-13 (Apr. 8, 
1997). It is not even clear, at least in the Rule of Reason context, that the presence of 
a less restrictive alternative will, ipso facto, invalidate an otherwise procompetitive 
restraint. See National Football League v. North Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 
1079-80 (1982) (Rehnquist, ]., dissenting from denial of certiorari) {"The antitrust 
laws impose a standard of reasonableness, not a standard of absolute neces-
sity .... [T]he possibility of less restrictive alternatives is only one among many proper 
considerations for the factfinder."); Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The 
Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1163, 1194 n.144 (1988). 
190 See BORK, supra note 24, at 379-80 ("There is no showing that these alternative 
routes will be as effective as the tie-in of the related product, or that they will accom-
plish the result as inexpensively."). 
191 See id. at 304-05 ("The advantage of the [requirements] contract must be the 
creation of efficiency .... "). 
192 See Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE LJ. 
950, 963 (1968). 
193 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23, Jefferson Parish Hosp. 
Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (No. 82-1031). 
1 
... See id. ("[W]here a supplier chooses to offer physically separable products only 
in a single package, the choice ordinarily will reflect the supplier's judgment that this 
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are similar to those more commonly discussed in the merger con-
text.195 There was no attempt to explain why the existence of these 
efficiencies should render a tie presumptively legal-the mere pres-
ence of efficiencies does not establish that they predominate.196 Nor 
was there any attempt to deal with the assertion that less restrictive, if 
slightly less effective, alternatives are often available for such con-
tracts. Finally, there was no attempt to demonstrate why such ties 
must be imposed by contract. Mter all, if a firm can obtain efficien-
cies in distribution through tying, it presumably would be able to 
offer lower prices to its customers for the package than for a separate 
sale, thus inducing them to take the tied product "voluntarily. "197 
Thus, like Judge Posner's argument, the brief offered no effective 
response to the Traditionalist assertion that any such benefits are 
"forced" on purchasers.198 Indeed, the United States seemed to think 
that it did not matter whether such arrangements made purchasers 
better off. In a stunning show of Chicago bravado, the brief simply 
argued that they would enhance consumer welfare, without asserting 
that these cost savings would be passed on to consumers.199 The most 
commonly asserted justification for such contracts-the protection of 
goodwill-was treated in one unenlightening sentence.200 
method of distribution is the most likely to satisfy consumer preferences at the lowest 
price and so enhance the supplier's ability to compete in the marketplace."). 
195 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.0, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,562 (1992) 
(stating that "cognizable efficiencies include ... achieving economies of scale, better 
integration of production facilities, plant specialization, lower transportation costs, 
and similar efficiencies"), revision available in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) f 13,104, at 
20,569, 20,573-13 (Apr. 8, 1997). As Professor Williamson notes, such "efficiency" 
arguments are from the realm of price theory. See Williamson, supra note 31, at 272. 
196 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 4.0 (1997), available in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. f 
13,104, at 20,573-13 (noting that efficiencies will justify an otherwise anticompetitive 
merger only when they are passed along to consumers in the form oflower prices). 
197 See Kahn, supra note 40, at 324 n.160 (arguing that if a package sale is beneficial 
to purchasers, sellers could make it optional); Turner, supra note 22, at 66-67 (same). 
198 See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
199 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15 n.19, Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (No. 82-1031) ("The court of appeals 
erred in holding that such cost savings brought about an anticompetitive result merely 
by increasing the Hospital's profits. Arrangements that increase efficiency and lower 
costs enhance welfare, even if they also increase a firm's profits. It is, of course, the 
profit incentive that motivates firms to innovate and to reduce costs." (citation omit-
ted)). This statement, of course, is a classic application of the allocative-efficiency 
criterion. 
200 See id. at 23 ("Another recognized justification for tying is to protect the seller's 
goodwill by assuring that the tying product is used with essential complements that do 
not impair the product's quality or performance."). 
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II. CONSTRUCTING A NEW PARADIGM 
Given the inadequacies of the Chicago School approach, any at-
tempt to undo the per se rule against tying-in either its Traditional 
or Modern form-must rest on some new paradigm of analysis. Any 
new model must be different from the Traditional approach, and 
from that offered by Chicago. A new approach should ideally possess 
several characteristics. First, it must not rest upon controversial nor-
mative premises about the purposes of the antitrust laws, but instead 
must take as a given the Traditionalist assumption that "coercive forc-
ing" merits condemnation. Second, it must provide some benign 
explanation for tying contracts. It must explain why, aside from a 
desire to affect competition in the market for the tied product, the 
seller of a tying product might seek to assert control over the buyer's 
selection of the tied product. Third, it must offer some alternative to 
the Traditionalist assumption that all tying contracts are "imposed" 
through some exercise of market power and thus represent coercive 
forcing. Fourth, it must explain why the existence of less restrictive-
if somewhat less effective-alternatives to ties should not ipso facto 
establish their illegality. Fifth, it must produce conclusions suffi-
ciently robust to apply outside the confines of the world described by 
price theory. Most importantly, it must yield predictions useful in a 
world, like ours, characterized by the sort of monopolistic competi-
tion that results from product differentiation. Sixth and finally, the 
approach must provide a convincing rationale for altering current 
doctrine despite the principle of stare decisis. 
Fortunately, antitrust scholars need not look far for such a para-
digm. Indeed, one can say, to Chicago Schoolers, at least, that the 
paradigm is "just under your noses" -in the work of Professor Ronald 
Coase and his intellectual successors, work that is now collectively 
referred to as the New Institutional Economics. 
A. Rnnald Coase and the New Institutional Economics 
Over two decades ago, Professor Coase lamented the propensity 
of academicians to condemn trade practices, such as non-standard 
contracts, that they did not understand.201 As he put it: 
201 See COASE, supra note 37, at 60-61; see also WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 19 
(describing "customer and territorial restrictions, tie-ins, block booking, franchising, 
vertical integration, and the like" as "nonstandard modes of economic organization"). 
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[I]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or 
other-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explana-
tion. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number of ununder-
standable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a 
I I . . fi 202 monopo y exp anauon Is requent. 
51 
Many scholars, from both within and outside the Chicago School, 
have taken this as a criticism of the so-called "inhospitality approach" 
to antitrust law, associated with Donald Turner, Joseph Bain, and 
other devotees of the "Harvard School" of antitrust analysis.203 That 
approach adopted a price-theoretic explanation for such contracts, 
concluding that they constituted the exercise of market power to ex-
tend a firm's influence into another market.204 
Coase's criticism is certainly meant in that way.205 But it is also 
clear that Coase's criticism of the Harvard School is not meant in any 
way to elevate Chicago. Coase's criticism is not of the Harvard School 
itself, but rather of the use of price theory, or "blackboard econom-
ics," by any camp to explain suspicious trade practices, such as tying 
contracts and other forms of vertical integration.206 In illustrating his 
202 COASE, supra note 37, at 67. 
203 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 89, at4-7 (describing the inhospitality tradition 
in antitrust);Jacobs, supra note 34, at 227-28 & n.37 (describing the Harvard School). 
Contrary to the suggestions of some, see, e.g., id. at 230 n.52, the phrase "inhospitality 
tradition" was coined by Professor Turner, who stated: "I approach territorial and 
customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in 
the tradition of antitrust law," Robinson, supra note 31, at 29 (quoting Donald 
Turner); see also Kaplow, supra note 41, at 553-54 (discussing Professor Turner's inhos-
pitable approach to tying arrangements). 
204 See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text. 
205 SeeCOASE, supra note 37, at 59-60 (discussing Bain's work). 
206 See RH. COASE, The Finn, the Market, and the Law, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW, supra note 37, at 1, 28-29 (criticizing the undue devotion by economists to 
"blackboard economics"); WIWAMSON, supra note 35, at 189 ("[T]here [was] no place 
for ... nonstandard ... contracting practices within the applied price theory tradi-
tion .... "); Williamson, supra note 31, at 273 & n.6 ("The prevailing applied price 
theory orientation within industrial organization ... gave succor to the inhospitality 
tradition."). 
It is worth noting here that Chicagoans may not agree with Professor Coase's char-
acterization of the Harvard School as engaging in price theory. Judge Posner, for 
instance, describes the Harvard School this way: 
[I]n the 1950s and early 1960s, industrial organization, the field of economics 
that studies monopoly questions, tended to be untheoretical, descriptive, 
"institutional," and even metaphorical. Casual observation of business behav-
ior, colorful characterizations (such as the term "barrier to entry"), eclectic 
forays into sociology and psychology, descriptive statistics, and verification by 
plausibility took the place of the careful definitions and parsimonious logical 
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cnUctsm, Coase focuses as much on George Stigler's work as on 
Joseph Bain's, and surely Stigler is a member of the Chicago 
School.207 To Coase, price theory is the main culprit, and price theory 
is the self-admitted foundation of the Chicago School, a foundation 
that, as explained earlier, has not provided a sound basis for critiqu-
ing either the Traditional or the Modem approach to tying con-
tracts.208 
At this point, one may fairly ask: Other than the Traditionalist-
Harvard approach, on the one hand, and the Chicago approach, on 
the other, what else is there? Although there are certainly other 
normative theories of what antitrust law should do, they generally rest 
on (even) more controversial premises than do the prescriptions of 
the Chicago School.209 Absent a substitute for price theory that can 
provide useful insights within the Traditional normative framework 
that the Supreme Court has adopted with respect to tying contracts, 
Coase's lament is hardly useful for antitrust lawyers. 
Luckily, Coase is more than a debunker, and his work suggests a 
third way. By "work" I mean not just the theorem that made him 
famous, but also, and perhaps more importantly, his work on what 
makes firms tick. More precisely, I am referring to his research on 
why we have firms at all.210 It is this work, the inspiration of the so-
called "New Institutional Economics," that directly challenges price 
structure of economic theory. The result was that industrial organization 
regularly advanced propositions that contradicted economic theory. 
An example is the "leverage" theory of tie-ins that Donald Turner, a Har-
vard economist in the Edward Mason and Joe Bain tradition, espoused .... 
Posner, supra note 23, at 928-29. 
207 See COASE, supra note 37, at 59-60 (discussing Bain and Stigler as having 
authored "two of the most respected books" on the subject of industrial organization); 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 26 (noting that "applied price theory," against which 
Coase railed, infused the work of Bain and Stigler); see also Posner, supra note 23, at 
931-33 (describing Stigler's contributions to the Chicago School of antitrust analysis). 
208 See supra Part LB. 
209 One "natural rights" school, for instance, would return to the classical eco-
nomic philosophy of the 19th century and abolish antitrust law altogether, hardly a 
legitimate project for the courts. See D.T. Armentano, Time to Repeal Antitrust Regula-
tion'!, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 311, 327-28 (1990); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1911) (observing that the Sherman Act was a conscious rejection of 
classical political economy); HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 285 (noting the neoclassi-
cal interpretation of the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court in the late 19th century). 
210 SeeCoase, supra note 35, at 386 (attempting to explain the origin of firms); R.H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (articulating what would be-
come known as "the Coase Theorem"). 
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theory and its conclusions about the origins of, and appropriate anti-
1. d . 211 trust po 1cy towar , tymg contracts. 
In the world of price theory, there are two types of actors: firms 
and consumers.212 Consumers seek to maximize their utility in light 
of their own preferences, budget constraints, and the relative prices 
of products available in the market.213 A firm, on the other hand, 
must decide what and how much to produce in light of its own costs, 
consumer demand, and the resulting price that its output will com-
mand.214 In this world, the firm is a mysterious animal, a kind of black 
box, surrounded by the chaos and disorder of the market.215 Its exis-
tence is taken as a given; the amount it produces and the inputs it 
utilizes are determined by a "production function."216 Moreover, the 
boundary between "the firm" and "the market"-that is, the distinc-
tion between what the firm produces itself and what it purchases from 
suppliers-is determined by technology and, perhaps, by the suppli-
ers' production costs.217 In this world, the use of tying contracts and 
211 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 42643 (1995) (describing 
the New Institutional Economics); WILLIAMSON, supra note 94, at 1-19 (same). 
212 See generally STIGLER, supra note 79, at 21-119. 
215 See generally id. at 21-83. 
214 See generally id. at 104-19. 
215 One source quoted by Coase appropriately captures this price-theoretic charac-
terization of the firm. See Coase, supra note 35, at 388 (characterizing firms as "'islands 
of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter 
coagulating in a pail of buttermilk'" (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, CONTROL OF IN-
DUSTRY85 (1923))). 
216 See KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 88 
(1974) (noting that "[a] general statement of all outputs that can be obtained from all 
efficient input combinations is called the production function"); George J. Stigler, The 
Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 185, 187 (1951) 
("The firm is usually viewed as purchasing a series of inputs, from which it obtains one 
or more salable products, the quantities of which are related to the quantities of the 
inputs by a production function."). 
217 As Professor Williamson put it: 
The prevailing orientation toward economic organization [ordained by price 
theory] was that technological features of firm and market organization were 
determinative. The allocation of economic activity as between firms and mar-
kets was taken as a datum; firms were characterized as production functions; 
markets served as signaling devices; contracting was accomplished through an 
auctioneer; and disputes were disregarded because of the presumed efficacy 
of court adjudication. 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 7; see also id. at 86-90; Stigler, supra note 216, at 185 
(noting that economists "have generally treated as a (technological?) datum the prob-
lem of what the firm does-what governs its range of activities or functions"). Profes-
sor Stigler then argues that the extent of vertical integration within an industry is 
determined by the depth of the market and the resulting opportunities for specializa-
tion by firms and their suppliers. See id. The extent to which this was an improvement 
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other devices to influence the purchasing decisions of a firm's cus-
tomers appear to be attempts to employ market power to extend a 
firm's influence beyond its "natural" boundaries or to reduce a firm's 
costs of production.218 This approach, of course, explains the Tradi-
tional assertion that ties are methods of exploiting a firm's market 
power by "leveraging" into the market for the tied product, as well as 
the assertion by Chicagoans that ties are a means of affecting compe-
tition in the tied product in order to engage in price discrimina-
tion.219 
It was Coase, however, who first asked why the animal exists, and 
why it does what it does. After all, no firm does all of its own work; 
each purchases some supplies and/ or services (including distribu-
tion) from other firms. Sometimes the firm buys its inputs in the spot 
market, while other times it acquires them pursuant to long-term 
contracts. If a firm can do some of its work by contract, as opposed to 
internally, why does it not do all of its work that way?220 Or, to come at 
the problem from the opposite direction, why do firms choose to farm 
some projects out in the first place?221 When they do, why might they 
rely upon long-term contracts instead of the spot market? 
The answer Coase gave was, at least to him, "very simple."222 It is 
true, he said, that all work performed within a firm could be per-
formed outside it. Even if firms were outlawed, work could still, theo-
retically, get done. Individuals formerly employed by firms could 
over the traditional price-theoretic approach is the subject of some debate. For, al-
though Stigler was not content simply to take the boundary between the firm and the 
market as a given, the derivation of that boundary is ultimately founded on (and lim-
ited by) price theory. See, e.g., COASE, supra note 37, at 65 ("Stigler does not take us 
very far, but he takes us as far as we have gone."). 
218 See Williamson, supra note 31, at 272 (explaining that "[e]fforts to extend the 
reach of the firm [beyond its natural boundaries as defined by technology] 
were ... presumed to be anticompetitive"); see also Bork, supra note 90, at 200 
(concluding that the beneficial purposes of vertical integration are twofold: "enabling 
the firm so organized to bypass a monopoly at one level, or ... enabling the achieve-
ment of internal efficiencies"). 
219 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (explaining the Traditionalist 
approach and the Chicago assertion that ties are generally efforts directed at exploit-
ing market power through price discrimination). 
220 See Coase, supra note 35, at 390 ("Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm 
emerges at all in a specialised exchange economy."). 
221 See id. at 394 ("A pertinent question to ask would appear to be ... why, if by 
organising one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, 
are there any market transactions at all? Why is not all production carried on by one 
big firm?" (footnote omitted)). 
222 
"The solution to the puzzle ... was, as it turned out, very simple." RH. Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 19 (1988). 
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simply coordinate their activities by contract.223 In the real world, 
however, such coordination might entail significant costs. Individuals 
must negotiate contracts, monitor compliance with them, and en-
force them. In this world, then, a firm is more than just a production 
function that takes certain prices as a given and responds accordingly. 
Instead, it is a device for reducing the transaction costs attending the 
endless haggling associated with purely individual production. 224 
Once it is conceded that a firm exists for the purpose of reducing 
transaction costs, we can, theoretically, determine the extent to which 
a firm will vertically integrate. In other words, we are able to tell what 
sorts of work a firm will do internally, and what work it ·will farm out 
to other firms.225 Moreover (and perhaps more important for pur-
poses of this Article), once it is recognized that everything done 
within a firm could, at least theoretically, be performed outside of it 
and vice versa, we realize that the line, drawn by price theory, be-
tween "firms" and the "market" or between "firms" and "consumers" 
is purely arbitrary. This suggests that contractual integration should 
not necessarily be viewed as an attempt to "extend" a firm's reach 
beyond its "natural" boundaries.226 Once it is recognized that the 
scope of intrafirm production is not necessarily related to the differ-
ent production costs experienced by a firm and its suppliers, but can 
instead be determined by the transaction costs associated with reli-
ance upon the market, new (and benign) explanations are suggested 
for practices, such as long-term contracts, partial acquisitions, and the 
like that are not explicable by a price-theoretic model, except as at-
tempts to extend a firm's control into an adjacent market. Just as the 
creation of a firm might reduce transaction costs, so too might less 
225 See Coase, supra note 35, at 388 ("[H]aving regard to the fact that if production 
is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organi-
sation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation?"); see also Steven 
Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-5 (1983). 
224 See Coase, supra note 35, at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to estab-
lish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism."). 
Consider Professor Williamson's comments: 
The older theory of the firm as production function gradually made way (or 
gave way) to a theory of the firm in which express allowance was made for 
transaction costs. Accordingly, the firm was thereafter described as a govern-
ance structure .... Technology was no longer determinative, and the 
boundaries of the firm (what to make, what to buy, how to trade, etc.) now 
needed to be derived. 
Williamson, supra note 31, at 273. 
225 See Coase, supra note 35, at 396-97. 
m See WIWAMSON, supra note 35, at 87-88. 
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drastic levels of integration without forgoing all of the advantages of 
1 . th k 227 re ymg on e mar et. 
Now, it is critically important to recognize that the transaction 
costs that cause reliance upon the market to fail, and thus determine 
the existence and scope of a firm under Coase's analysis, need not be 
conceptualized only as the sort of bargaining or haggling costs ordi-
narily associated with that term.228 Instead, as Oliver Williamson and 
others have emphasized, these costs may include any number of dis-
advantages associated with reliance upon markets instead of firms, 
that is, with "transacting" as opposed to "directing" economic activ-
ity.229 Such costs include the possibility of opportunistic behavior, that 
is, that parties will shirk their responsibilities and impose costs on the 
other party to the transaction, as well as the real-world difficulty of 
enforcing contracts that purport to prevent such behavior. Of course, 
these latter costs of using the market-and the resulting market fail-
ures-only exist because of the former costs; if there were no bargain-
ing or information costs, parties could anticipate or discover all 
incidents of opportunistic behavior, and punish them via a perfectly 
designed contractual regime.230 Still, it is useful to conceptualize 
227 See infra notes 244-49 and ~ccompanying text (discussing the benefits of inte-
gration at various levels). I do not mean to suggest that price theory can never explain 
the scope and make-up of a firm's production. It is possible, for instance, that vertical 
integration will create efficiencies of the sort traditionally considered by price theo-
rists. See Williamson, supra note 31, at 273 ("[During the 1970s,] the social benefits of 
efficient resource allocation-to include the importance of economies as an antitrust 
defense-became much more widely appreciated." (footnote omitted)). However, 
even where these efficiencies point in a certain direction, insights provided by the 
New Institutionalism often lead convincingly the other way. See, e.g., infra notes 234-39 
and accompanying text (explaining, within a New Institutional framework, why major 
airlines integrate vertically by purchasing their commuter partners, even though such 
integration raises the cost of production by subjecting commuter operations to the 
higher cost structure of the majors). 
228 Cf Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra~ 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-98 (1972) (defining 
transaction costs narrowly to include only haggling and information costs). But see 
Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 144-47 (1979) 
(discussing traditional definition of transaction costs and arguing that the definition 
should be expanded). 
229 See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 20-22; see also COASE, supra note 206, at 7 
("The limit to the size of the firm is set where its costs of organizing a transaction 
become equal to the cost of carrying it out through the market."); Dahlman, supra 
note 228, at 148 ("These then, represent the first approximation to a workable con-
cept of transaction costs: search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, 
policing and enforcement costs."). 
230 See Dahlman, supra note 228, at 148 ("Policing and enforcement costs are in-
curred because there is lack of knowledge as to whether one (or both) of the parties 
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these latter costs separately, insofar as, once contracts are entered, 
information and bargaining costs are significant.231 
Thus, any attempt to explain why economic activity occurs within 
a firm must begin ·with the recognition that the alternative vehicle-
transacting-is often characterized by "market failure," that is, a devi-
ance from the result that the parties would select in the absence of 
bargaining and information costs. Any explanation of this or that 
amount of integration must take into account the possibility that 
other choices, while perhaps more efficient from the sort of static 
perspective familiar to price theorists, actually impose high 
"governance" costs on the relationship and are thus undesirable.232 
According to Professors Coase and Williamson, then, price theory-
whether applied by the Traditional or Chicago Schools-may be en-
tirely useless in explaining why a given variety of integration takes 
place, just as it is useless in explaining why, for instance, an automo-
bile company chooses to manufacture its own automobile bodies, but 
relies on others to distribute the finished product.233 
The recent history of the airline industry provides a useful exam-
ple of the superiority of the NIE over price theory in explaining and 
predicting the cause and extent of vertical integration. In the late 
1970s, major air carriers began to develop partnerships with smaller 
commuter airlines as a means of "delivering" passengers from small 
towns to the majors' hubs, where passengers would board a mcyor's 
flight on the way to their ultimate destination.234 These partnerships 
involved so-called codesharing agreements, under which the flights of 
involved in the agreement will violate his part of the bargain: if there were adequate 
foreknowledge ... , these costs could be avoided .... "). 
231 See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 20-22. 
252 See id. at 2-5 (noting that price theory fails to account for the possibility of op-
portunism and imperfect contract enforcement); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical 
Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 120 
(1971) ("If checks are costly and proof of contractual violation difficult, contractual 
sharing arrangements manifestly experience short-run limitations."); see also Otto A 
Davis & Morton I. Kamien, Externalities, Information and Alternative Collective Action, in 
PUBUC EXPENDITURES AND POUCY ANALYSIS 74, 90-91 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius 
Margolis eds., 1970). 
233 See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 110 (noting that the transaction-cost model 
explains an automobile manufacturer's decision to distribute via franchises); 
~enjamin Klein eta!., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contract-
ing Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 308-10 (1978) (noting that similar considerations 
explain General Motors's decision to manufacture its own auto bodies). 
254 So, for instance, a resident of Springfield, Illinois, who wished to fly to Seattle, 
Washington, might be "delivered" to Chicago by a commuter carrier, and then pro-
ceed to Seattle on a flight by a major carrier. 
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the commuter would be advertised to the public under the "code" or 
label of the major carrier, suggesting that they were, in fact, flights of 
the major.235 As a purely static, price-theoretic matter, these relation-
ships minimized costs, because commuter operations were less ex-
pensive than those run by mcyor carriers.236 Application of a price-
theoretic model, then, would have predicted that, so long as com-
muter carriers retained these lower cost structures, major carriers 
would rely on the market, that is, would continue to look to these 
smaller carriers to transport passengers to hubs, and codeshare rela-
tionships would thrive.237 
Such predictions, however, were off the mark. Although code-
share relationships did minimize short-run operating costs, they also 
created a situation in which the quality (or lack thereof) of the com-
muter's operation was attributed to the trademark, and hence the 
reputation, of the major carrier.238 More technically, commuter carri-
ers did not internalize the full benefits of their investments in high-
quality service and thus were left with insufficient incentives to main-
tain such quality. This market failure, in tum, led most major airlines 
to substitute additional integration for the more traditional codeshare 
model of doing business, by, for instance, purchasing their commut-
ers outright or starting commuter operations of their own, even 
though these strategies led to higher operating costs.239 Far from 
235 See Allegheny Substitute-SeiV. Agreements, 80 C.A.B. 588, 592-94 (1979) 
(discussing promotion of commuter flights by a major carrier); DON H. PICKRELL & 
CUNTON V. OSTER, A STUDY OF THE REGIONALAIRUNE INDUSTRY 36 (1986) (discussing 
potential for confusion as to which airline will be running the "delivery" flight). These 
"advertisements" would usually consist of display in a travel agent's computer reserva-
tion system, or in the so-called Official Airline Guide. See United Air Lines v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1109-11 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the operation of 
computer reservation systems). 
236 See Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm 
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. ON REG. 393, 410-11 (1987) (discussing why vertical 
integration is more costly for major carriers than contractual alliances). 
237 See TRANSPORTATION REsEARCH BD., WINDS OF CHANGE: DOMESTIC AIR TRANs-
PORTATION SINCE DEREGULATION 55, 155-56 (1991) (discussing the benefits of 
codesharing for major airlines); cf. Stigler, supra note 216. 
238 See Levine, supra note 236, at 439-40 ("The use of large airlines' codes was a 
powerful form of information and signalled to passengers a great many product at-
tributes which were not in fact present."). 
239 See id. Economists have identified many other instances in which vertical inte-
gration is a response to market failures of various types that accompany reliance upon 
the market. See, e.g., WilliAMSON, supra note 35, at 103-30, 103 (arguing that "vertical 
integration ... is more consistent with transaction cost economizing than with the 
leading alternatives"); Scott E. Masten eta!., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 1, 8 (1991) (examining determinants of vertical integration in the shipbuilding 
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thriving, then, codesharing agreements, without any additional inte-
gration, are almost a thing of the past, consistent with teachings of 
the NIE. 
B. Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics 
As already suggested, ordinary price-theoretic models do not ac-
count for the possibility of market failure; instead, they assume that 
the firms and consumers in question internalize the costs and bene-
fits of their actions, that is, that there are no externalities.240 This 
assumption is not an assumption in the nature of a premise; instead, 
it flows from other assumptions, that is, that all parties have perfect 
information and that there are no transaction costs. For, in such a 
world, there are no externalities-that, after all, is the point of the 
Coase Theorem.241 Indeed, price theorist George Stigler has defined 
the Coase Theorem with reference to perfect competition: "under 
perfect competition private and social costs will be equal. "242 
In the real world, of course, there are transaction costs and thus 
there are often externalities associated with reliance on the market. 243 
As suggested above, vertical integration may be a method of eliminat-
ing, or at least attenuating, these externalities.244 By assuring that 
industry); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 
21 J.L. & ECON. 223, 228 (1978) (describing how franchise relationship is character-
ized by externalities that can be eliminated through partial integration). 
2
'
0 See COASE, supra note 206, at 15 ("[D]iscussion of the Coase theorem is con-
cerned with a situation in which transaction costs, explicitly or implicitly, are assumed 
to be zero."). 
2
<1 See Coase, .supra note 210. 
2
'
2 STIGLER, supra note 79, at 113; .see also COASE, .supra note 206, at 15 ("The world 
of zero transaction costs, to which the Coase Theorem applies, is the world of modern 
economic analysis, and economists therefore feel quite comfortable handling the 
intellectual problems it poses, remote from the real world though they may be."). As 
Coase pointed out, however, it is not perfect competition itself that leads to the equa-
tion of private and social costs, but instead the absence of bargaining costs. See RH. 
COASE, Note.s on the Problem of Social Co.st, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW, supra 
note 37, at 95, 158. · 
243 See RH. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3, 17 (1988) 
("The solution was to realize that there were costs of making transactions in a market 
economy and that it was necessary to incorporate them into the analysis. This was not 
done in economics at the time-nor, I may add, is it in most present-day economic 
theory."). 
2
" See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text; .see also WIWAMSON, supra note 
35, at 103-30; Williamson, supra note 232, at 121-22 ("[V]ertical integration may ... be 
undertaken because of the defective specification of property rights."). See generally 
Coase, .supra note 35, at 390-92 (discussing how establishing a firm can alleviate costs 
of using the price mechanism). 
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property rights are assigned in a way that induces parties to internal-
ize the costs of their actions, such integration can reduce the private 
and social costs associated with the sort of continuing relationship 
between two self-interested parties that characterizes reliance on the 
market.245 
Such integration is not an ali-or-nothing proposition.246 Often, 
complete integration creates its own problems. Formerly independ-
ent entrepreneurs are now employees, who might lack the incentives 
to remain productive and creative.247 Bureaucracies might grow as 
fast as firms, increasing the costs of internal coordination.248 Not all 
airlines, for instance, own their commuter partners outright; some, 
instead, simply hold large (but minority) equity positions in them, 
coupled ·with detailed contracts giving the m<9or carrier substantial 
control over the commuter's operations.249 By choosing the right mix 
' 
2
" See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 111-14 (discussing transaction-cost interpreta-
tion); Williamson, supra note 232, at ll8, 121-22. 
216 See Coase, supra note 222, at 27; see also Cheung, supra note 223, at 19 ("The 
polar cases are complicated by middlemen and subcontractors; agents contract among 
themselves; and any type of input may support a variety of contractual arrangements. 
We surmise that these very complications, which render 'the firm' ambiguous, have 
arisen from attempts to save transaction costs that were not avoidable in the polar 
cases."); Klein et al., supra note 233, at 326 ("[The] primary distinction between trans-
actions made within a firm and transactions made in the marketplace may be too 
simplistic. Many long term contractual relationships ... blur the line between the 
market and the firm."); cf. Coase, supra note 35, at 392 n.1 (discussing the definition of 
a firm). 
217 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94]. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986) (stating that 
"[complete] integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and distortionary be-
havior, but it does not remove these incentives"). 
248 See Coase, supra note 35, at 394-95 ("[A]s a firm gets larger, there may be de-
creasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organising addi-
tional transactions within the firm may rise."). 
219 See PICKRELL & OSTER, supra note 235, at 80; Levine, supra note 236, at 441 
(describing how a number of larger airlines have acquired commuter airlines to en-
sure long-term availability). Similarly, firms frequently wish to realize the economies 
associated with joint production without merging their operations entirely. Thus, they 
may create a production joint venture that manufactures a product, which the part-
ners then sell in competition with each other. Unfettered competition, however, 
might lead to externalities and thus market failure related to the promotion and sale 
of the product, externalities that can only be eliminated by some form of partial inte-
gration in addition to that which is necessary purely for the purpose of production. 
See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (scrutinizing exclusive 
territories ancillary to production joint venture); Morton Plant Servs., Inc., 59 Fed. 
Reg. 49,996 (Dep'tjustice 1994) (approving, in a consent decree, a joint production 
venture but requiring separate selling of output). 
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of integration and reliance upon the market, a firm can minimize the 
sum of the costs of both methods of doing business. 
C. Tying as Partial Integration 
In many cases, tying can be viewed as partial vertical integration 
designed to eliminate or attenuate market failure. By vesting control 
over the selection of the tied product in the seller of the tying prod-
uct, a tying contract can eliminate the transaction costs that can result 
from reliance on the market (that is, the buyer's unfettered discre-
tion) for choice of the tied product. Although there are several ex-
amples of instances in which tying is properly characterized in this 
way, detailed discussion of three examples will suffice for purposes of 
this Article. 
1. False Attribution 
First, consider the most commonly asserted justification" for a ty-
ing contract, the so-called false-attribution defense.250 Often the func-
tioning of a machine or other product will depend upon the quality 
of inputs employed in conjunction with it.251 Use of poor quality in-
puts may cause the product to break down or malfunction, and cus-
tomers-who possess imperfect information about the interrelation 
of the product and its inputs-may attribute that breakdown to the 
quality of the product. 252 A classic example is the use of punch cards 
in a computing machine.253 Use of inferior cards might cause the 
machine to break down or produce incorrect computations. Custom-
ers, without knowledge-or any incentive to acquire knowledge-of 
250 This affirmative defense has been asserted in the Supreme Court since at least 
the 1930s and in lower courts even before then. See IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 
U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936) (discussing lessor's claim that the law "does not forbid tying 
clauses whose purpose and effect are to protect the good will of the lessor in the 
leased machines, even though monopoly ensues"); see also International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 
F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1935), affd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936); Radio Corp. of Am. v. 
Lord, 28 F.2d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1928); cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 48~4 (1992) (entertaining similar justification for tying 
contract alleged to be monopolistic). 
251 See FREDERICK R WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS 21-22 
(1978). 
252 See, e.g., id. at 22. 
255 See IBM Corp., 298 U.S. at 138-40 (scrutinizing a tying agreement requiring 
lessees to use cards produced by the manufacturer of machines). 
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the intricacies of the machine, may attribute the breakdown to the 
machine and not to the inferior cards. 
Pure reliance upon the market, however, would imply sale of the 
machine to customers without any restrictions on how it is used, or 
which inputs are used with it. Such complete reliance on the market, 
however, would be hampered by substantial market failure. Without 
the information necessary to make proper input choices, customers 
might cause more breakdowns than necessary, breakdowns that injure 
(improperly) the reputation of the seller's product, and any other 
products distributed under the seller's trademark. Moreover, even 
with perfect information, customers might not possess the incentives 
necessary to protect the seller's reputation by using inputs of a suffi-
cient quality to maintain an optimal rate of malfunctions. In short, 
the customer does not internalize the costs and benefits flowing from 
its choice of which inputs to employ.254 
Of course, it would be possible (theoretically) for the manufac-
turer to eliminate this externality through complete integration. In 
the 1930s, for instance, IBM could have integrated into accounting 
and all the other businesses that utilized computing machines, 
thereby ensuring that appropriate inputs (punch cards) were utilized 
with them.255 Such complete integration, however, would be ex-
tremely cosdy.256 By requiring all customers to purchase inputs from 
it, then, the manufacturer can eliminate market failure and thus real-
ize all the benefits of such integration, without any of the resulting 
costs. 257 The elimination of such market failure, in turn, will enhance 
the incentives of manufacturers to differentiate their products, 
thereby better satisfying the demands of the marketplace. 256 
25
• See WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 251, at 21-22 (characterizing the problem as 
one of externality); see also Wollenberg, supra note 24, at 754 & n.112 (same). 
255 Cf Coase, supra note 35, at 394 ("[W]hy, if by organising one can eliminate 
certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transac-
tions at all? Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?"). 
256 See Davis & Kamien, supra note 232, at 90 (arguing that the efficacy of merger as 
a solution to externalities diminishes with the number of actors involved). 
257 See WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 251, at 22 (stating that market failure "would 
appear to be solved by integration between the (single) input producer and the users 
of the input"); cf. Annen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, 
and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (arguing that vertical 
integration is often a response to the difficulty inherent in measuring the contribution 
of complementary inputs to a final product). 
258 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. 
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2. Franchising 
Next, consider the case of franchising. Most franchises are of a 
business-format variety, where the franchisor dictates the basic con-
tours of the business, but the franchisee controls the day-to-day opera-
tion ofit.259 In this capacity, the franchisee must choose which inputs 
to employ in producing the franchise product. A fast-food franchisee, 
for instance, must choose where to purchase various ingredients and 
supplies, such as paper products and spices.260 In making this choice, 
however, the franchisee faces skewed incentives. For, it is in the very 
nature of franchising that the quality produced by any given outlet 
will be attributed to the franchise trademark, and thus to the fran-
chise system as a whole.261 If high-quality inputs are chosen, other 
franchisees will benefit, as customers view the trademark more fa-
vorably and therefore patronize other franchisees displaying the 
mark; if low-quality inputs are chosen, other franchisees will suffer, as 
customers forsake them for outlets of a competing franchisor. 262 
In the jargon of the NIE, the reputation of a franchise system is a 
collective good, the production of which is characterized by market 
failure.263 Left to its own devices, then, the individual franchisee will 
259 See Kurt Strasser, Big Macs and Radio Shacks: Antitrust Policy for Business Fonnat 
Franchises, 27 ARiz. L. REV. 341, 341-42 (1985) ("[B]usiness format franchises involve 
a ... more fully integrated economic relationship in which the franchisor supplies 
know-how, and frequently facilities, for a complete business operation and the fran-
chisee operates the business to produce and sell the good or service."). 
260 See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 
368, 373 (5th Cir. 1977) (detailing various supplies, such as napkins and utensils, 
purchased by franchisees); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 888 (E.D. 
Mich. 1995); cJ. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 
(E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997). 
261 Indeed, trademark law has generally required the owner of the trademark to 
maintain uniform quality so that customers may rely upon the mark. See Dawn Donut 
Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959) (entertaining argu-
ment that trademark owner "failed to exercise the control required by the Lanham 
Act over the nature and quality of the goods sold by its licensees"); see also Landes & 
Posner, supra note 155, at 270 ("[A] firm's incentive to invest resources in developing 
and maintaining ... a strong mark depends on its ability to maintain consistent prod-
uct quality."). 
262 See Klein & Saft, supra note 148, at 349-50 ("Because the product is standard-
ized, consumers who receive products of less than anticipated quality will blame the 
entire group of retailers using the common name."). 
263 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14-16 (1965) (defining 
collective goods); Rubin, supra note 239, at 228 ("What is involved is a classic external-
ity problem. If any one franchise allows quality to deteriorate, he will generate reve-
nue because consumers perceive him as being of the same quality as other stores with 
the same trademark."). 
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behave opportunistically and purchase suboptimal inputs.264 Fran-
chisors will be left with weaker incentives to adopt policies that differ-
entiate their product from those of others, thus leading to a 
marketplace less able to satisfy various consumer preferences. 265 
A franchisor could eliminate this market failure entirely by refus-
ing to franchise in the first place, that is, by integrating forward into 
the manufacture and distribution of the franchise product. Although 
many franchisors do own some of their own outlets, such total inte-
gration often destroys the efficiencies associated with the reliance on 
the market that franchising involves.266 Short of total integration, the 
parties could include a "best efforts" provision in the franchise con-
tract, a provision that likely would be interpreted as preventing shirk-
ing by franchisees.267 Such a provision, however, would be difficult to 
monitor and enforce, particularly in light of the incentives facing the 
franchisee.268 By simply requiring a franchisee to purchase inputs 
from a franchisor, then, a tying contract can eliminate the market 
264 See Klein & Saft, supra note 148, at 349-50 (noting that "franchise arrangements 
create an incentive for franchisees to shirk on quality"); Rubin, supra note 239, at 228 
(discussing potential externalities created by franchise relationship). 
265 See Klein & Saft, supra note 148, at 349-50 ("Because the quality information 
applies to a group of franchisees using a common name, there is a free-riding prob-
lem."). 
266 See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 110 (examining why automobile manufactur-
ers choose to distribute vehicles via franchisees instead of through company-owned 
dealerships);James A Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice ofOrganizationalFrmn: 
The Case of Franchising, 18J. FIN. ECON. 401, 407-08 (1987) (discussing costs of owning 
versus franchising). Of course, quality control may not be the only rationale for such 
integration. Two scholars, for instance, have suggested that, by owning some of their 
own outlets and thus putting their own capital at risk, franchisors signal to potential 
franchisees that the opportunity is, indeed, profitable. See Nancy T. Gallini & Nancy A 
Lutz, Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 471, 472-73 
(1992). See generally Francine Lafontaine, Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: 
Evidence from Franchising, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1993). 
267 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 66-67 (noting that perfect "general clause" 
contracting can eliminate opportunistic behavior); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1111-30 (1981) (discussing "best efforts" pro-
visions in distribution context). Indeed, the covenant of good faith that is implied. in 
every contract may well impose on the franchisee a duty not to shirk via the purchase 
of inferior inputs. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir. 
1979) (noting that the implied covenant of good faith prevents one party to a fran-
chise contract from depriving the other party of the benefits reasonably expected 
from the relationship). 
268 See Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. 
REV. 521, 523, 575-80 (1981) (discussing shirking by franchisees as a paradigmatic 
example of opportunistic behavior); see also WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 68-84 
(describing how classical contract law is an imperfect mechanism for governing long-
term relations). 
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failure inherent in allowing the franchisee to choose its own inputs, 
while at the same time retaining the other benefits of reliance upon 
the market through franchising.269 The ability to differentiate prod-
ucts will be enhanced, and consumer desires better satisfied. 
3. Complex Machinery and the Production oflnformation 
Finally, consider the case of a manufacturer of a complex ma-
chine who, in the process of maintaining the machine after it is sold, 
might gain valuable knowledge about its workings. By requiring pur-
chasers of the machine also to purchase post-sale maintenance serv-
ices from it, the manufacturer can ensure that it is in a position to 
gather this sort of information.270 Absent such a requirement, pur-
chasers-who do not internalize the benefits of the information gen-
erated by the seller during the maintenance process-may turn 
elsewhere for such service, with the result that a suboptimal amount 
of information about the working of the machine will be generated.271 
Here again, tying can eliminate the market failure that would result 
from leaving the buyer to choose, on its own, the proper service pro-
vider. This justification, it seems, will have increasing relevance in 
this era of rapidly changing technology, as indicated by the several 
recent cases involving attempts by manufacturers to require purchas-
ers also to buy repair service from them.272 
These are not the only ways in which tying contracts can eliminate 
market failure; scholars have identified others.273 The balance of this 
269 See Klein & Saft, supra note 148, at 351-53 ("[G]iven the incentive for free riding 
it makes sense for the franchisor to require that franchisees use certain inputs."); 
Meese, supra note 73, at 117-19 ("By ensuring that franchisees purchase inputs of a 
certain quality ... tying contracts can prevent a deterioration in the reputation of the 
franchise product and trademark."). 
270 See 3A PHilliP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'I 806e3, at 
338 (1996) ("[S]ervicing can yield information about component or design weak-
nesses that will materially contribute to product improvement."). 
271 See id. at 338-39. 
272 See PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 813-22 (6th Cir.) 
(scrutinizing requirement by Honeywell that purchasers of its circuit boards also buy 
repair services from it), cerl. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1424-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (scrutinizing requirement that 
purchasers of software servicing also purchase hardware servicing); Allen-Myland, Inc. 
v. IBM Corp., 33 F.3d 194, 201-11 (3d Cir. 1994) (scrutinizing requirement that pur-
chasers of computer upgrades also purchase installation services); Service & Training, 
Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 684-88 (4th Cir. 1992) (scrutinizing requirement 
that purchasers of diagnostic software also purchase repair services). 
275 For instance, two economists have argued that requiring purchasers to buy 
several items of disparate quality in one package may eliminate socially wasteful search 
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Article, however, will confine its discussion to the three types of mar-
ket failure just detailed, particularly the false attribution problem 
and, to a lesser extent, franchising. 
III. DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF FORCING 
Although some adherents to the New Institutional Economics 
have recognized that tying can eliminate market failure, none has 
attempted to translate this insight into a comprehensive critique of 
tying doctrine, either in its Traditional or Modern form.274 As shown 
below, however, the realization that tying can be a form of vertical 
integration that eliminates market failure has powerful ramifications 
for Modern tying doctrine, as well as the Traditional thinking that has 
so strongly influenced it. By offering an explanation of ties that is 
unrelated to the exercise or expectation of market power, the realiza-
tion suggests that ties can arise absent any "forcing." If this is the 
case, the Traditional hostility toward ties and the concomitant sup-
port for the per se rule, premised as it is upon the belief that all such 
contracts are the result of "coercive forcing," lacks foundation. 
Moreover, the Modern approach, which presumes per se illegal forc-
ing whenever the seller possesses market power, does not constitute a 
rational means of sorting coercive from noncoercive ties, but instead 
rests upon a presumption that does not reflect economic realities. 
Traditionalists may respond that any benefits of tying could be 
achieved through other forms of integration. However, close analysis 
reveals that these alternate forms of integration are almost always 
more expensive than outright ties, and never less expensive. Further, 
in light of the nature of the market failure that ties are designed to 
overcome, these more expensive alternatives will likely be less effec-
tive as well. Thus, the presence ofless restrictive alternatives does not 
militate against the conclusion offered here, namely, that the mere 
costs that would result from a "spot market" approach to selling the items in question. 
See Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
497, 500-16 (1983) (describing how diamond mines sell packages of diamonds, guar-
anteed to be of a certain average quality, in order to eliminate wasteful scrutiny by 
buyers of individual gems); see also United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 
(1962) (finding per se illegal the practice of "block booking" films sold to television 
stations). · 
27
• See WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 251, at 21-22 (discussing the benefits of inte-
gration, particularly in relation to eliminating externalities); WILUAMSON, supra note 
35, at 39. Indeed, in discussing tying contracts, Professor Williamson adopts decidedly 
Chicago School normative premises. He assumes, for instance, that ties that facilitate 
price discrimination leading to higher output should be legal. See id. at 373 & n.l4. 
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existence of a tie is as consistent with the presence of voluntary con-
tractual integration as it is with the presence of"forcing." 
Because tying contracts can arise without any exercise of market 
power, proof that a particular contract produces benefits by eliminat-
ing market failure implies that the contract is not the result of coer-
cive forcing. More importantly, the existence of a not insignificant 
proportion of contracts that produce these benefits suggests that the 
mere proof of a tying contract, even if obtained by a seller that pos-
sesses market power, does not imply that such a contract is related to 
the exercise or expectation of market power. Instead, the presence of 
a tie is equally consistent with the hypothesis that the agreement is 
purely voluntary contractual integration. Thus, any presumption, in 
the form of a per se rule or otherwise, that such contracts are "forced" 
on purchasers, is unwarranted, even when the seller possesses market 
power. Even if one adopts the Traditional normative premise that 
still animates current law-that is, that coercive forcing is harmful in 
and of itself-the per se rule must be abandoned, despite considera-
tions of stare decisis. 
A. The Chimera of Forcing 
As explained earlier, the Traditional approach assumes that all ty-
ing contracts result from an exercise of market power, that is, that no 
firm can obtain an agreement to a tie without inducing that agree-
ment through "forcing."275 Modern doctrine, while seeming to admit 
that ties can arise in competitive markets, still assumes that, where 
market power is present, the firm that has obtained the tie must have 
employed that power.276 Indeed, the ratio decidendi of jefferson Parish is 
just that: When a seller possesses market power and obtains an 
agreement to a tie, a presumption is established that forcing has oc-
curred, a presumption that may be irrebuttable.277 
The insights provided by the NIE entirely undermine the prem-
ises of both the Traditional and the Modern approaches to tying con-
tracts. Although many firms that employ such contracts possess some 
degree of market power, the possession of such power is in no way 
275 See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text. 
276 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
277 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984); see also 
Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs., Inc., 806 F.2d 953, 957-58 (lOth Cir. 1986) 
(suggesting that the presumption in jefferson Parish is irrebuttable); Ringtown Wilbert 
Vault Works v. Schuylkill Mem'l Park, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 823, 825 (E.D. Pa. 1986) 
(same); supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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necessary to the negotiation or procurement of a tying contract that 
eliminates market failure. Instead, sellers can obtain agreement to 
such contracts through a process of purely voluntary negotiation. 
At first glance, the assertion that voluntary negotiation can lead to 
contracts that overcome market failure may seem counterintuitive. 
After all, the usual response to market failure is the exercise of some 
form of coercion to end it. No one would suggest, for instance, that 
the provision of national defense-a classic example of a good whose 
production is characterized by market failure-should be left to 
whatever private contracts would result from bargaining among 250 
million citizens.278 Similarly, one may ask, if a customer does not in-
ternalize these costs and benefits of its actions once it has purchased 
the tying product, how can a seller induce this customer to act as 
though it does internalize the costs and benefits without some exer-
cise of coercion? 
The solution to this apparent conundrum requires a recognition 
that it is based upon a false premise. Like the location of the bound-
ary between the firm and the market, market failure is not a perma-
nent condition determined by technology or physical laws. Instead, it 
exists only in those circumstances in which significant bargaining and 
information costs prevent parties from organizing their joint activities 
in an optimal way.279 Whether these costs do, in fact, lead to market 
failure depends upon the allocation of property rights, the incentives 
facing parties holding such entitlements, and the cost of transferring 
or redefining those rights.280 · 
278 See, e.g., J. RONNIE DAVIS & CHARLES W. MEYER, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE 
32-34 (1983) (employing the production of national defense as an example of coer· 
cive government intervention in order to eliminate the market failure that would 
result from voluntary production); OLSON, supra note 263, at 14, 145. 
279 See COASE, supra note 206, at 28-30 (attributing market failure to lack of bar· 
gaining and information); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: 
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Ver.sus Nonmarket Allocation, in PUBLIC EXPEN-
DITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 232, at 59, 60 ("[M]arket failure is not abso-
lute; it is better to consider a broader category, that of transaction costs, which in 
general impede and in particular cases block the formation of markets."); see also, e.g., 
Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11, 
30-32 (1973) (describing how contracting overcomes possible market failure in the 
bee-pollination industry); Dahlman, supra note 228, at 147-48 (arguing that, absent 
information costs, there would be no externalities); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, 
Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36J.L. & ECON. 553 
(1993) (arguing that entitlements should be assigned in a way that minimizes the sum 
of externality and holdout costs). 
280 See RH. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 375-76 (1974) 
(arguing that, contrary to the assumptions of most economists, lighthouses are not 
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It is certainly true that once a customer has purchased a tying 
product, significant bargaining and information costs will lead to the 
sort of market failures described above as purchasers fail to internal-
ize the full costs and benefits of their actions. Buyers will, however, 
internalize these costs and benefits before they purchase the tying 
product. It is at this point, when parties are negotiating over the con-
tent of the contract ancillary to the sale of the tying product, that the 
seller can ensure that the purchaser internalizes the (future) costs of 
its actions. For, here, the seller has the option of charging the pur-
chaser a price that reflects the costs of the purchaser's refusal to agree 
to a contractual provision, such as a tie, that eliminates the possibility 
of future market failure. 281 
More precisely, where conditions are such that the buyer's post-
purchase use of the tying product will be characterized by market 
failure, the seller will offer the buyer two choices: (1) purchase of the 
tying product without any ancillary restrictions that will prevent mar-
ket failure, or (2) purchase of the tying product along with ancillary 
restrictions that will attenuate or eliminate the possibility of market 
failure.282 Of course, the seller will charge a higher price if the buyer 
exercises the first choice, a price that reflects the additional costs that 
the seller knows it will experience if the anticipated market failure is 
not eliminated.283 This "price differential" faced by the buyer, one 
(high) price for the tying product with no contractual provisions at-
tenuating market failure, and one (low) price for the tying product 
plus provisions that do attenuate market failure, ensures that the ex-
ternality that would arise subsequent to formation of the contract 
instead becomes a cost, a cost internalized by the purchaser before 
the contract is signed.284 Where this differential is greater than any 
necessarily collective goods, but may be transformed into private goods through the 
proper allocation of property rights). 
281 See WIWAMSON, supra note 35, at 33-34. 
282 See id.; Meese, supra note 73, at 137-41. 
283 See WIWAMSON, supra note 35, at 33-34 (noting that a seller will charge a higher 
price for a contract that does not include safeguards against market failure); cf. 
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, 
J.) (noting that sellers will pass along cost savings resulting from efficient contractual 
provisions). 
284 See STIGLER, supra note 79, at 113; Coase, supra note 210, at 1; see also Armen 
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. Hisr. 16, 21 
(1973) (describing how interference with price system increases bargaining costs); 
Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7-9 
(1969); FA Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 526-27 
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private benefits the buyer might realize from market failure, the 
buyer will be induced to agree to the (lower-priced) arrangement. 
Of course, this type of price differential looks exactly like the dif-
ferential pricing that constitutes the sort of forcing condemned by 
Traditional and Modem tying doctrines.285 Indeed, many reported 
cases in which forcing was found or alleged involved explicit differen-
tial prices: one for sale with a tie and one for sale without it. 286 There 
is, however, one crucial difference between these two types of differ-
ential. The differential associated with coercive forcing includes one 
price-the price for sale of the tying product by itself-that is above 
cost. The differential described by the NIE, in contrast, consists of 
two prices, each of which is costjustified.287 Insofar as market power is 
defined as the ability to price above cost, a price differential that 
merely reflects the reduction in cost associated with the avoidance of 
market failure is unrelated to the possession or exercise of market 
power, and thus does not constitute forcing in any economically 
. gful 288 meanm sense. 
(1945) (noting that price systems impound information and thus reduce the cost of 
transacting). 
285 See Former Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 
(1969); supra notes 116-18. 
286 See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139 (1936) (stating that the 
United States government paid a "15% increase in rental to secure the privilege of 
making its own cards" for use in IBM computing machines, rather than using IBM's 
cards); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457 (1922) (noting 
that "the discriminatory royalty clause" provided for "lower royalty for lessees who 
agree not to use certain machinery on shoes lasted on machines other than those 
leased from" the defendant); see also, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 465 
(1923) (recounting findings by the FTC that refiners had leased gasoline pumps to 
stations "at nominal prices and upon condition that the equipment should be used 
only with gasoline supplied by the lessor"). Thus, in light of the price differentials 
offered by companies to various purchasers, as evidenced in the preceding cases, the 
IBM case did not necessarily involve discrimination between the government and 
other purchasers. But see Grimes, supra note 45, at 275 n.43 (noting cases in which this 
discrimination did take place). Perhaps IBM would have allowed other purchasers to 
make their own cards if, like the government, they had paid an additional royalty. 
287 See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 33-35; Meese, supra note 75, at 187-89; see also 
STIGLER, supra note 79, at 113. 
288 See WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 23-29 (distinguishing between "monopoly 
branch" and "efficiency branch" of contract, and placing agreements that eliminate 
market failure in the latter); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (defining market power as the ability 
to set price above costs); cf. Coase, supra note 35, at 394-95 (asking and positing possi-
ble explanations for what, "apart from the monopoly considerations," determines the 
boundary between the firm and the open market); Coase, supra note 222, at 26-27 ("In 
the early 1930s I was looking for an explanation for the existence of the firm which 
did not depend on monopoly. I found it, of course, in transaction costs."). Indeed, 
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B. Less Restrictive Alternatives 
As noted earlier, Traditionalists occasionally admit that ties can 
produce procompetitive benefits, including the type of benefits that 
involve the elimination of market failure as predicted by the NIE.289 
Despite this recognition, however, Traditionalists have continued to 
support a per se rule against tying. In so doing, these scholars have 
relied heavily upon the purported presence of so-called less restrictive 
alternatives that, they say, can produce the same benefits as tying con-
tracts. 
This reliance on less restrictive alternatives has generally taken 
two forms. Some Traditionalists would apply a less restrictive alterna-
tive test on a case-by-case basis, that is, they would allow sellers to jus-
tify otherwise per se illegal ties, subject, however, to a showing by 
purchasers that the objective could be achieved through means other 
than the tie.290 Others see the general availability of such alternatives 
as an invitation to engage in a sort of "categorical balancing" that 
results in a declaration that all ties are per se illegal-with no possibil-
ity of justification-because such treatment does not deprive the 
economy of benefits that could not be realized in other ways.291 As 
several Traditionalists admit that a costjustified price differential does not constitute 
forcing, a result consistent with current law. See Slawson, Reana~zing Tie-in Doctrine, 
supra note 22, at 277-78 (defending differential pricing that is costjustified); Turner, 
supra note 22, at 75 (same); see also United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 5455 
(1962) (approving remedial decree that allowed costjustified differential pricing, even 
if that pricing induced purchasers to agree to a tying contract). 
289 See supra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Kaplow, supra note 41, at 540-
46,545 n.121; Slawson, Reana~zingTie-inDoctrine, supra note 22, at27476. 
290 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 22, at 337 (describing a proposal that would allow 
assertion of affirmative defenses to otherwise per se illegal ties); Slawson, Reanalyzing 
Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 275-76 (urging same). Indeed, Professor Bauer would 
place the burden on the seller to show that there are no less restrictive alternatives. See 
Bauer, supra note 22, at 337. As explained supra note 74, the Supreme Court has never 
endorsed such an affirmative defense to what it has deemed per se illegal conduct. 
Some lower courts, however, continue to entertain such defenses, at least in some 
contexts. See supra notes 72-73. 
:m See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 
(1969) ("[B]ecause tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose 
that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable 
restraint on competition provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie."); KAYSEN 
& TURNER, supra note 41, at 159 ("[A] flat rule against tying arrangements, regardless 
of whether or not they would serve a useful purpose, appears justified."); Turner, supra 
note 22, at 59-90 ("A per se rule is clearly justified if it protects a legitimate interest 
and if the restrictive practice serves no other legitimate interest; if the other interests 
can be equally well or nearly as well served by less restrictive devices; or if the contri-
butions to legitimate interests are •.. comparatively small."); see also Kaplow, supra note 
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shown below, neither of these lines of argument is persuasive, be-
cause each rests upon economic assumptions, ordinarily associated 
with a price-theoretic model, that are outmoded in light of the NIE. 
These assumptions, ironically, also are inconsistent with the Court's 
recent decision in Eastman Kodak. 292 
1. Case-By-Case Treatment 
Several scholars associated with the Traditional approach have 
suggested that the apparent harshness of the per se rule can be miti-
gated by the availability of "affirmative defenses."293 Thus, they argue, 
all explicit ties should be declared presumptively illegal, subject to ari 
exception, where it can be shown that any anticompetitive effects of 
the tie are outweighed by its procompetitive benefits.294 Unfortu-
nately, Traditionalists do not explain how the proponent of a tie can 
prove that its benefits outweigh the harm associated with it. Indeed, 
to the extent that the harm included within the Traditional calculus 
includes such values as "buyer freedom"295 and "entrepreneurial o~ 
portunity,"296 this balancing is impossible.297 
41, at 539 (suggesting a per se prohibition as one possible stance toward tying con-
tracts). The phrase "categorical balancing," of course, has been borrowed from First 
Amendment law. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categori-
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Ana~sis, 88 HAR.v. L. REv. 1482, 1500 (1975) 
(describing "categorical balancing" in First Amendment context). 
292 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techpical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
293 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 22, at 337; Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra 
note 22, at 275; see also Fox, supra note 23, at 1189-90. 
294 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 22, at 337 ("To the extent that a seller can show that 
the use of tying arrangements wiU produce specific benefits that outweigh any harm to compe-
tition, the ties should be permitted as exceptions to the per se rule." (emphasis 
added)); Oppenheim, supra note 22, at 1181 (stating that ties should be deemed 
prima facie illegal, subject to proof by "clear and convincing evidence" that the tie's 
benefits outweigh its harms); Slawson, supra note 41, at 495 (describing possible af-
firmative defenses when procompetitive effects predominate). 
295 Ross, supra note 1, at 279 n.28. 
296 Strasser, supra note 52, at 283-84. 
297 In fact, some commentators have argued that balancing in the tying context is 
impossible, even if the harms and benefits to be balanced are of a purely economic 
variety. For instance, one scholar, commenting on Justice O'Connor's assertion in 
Jefferson Parish that ties should be evaluated under a Rule of Reason balancing test, 
stated: 
The method by which this weighing process is to be conducted is a mystery 
not clarified by the opinion. As an example of the confusion generated by 
this balancing approach, suppose that the evidence in Hyde had shown that 
the Roux contract lowered total hospital costs by one percent and surgical 
costs by a larger percentage. It simply is impossible to 'weigh' this hypotheti-
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Ultimately, however, the inability of Traditionalists to fashion a 
rational method of comparing the costs and benefits of tying ar-
rangements is largely moot. For, according to the Traditionalist 
camp, the mere fact that a tie's benefits outweigh its harms will not, 
ipso facto, justify it. Even if a tie is, on balance, beneficial, Tradition-
alists say, courts should still find it illegal if there is an alternative to it 
that will produce the same beneficial results.298 This is also the ap-
proach taken by those lower courts that recognize such an affirmative 
defense.299 In these cases, firms that adopt such contracts are penal-
ized not for imposing net social harm, but instead, for failing to bene-
fit society sufficiently.300 
cal evidence against hypothetical proof that, for example, Roux had used no 
new anesthesia in obstetrics cases for two years despite use of such innova-
tions by anesthesiologists in other hospitals. This balancing is analogous to 
deciding whether a particular rose smells as sweet as a specified ripe peach 
tastes .... 
Kramer, supra note 7, at 1061. Despite this metaphorical flourish, the balancing pro-
posed by Chicago-oriented advocates such as Justice O'Connor is at least theoretically 
objective, premised, as it is, on the partial-equilibrium trade-off model that informs 
antitrust balancing in other contexts. See, e.g., Arthur, supra note 148, at 15 (applying 
"Oliver Williamson's famous tradeoff model, in which the allocative efficiency losses 
from a challenged practice are compared to its possible cost savings" in the antitrust 
context); cf. Williamson, supra note 28, at 18-19 (describing the tradeoff model in a 
merger context). No such theoretical objectivity, of course, informs the sort of balanc-
ing proposed by the Traditionalists in this context. 
298 See Bauer, supra note 22, at 337; Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 
22, at 275; see also Fox, supra note 23, at 1189 & n.179. 
299 See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz A.G., 828 F.2d 1033, 1040-42 
(4th Cir. 1987) (holding that even a beneficial tying arrangement is unlawful if less 
restrictive means could have achieved the same beneficial results); Betaseed, Inc. v. U 
& I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1228 & n.38 (9th Cir. 1982) (same); William Cohen & Son, 
Inc. v. All Am. Hero, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D.NJ. 1988) (same). 
soo This apparent anomaly is not confined to the work of Traditionalist scholars or 
even to the tying context. Even the enforcement guidelines promulgated by President 
Reagan's Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission indicated that a defen-
dant could not sustain an efficiencies defense if the same efficiencies asserted could 
be achieved by means of a less restrictive alternative. See Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines§ 3.5 (1984), available in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) t 13,103, at 20,551, 
20,564 Uune 14, 1984); FfC Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers, 4 Trade Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) t 13,200, at 20,901, 20,904 Uune 14, 1982); American Med. Int'l, Inc., 104 
F.T.C. 1, 218-19 (1984). If, as both agencies have claimed, there is no legally cogniza-
ble efficiency defense in the first place, this approach might make sense as a method 
of rationing enforcement resources. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 173 n.90 (1996). If, on the other hand, one concedes that 
such a defense is statutorily authorized, the government's position seems dubious. See 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doc-
trine, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 156, 181 (1972) ("The Clayton Act, by its terms, reaches only 
those actions that decrease competition, not those that fail to increase competition."). 
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The Traditionalist emphasis on less restrictive alternatives, then, 
seems to rest on shaky theoretical footing. Even assuming that the 
ties in question are, in fact, forced upon purchasers, it would seem 
that proof (however produced) that the contract's benefits outweigh 
the negative consequences of forcing should be enough to justify the 
tie, regardless of whether those benefits could also be achieved in 
some other way. 
Putting this objection to one side, however, there is a more fun-
damental reason why the less restrictive alternative approach, as pro-
pounded by Traditionalists, should be rejected. The alternatives 
advanced by the Traditional approach, although certainly less restric-
tive,301 are not only more costly than outright ties, but are also less 
effective at stemming the market failure that can create the need for 
contractual integration in the first place. In these circumstances, the 
failure to adopt a less restrictive (but more costly and less effective) 
alternative in any particular case simply suggests that the parties are 
minimizing their joint costs. Thus, far from mitigating the harsh 
effects of a per se rule, any defense associated ·with the Traditionalist 
approach rests upon an unjustified presumption that the ties at issue 
are the result of coercive forcing. A brief consideration of the various 
alternatives suggested by the Traditional approach will confirm this 
intuition. 
The earliest support for the less restrictive alternative approach 
comes not from Traditionalist scholars, but from the Supreme Court 
itself. In IBM Corp. v. United States, the Court scrutinized IBM's re-
quirement that purchasers of its computers also purchase its punch 
cards.302 The Court rejected IBM's assertion that the requirement was 
justified as an attempt to protect itself from any negative impact on its 
goodwill that could result from computer breakdowns caused by sub-
standard cards.303 Even if such a defense were available, the Court 
stated, IBM had not made one out given the various alternatives avail-
able to it for protecting the interest asserted.304 There were, accord-
ing to the Court, three such alternatives: (1) pure reliance upon the 
market, that is, leaving customers to their own devices to purchase 
!Ot No Traditionalist, for instance, has suggested that complete vertical integration 
is a "less restrictive" alternative. Cf Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 
319-21 (1949) (Douglas,]., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should not adopt rules 
that encourage manufacturers to integrate forward). 
!02 298 u.s. 131 (1936). 
!Os See id. at 139-40. 
S<>< Seeid. 
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cards of suitable quality; (2) informing customers of the virtues of 
IBM's cards or, alternatively, warning customers of the dangers of 
using substandard cards; or (3) "even" leasing the machines condi-
tional upon the agreement by the customer only to use cards meeting 
IBM's specifications.305 These alternatives are generally representative 
of the alternatives put forth by the Traditional approach. As demon-
strated below, however, none of these alternatives is as cost-effective at 
eliminating market failure as an outright tie. 
a. Reliance upon the Market 
The assertion that reliance upon the market to supply products of 
appropriate quality will safeguard a seller's interest in the goodwill 
associated with a tying product has been repeated several times by the 
S C 3061 307 d hi 308 ld d' .. upreme ourt, ower courts, an sc o ars. n ee , It IS Im-
sos See id. 
S06 See id.; see also Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 
(1953) ("[A]ny intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choos-
ing buyers to select it over others, anyway."); Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 306 ("If the 
manufacturer's brand of the tied product is in fact superior to that of competitors, the 
buyer will presumably choose it anyway."). Indeed, this idea predates the decision in 
IBM, which relied upon Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 
(1931). Carbice Corp., however, did not involve any attempt to justify a tie by procom-
petitive benefits or otherwise. See id. Instead, the Court simply held that ties necessar-
ily exclude competitors from the market for the tied product: "'The very existence of 
such restrictions suggests that in [their] absence a competing article of equal or better 
quality would be offered at the same or at a lower price ... .'" ld. at 32 n.2 (quoting 
FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYsTEM 127 (1925) ); see also STEvENS, 
supra note 38, at 75 (stating that the mere presence of a tying contract establishes that 
a more efficient producer of the tied product likely has been precluded from the 
marke~. · 
!0
7 See Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz AG., 828 F.2d 1033, 1041 (4th Cir. 
1987); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir. 1976); R & G Affiliates, 
Inc. v. Knoll Int'l, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1395, 1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
' sos See Grimes, supra note 45, at 285 (arguing that if the tie does, in fact, enhance 
the quality of tying product, buyers will purchase tied product willingly, without any 
requirement); Schwartz, supra note 58, at 27 ("[T]he efficiency of uniting two prod-
ucts in use [should] be judged by the user."). Indeed, the assertion seems implicit in 
the Traditionalist argument that buyers will "willingly," that is, without contractual 
requirement, purchase a tied product where that product is superior. See Lockhart & 
Sacks, supra note 41, at 946; Turner, supra note 22, at 61; see also Strasser, supra note 52, 
at 262 (arguing that customers will have proper incentives to purchase tied products of 
sufficient quality, as long as they are properly informed). 
Similar Traditionalist assertions are made with respect to vertical agreements in 
general. One scholar, for instance, argues that resale price maintenance is not neces-
sary to prevent free-riding by distributors, because sellers can "restrict the distribution 
of their products to buyers whom they are certain will provide point of sale services." 
Flynn, supra note 119, at 292. Flynn does not explain, however, how a seller can de-
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plicit in the statements by the Court and scholars that the false-
attribution justification should fail in those instances when other sell-
ers could supply products of the same quality as the tied product.309 
These assertions, however, are simply wrong and premised, ironically, 
on "blackboard economics," that is, the existence of a price-theoretic 
world that is characterized by low transaction costs and perfect infor-
mation. 
Consider the IBM case itself. It is certainly possible that, as the 
parties stipulated, other firms were capable of manufacturing cards to 
operate perfectly well in IBM's machines. This possibility, however, 
says nothing about whether other firms would, in fact, choose to do 
so. Many firms are no doubt capable of manufacturing pollution-
control equipment. That does not mean, however, that heavy pollut-
ers will purchase such equipment. Indeed, absent some legal re-
quirement, we would not expect them to do so. Because the costs of 
pollution fall largely on others, its prevention is characterized by a 
market failure, resulting in an underinvestment in pollution control 
devices.310 
termine in advance whether a particular distributor will provide such services. See 
Dahlman, supra note 228, at 148 (noting that, absent information costs, manufactur-
ers could "declin[e] to trade with agents who would be known to avoid fulfilling their 
obligations"). Such a determination will be particularly difficult in that context, in 
which the self-interest of each distributor consists of providing suboptimal services. See 
WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 47-49 (discussing ex post opportunism). Ironically, this 
assertion ultimately rests upon the assumption that is often-and sometimes falsely-
attributed to the Chicago School: namely, that markets for distribution behave in a 
perfectly competitive fashion, i.e., that no transaction costs attend the seller-
distributor relationship. This assumption, of course, is demonstrably false. See supra 
notes 228-32. 
sw See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483-84 
(1992); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947);/BM Corp., 
298 U.S. at 139 ("There is no contention that others than [IBM] cannot meet these 
requirements. It affirmatively appears, by stipulation, that others are capable of manu-
facturing cards suitable for use in [IBM's] machines, and that paper required for that 
purpose may be obtained from the manufacturers who supply [IBM]."); Roberts v. 
Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F.2d 1476, 1482 (9th Cir. 1983) (asking whether 
other firms "could" supply products of equal quality); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. 
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (stating that a tie is no longer permis-
sible when competitors can supply products of equal quality to the tied product), affd, 
365 U.S. 567 (1961); KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 41, at 158-59 (noting that in most 
cases in which a tying arrangement was rejected, the same quality of product could 
have been obtained without the tie); Bauer, supra note 22, at 326 (agreeing with the 
reasoning in Jerrold Electronics). 
310 See DAVIS & MEYER, supra note 278, at 2, 42-44;JAMES E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC EXTERNAUTIES 30-32 (1973). 
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Similarly, even if other firms could produce cards of a suitable 
quality, one would expect market failure to prevent such production. 
Such failure would take two forms. First, imperfect information may 
preclude customers from understanding the difference between high-
quality and low-quality cards, leading them to undervalue the former 
and to purchase inferior cards.311 Indeed, it is the possibility of ex-
actly this sort of informational market failure that underlies the hold-
ing in Eastman Kodak that unsophisticated customers could constitute 
a separate market.312 There the defendant argued that customers 
could protect themselves in advance from any exploitation by learn-
ing about Kodak's policies and negotiating for any necessary contrac-
tual protection.313 The Court rejected this assertion, noting that 
customers might not be sufficiently sophisticated to grasp such in-
formation or, in the alternative, might not be willing to incur the 
expense of doing so.314 Similar reasoning, of course, suggests that 
customers might not possess the expertise or incentive to evaluate the 
qualities of potential substitutes for a tied product. 
One could respond that the market might provide this informa-
tion, that is, sellers of substitutes for the tied product will find it in 
their interest to educate customers about the virtues of, for instance, 
superior punchcards.315 Yet, as the Court pointed out in Eastman Ko-
dak, such "education" will itself be characterized by market failure; 
even if a firm convinces customers that cards of a certain quality are 
important, there is no guarantee that customers will purchase the 
cards from it. Indeed, having been "convinced," the customer might 
su See Craswell, supra note 53, at 684-86 (noting the difficulties consumers face in 
evaluating the adequacy of individual components); GJ;"imes, supra note 45, at 285 
(appearing to concede that some "consumers may lack information or motivation to 
make the right choice" of tied product); see also George Stigler, The Economics of Infor-
mation, 69 J. POL ECON. 213 (1961). . 
s
12 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474-76; Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence 
ofanlnstalledBase, 62ANrrrRusrLJ.1, 17 (1992) (explainingthatEastmanKodakrests 
on a presumption of information failure in markets for complementary goods); 
Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. Cr. 
ECON. REV. 43 (1993); Lande, supra note 165, at 195-97. 
sis See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-77; see also Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's 
Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that customers had sufficient 
information before purchase to avoid a tie by turning to alternatives to the tying prod-
uct); United Farmers Agents Ass'n v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 F.3d 233, 236-37 (5th Cir. 
1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 960 (1997). 
Sl< See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-77; Grimes, supra note 45, at 272-79. 
sis CJ. Landes & Posner, supra note 155, at 270 ("The free-riding competitor will, at 
little cost, capture some of the profits associated with a strong trademark because 
some consumers will assume ... the ... brands are identical."). 
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choose to buy the cards from the seller of the tying product! As a 
result, the incentives to engage in such education will be attenu-
ated.316 Ironically, the departure from a price-theoretic world, far 
from supporting the Traditionalist position, actually suggests that less 
restrictive alternatives will also be less effective. 
Second, even if the production and absorption of information 
were costless, purchasers would still not purchase tied products of 
sufficient quality absent a contractual requirement to do so. Contrary 
to Traditionalist assumptions,317 purchasers will not fully internalize 
the costs associated with a choice of inferior products. Here it is im-
portant to realize that the incentives faced by a purchaser are de-
pendent upon contractual background rules, including the 
availability of warranties, that pervade and construct the market.318 
Where such warranties are applicable, many of the costs of malfunc-
tion will be borne by the original seller, who must satisfy claims made 
by the purchaser under the warranty. In these circumstances, the 
purchaser will internalize only part of the costs of breakdown, and 
thus its behavior will be characterized by moral hazard, causing it to 
underinvest in the tying product's maintenance and upkeep, and to 
purchase inferior substitutes for the tied product.319 Again, the depar-
••
6 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474 n.21 (citing Howard Beales eta!., The Efficient 
Regulation of Consumer lnfomzation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 503-04, 506 (1981) ); see also 
KENNETH]. ARROW, EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 152 (1971) (noting that, 
where information is concerned, "its value for the purchaser is not known until he has 
the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost"). 
m See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 41, at 158-59 ("[A] flat rule against tying 
arrangements, regardless of whether or not they serve a useful purpose, appears justi-
fied."); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 41, at 946 ("The very use of the tying device 
indicates that the benefit of the requirements contract is not a sufficient inducement 
.... "); Schwartz, supra note 58, at 27 (" [T] he efficiency of uniting two products in use 
is a matter to be judged by the user."); Strasser, supra note 52, at 262 ("A tying ar-
rangement is necessary only when a buyer does not perceive or does not act 
on ... [an] interdependence."). 
'
18 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972) (creating implied warranty of merchantability); 
cf. COASE, supra note 206, at 27-28; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargain-
ing in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88YALELJ. 950 (1979). 
••
9 See Bailey Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Market-
place, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 893, 948 n.185 (1990) ("When, via the warranty, the con-
sumer is 'insured' against losses, he will 'behave in a way which increases the 
probability and magnitude of the adverse event against which he is insuring himself.'" 
(citation omitted)). As two scholars explain: 
Moral hazard might exist because the marginal cost to a consumer of using a 
product carefully is positive, for time and effort are costs, while the marginal 
gain of extra care is apparently zero to one who has purchased warranty cov-
erage, for the warranty insures the consumer against product-related harms. 
Hence, consumers protected by warranties could be less careful in their use of 
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ture from perfect competition in the form of market failure-here 
moral hazard-undermines the Traditional position, suggesting that 
the alternative offered by Traditionalists is inferior to an outright tie. 
Yet, even if there were no warranties, the purchaser would still fail 
to internalize all the costs of such breakdowns, particularly the effects 
of such breakdowns on the seller's reputation.520 Each breakdown 
falsely attributed to the tying product will lower the esteem of the 
buyer for it, as well as the esteem of any other potential purchasers 
who happen to hear from the buyer about the product's "failings." A 
purchaser may internalize, in a rough sense, the costs resulting from 
its own loss of esteem, insofur as that loss corresponds to the eco-
nomic loss that it has suffered. The purchaser will not, however, in 
any way internalize the reputational losses suffered by the manufac-
turer in the eyes of those who have heard, by word of mouth or oth-
erwise, of the purchaser's troubles.521 Again, the purchaser will simply 
possess inadequate incentives to maintain the tying product and, 
therefore, to purchase tied products of sufficient quality. 
Finally, it should be noted that this reduction in esteem will not 
be limited only to the tying product, but will also affect any other 
products bearing the same trademark.522 If, for instance, a Kodak 
products than consumers who do not have warranties. The warranty, in short, 
might create a "moral hazard." 
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperftct Infcmnation in Markets for Contract Tenns: The 
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1446 (1983). Of course, 
the cost of moral hazard-that is, the increased warranty-related costs borne by sell-
ers-will be impounded in the price that the purchaser must pay for the warranty and 
thus the product itself. See Demsetz, supra note 284, at 7-S. Parties could also choose 
to avoid that cost by disclaiming applicable warranties, leaving the buyer to bear any 
loss associated with the breakdown of a substandard product. See U.C.C. § 2-316 
(1972). To the extent that a tie can eliminate this hazard, however, the cost of a war-
ranty will fall, benefiting both parties and eliminating the necessity of such a dis-
claimer. 
520 See WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 251, at 22 ("[W]here the manner of use of a 
product by purchasers may affect the reputation ... of the producer, the producer 
may want users to uphold certain standards in the use or maintenance of the prod-
uct."). 
521 See Michael R Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the optimal Amount of 
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 77 (1973) (noting that co~sumers gather information about 
a product's durability by relying upon the experience of neighbors). Such informa-
tion, however, need not consist solely of the direct, "word of mouth" variety. It may 
also consist of information gathered from the buyer by informational intermediaries 
and distributed to other potential purchasers. See Beales et al., supra note 316, at 501-
02 (discussing role ofinformational intermediaries). 
522 See Stephen E. Margolis, Monopolistic Competition and Multiproduct Brand Names, 
62J. Bus. 199, 201-02 (1989) ("[W]here consumers are aware that two or more prod-
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copier breaks down because substandard replacement parts are used, 
the purchaser's loss of esteem will no doubt extend beyond the par-
ticular model of copier involved to all copiers and other products 
bearing the Kodak trademark. Indeed, a growing body of scholarly 
literature recognizes that detrimental effects on the reputation of one 
product can have serious negative consequences for the reputation of 
other products bearing the same brand.323 For instance, business 
strategies involving "brand leverage" or "brand extension" are prem-
ised upon the consumer's propensity to associate the qualities of a 
new product with other, more established products bearing the same 
brand.324 All in all, then, the "alternative" of simply relying upon the 
market will be significantly less effective in light of the nature of the 
market failure that the alternative is designed (albeit poorly) to ad-
dress. 
Similar factors also undermine the potency of this less restrictive 
alternative in the franchising context.325 Franchisees may not have 
the expertise necessary to evaluate the quality of various inputs to the 
franchise product.326 Moreover, even if they do, they will not possess 
the incentive to purchase inputs of a quality sufficient to maintain the 
reputation associated with the franchise trademark.327 Thus, while 
competitors might be capable of producing inputs of sufficient quality, 
ucts are provided by the same firm, actions of the firm with respect to one of its prod-
ucts affects [sic] the values that consumers place on the firm's other products."). 
s:zg See, e.g., David Aaker, Brand Extensions: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, SLOAN 
MGl\IT. REV., Summer 1990, at 47, 47 ("A brand name can fail to help an extension or, 
worse, can create ... associations that hurt the extension."); Birger Wernerfelt, Um-
breUa Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of SignaUing by Posting a 
Bond, 19 RAND]. ECON. 458, 459 (1988) ("A firm with a good old product and a bad 
new product ..• will lead consumers to believe that the old product is also of poor 
quality .... "); cf. DANIEL C. SMITH, AN EXAMINATION OF PRODUGr AND MARKET 
CHARACTERISTICS THAT AFFEcr THE FINANCIAL OUTCOMES OF BRAND EXTENSIONS 27-
28 (Marketing Science Inst. Working Paper No. 91-103, 1991) (recognizing that 
"unfavorable outcomes of new extensions can have ... negative effects on demand for 
established products affiliated with the brand," but asserting that such effects are likely 
to be negligible). 
524 See, e.g., Edward M. Tauber, Fit and Leverage in Brand Extensions, in BRAND EQUITY 
& ADVERTISING 313, 313-15 (David A. Aaker & Alexander L. Biel eds., 1993). 
s2S See Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz A.G., 828 F.2d 1033, 1041 (4th Cir. 
1987) (finding a tie illegal in light of less restrictive alternatives); Siegel v. Chicken 
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50-51 (9th Cir. 1971) (same). See generaUy Meese, supra note 
73, at 149-51 (describing and critiquing the role ofless restrictive alternatives in analy-
sis of affirmative defenses to franchise tying contracts). 
'
26 See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 53, at 683 (noting that the franchisee may decide 
to rely on the franchisor's judgment as to the appropriate inputs to purchase). 
m See supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text. 
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franchisees will not purchase them, even if they fully understand the 
consequences of not doing so. Again, the "alternative" of reliance 
upon the market, although less restrictive, appears to be markedly 
less effective.328 
b. Seller's Education of the Buyer 
As the Court noted in IBM, a seller "is not prevented from pro-
claiming the virtues of its [products] or warning against the danger of 
using, in its [own] machines, [products] which do not conform to the 
necessary specifications."329 Yet the mere fact that a seller can produce 
such information does not mean that it will, or that such production 
will be as effective as a tie. As the Court suggested in Eastman Kodak, 
generating and conveying information about a product's attributes is 
expensive.330 Firms must create such information, and customers 
must take the time and invest the resources to understand it. 331 
s2a It should also be clear that reliance on the market will not be an adequate 
alternative when the tie is justified as an attempt to generate information through the 
provision of repair service by the original manufacturer. See supra notes 270-72 and 
accompanying text. Although a manufacturer could, theoretically, purchase such 
information from independent repair services, educating independent firms and 
bargaining over such sales would involve costs over and above the costs of simply 
requiring the buyer to use the manufacturer's own services. 
s
29 IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936); see also Austin, supra 
note 74, at 115-16 (distinguishing IBM from Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors 
Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936), on the ground 
that, in IBM, "the purchaser ha[d] all the relevant information necessary to the proper 
operation of the machine and [was] likewise completely acquainted with conse-
quences of using a product manufactured by someone other than the vendor"); 
Turner, supra note 22, at 64; cf. Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 
680, 686-87 (4th Cir. 1992). 
!30 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473-75 
{1992) ("Much ... information is difficult-some of it impossible-to acquire at the 
time of purchase."). Professor Craswell, upon whom the Court relied, has made a 
similar point. See Craswell, supra note 53, at 671-81, 684, 689 (discussing tie-ins due to 
imperfect information and the expense of producing information). This is especially 
true where an attempt to persuade a customer to purchase the tied product is itself 
used as evidence of "coercion." See, e.g., Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, AG., 
553 F.2d 964, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that evidence that automobile manufac-
turer "urged" franchisees to stock its air conditioning units and that franchisees were 
required to make their "best efforts" to sell them supported finding of coercion neces-
sary to establish a tying violation). 
ssl See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-75 ("[E]ven if customers were capable 
of ... processing the complex ... information, they may choose not to do so."); see also 
Craswell, supra note 53, at 684 ("[T]his information itself may be costly to communi-
cate, or of little use without additional information as to why the seller recommended 
the products or services that he did, and what the consequences of using some other 
brand would be."); Grimes, supra note 45, at 272-75 (noting that buyers may lack the 
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Moreover, as with other advertising, such information is a collective 
good, the production and dissemination of which is characterized by 
market failure.332 No seller which informed its customers of the con-
sequences of using inferior products could be assured that customers 
would purchase the high-quality products from it and not from an-
other vendor.353 Again, merely relying upon the market to ensure 
that customers understand and purchase inputs of sufficient quality, 
while less restrictive, will also be less effective.334 
c. Contractual Specifications 
Although Traditionalists seem willing to concede that reliance 
upon the market will not always eliminate market failure, they do not 
concede that this insight leads to approval of ties. Instead, they con-
tend that a contractual requirement that purchasers only use items of 
certain specifications with the tying product will protect the interest 
asserted, a stance that originated with the Court in IBM, and has been 
repeated several times.335 They will admit an exception only when 
ability and incentives to evaluate complex products and their complements). Indeed, 
insofar as the price differential that leads a buyer to internalize the cost of expected 
market failure itself impounds information, requiring such education is redundant, 
since it bypasses the most efficient means of conveying the information. Cf. Hayek, 
supra note 284, at 526-27. Such understanding, of course, becomes increasingly diffi-
cult as more and more information is disclosed, subjecting purchasers to "information 
overload." See Craswell, supra note 53, at 689-90 (discussing the problem of "informa-
tion overload"). A similar phenomenon has been recognized outside the tying con-
text. See, e.g., Wieglos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 518 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(securities law); Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (duty to warn arising under products liability law). 
!!
2 See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text. 
'" See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
884 Similarly, in light of the inadequate incentives facing franchisees, simply in-
forming them of the virtues of using high-quality inputs will not induce them to do so. 
See supra notes 264, 268 and accompanying text. 
sss See Bauer, supra note 22, at 325-26 ("[T]he two products may be so related that 
use of a product meeting the specifications of the tied product will be necessary for 
the proper functioning of the tying product."); Grimes, supra note 45, at 285-86 ("A 
seller may use a tie to ensure that the tying product performs adequately and to main-
tain a reputation for quality."); Strasser, supra note 52, at 261-62 (same); Turner, supra 
note 22, at 64 (same); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 
(1949) ("[G]ood will may necessitate the use of tying clauses [when] specifications for 
a substitute would be so detailed that they could not practicably be supplied."); Metrix 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz AG., 828 F.2d 1033, 1040-42 (4th Cir. 1987); Rose-
brough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 114445 (8th 
Cir. 1981); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971). 
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such specifications are "too detailed and complex," an exception also 
. db 336 recognize y some courts. 
As with reliance on the market, there is no doubt that such con-
tractual specifications could overcome market failure as well as out-
right ties could, by leading buyers to purchase products of sufficient 
quality. Again, however, this potential will only be realized in a mar-
ket with characteristics different from those that obtai!! in the real 
world. The creation and communication of specifications, like the 
production and dissemination of other information, will come at a 
positive cost, particularly in light of the propensity of courts to 
second-guess their content.337 Moreover, in order for such specifica-
tions to have the desired effect, customers will have to invest re-
sources in understanding them, another positive cost.338 Neither of 
these costs is present when the seller simply requires the purchaser to 
take the tied product from it rather than from other vendors.339 
Putting these costs to one side, there is a more fundamental rea-
son why the specification alternative will not be as effective as an out-
right tie. The promulgation and enforcement of such specifications 
is considered necessary because without them customers possess in-
adequate incentives to purchase products of a sufficient quality to 
protect the seller's reputation.340 Promulgation of specifications, 
however, even if perfectly understood by buyers, will not change the 
nature of these incentives. Thus, even if a contract requires buyers to 
purchase products of certain specifications, buyers will have incen-
tives to breach the contract, by skimping on the quality of the prod-
ucts they purchase.341 
sss Bauer, supra note 22, at 325-26; see also, e.g., Susser v. CaiVel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 
512 (2d Cir. 1964). 
!3
7 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical SeiVS., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 474 
(1992); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 736 F.2d 441, 
444-45 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that detailed specifications were overbroad and unduly 
restricted competition). 
S38 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at474-75. 
!3
9 Indeed, Traditionalists implicitly recognize that the "specification alternative" 
involves some positive cost in addition to that involved in a tying arrangement when 
they concede that, at some point, the alternative can become "too" costly. If, in fact, 
some alternatives are "too" costly, then, it seems, all are "costly," at least when com-
pared to an outright tie. 
s.o See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 52, at 262 (assuming that buyers have appropriate 
incentives to follow specifications when they understand the interdependencies); see 
also supra notes 317-21. 
s.t See, e.g., Muris, supra note 268; cf. WIWAMSON, supra note 35, at 3 & n.3 (noting 
that the NIE accounts for the possibility of opportunism). 
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Such breaches, of course, will be difficult to detect. Only by mak-
ing surprise inspections of the buyer's operations, complete with the 
wherewithal for testing the quality of the products in question, can 
the seller assure itself that the buyer is living up to its contractual 
obligations.342 In such an environment, disputes over whether, in fact, 
the products purchased by the buyer meet the relevant specifica-
tions-both before and during litigation-are inevitable, and costly to 
sort out.343 Compliance with a straightforward tie, in contrast, is easy 
to monitor, and there can be no dispute that the tied product is "up 
to specification. "344 The specification alternative, then, will be less 
effective and more costly than a tie, thus suggesting that adoption of 
the latter is simply an attempt to minimize the joint costs of the rela-
tionship.345 In other contexts, courts and commentators have long 
recognized that such considerations militate in favor of certain con-
tractual provisions that, while apparently burdensome, minimize 
monitoring and enforcement costs and thus redound to the benefit 
ofboth parties.346 
"'
2 Cf Baker, supra note 24, at 1278 ("[S]pecifications require some system of on-
the-scene inspection to ensure compliance."); J. Brady Dugan, Case Note, Contrasting 
Approaches to Economic justifications in Tying Arrangement Anarysis, 12 GEO. MAsON L. 
REV. 139, 150-51 (1990) (noting the higher costs associated with the specification 
alternative in the franchising context). Despite these insights, neither of these com-
mentators reaches the conclusion offered by this Article. 
543 See generally Muris, supra note 268, at 529-30, 576-77. 
S<< See, e.g., Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1381 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (describing how a franchisor monitored purchases of tied item). As Profes-
sor Williamson has put it in another context: "[I]t is less costly to police simple sys-
tems than it is to police more complicated ones. Causality (responsibility) is difficult 
to trace (attribute) in complex systems. If few 'excuses' can be offered, fewer veracity 
checks have to be made." WILUAMSON, supra note 35, at 187. 
545 See Meese, supra note 73, at 149-51 (arguing that, in the franchise context, 
failure to adopt a less-restrictive alternative may simply evince an attempt to minimize 
joint costs). 
546 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) 
(sustaining a forum-selection clause because it "spar[es] litigants the time and ex-
pense of pretrial motions to determine the correct forum"); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. 
Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.); Richard A. Epstein, 
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisa~ 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 307-08, 314-15 (1975) 
(discussing benefits provided by "add-on" and "termination-at-will" contract clauses); 
see also Craswell, supra note 53, at 680-81 (contending that possession of monopoly 
power does not change seller's incentives to provide efficient contractual terms); Alan 
Schwartz, A Reexamination ofNonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1071-
73 (1977). 
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2. Categorical Balancing 
Some Traditionalists seem willing to admit that the less restrictive 
alternatives that they offer are, in fact, more expensive to employ than 
ties and less effective at implementing legitimate competitive objec-
tives.347 Yet many Traditionalists assert that the general availability of 
such alternatives should doom all tying contracts. Any marginal 
benefit to be derived from a tie as compared to its alternatives will, 
they say, be more than offset by the cost to competition and other 
values associated with the choice of a tie.348 Close analysis, however, 
requires exactly the opposite conclusion: The higher cost associated 
with less restrictive alternatives suggests that ties, even those adopted 
by firms with market power, are not the result of forcing. Absent forc-
ing or further proof of anticompetitive effects, of course, such con-
tracts pose no concern, even if one adopts Traditional normative 
assumptions about the purposes of the antitrust laws. 
Traditionalists have never quite explained why the costs flowing 
from a tie will outvveigh its benefits in those cases in which less restric-
tive alternatives are less effective. One scholar, for instance, while 
conceding that it is difficult to determine which effects predominate, 
sides with the Traditional approach simply because the "values that 
protect access to markets on the basis of merits, not leverage, are ex-
ceedingly strong. "349 Even if it were appropriate to presume anticom-
petitive harm from each tie, it is by no means clear that the harm of 
such a tie outweighs the costs of employing a less effective alternative. 
Indeed, as suggested earlier, such a balance would be impossible to 
conduct, given the value placed by Traditionalists upon the competi-
tive "process" and noneconomic values.350 One suspects that the out-
come of such grand balancing would depend upon the perspective of 
s.
7 See Kaplow, supra note 41, at 543; Turner, supra note 22, at 64. 
s.s See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969); 
KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 41, at 158-59; Turner, supra note 22, at 64. 
s.
9 Fox, supra note 23, at 1189. Similarly, in Standard Oi~ for instance, the Court 
simply stated that the specification alternative was "protection enough," without ex-
plaining the basis for its calculation. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 
293, 306 (1949); see also Earley Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 556 F. Supp. 544, 
550 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (stating that a tie could not be justified when the tying product 
"could" be produced without a tie). Professor Baker recognizes this anomaly. See 
Baker, supra note 24, at 1251. He does not, however, link it to the resulting absence of 
forcing. 
550 See supra notes 29-32. 
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the balancer, and not upon any actual calculation of concrete costs 
and benefits.351 
All of this is ultimately beside the point, however, as is any at-
tempt to balance net costs and benefits in any particular case. The 
purported necessity of this balancing is premised upon a belief that 
the tie produces anticompetitive harm in the first place, harm that 
must be balanced against something else. However, the demonstra-
tion that ties are generally superior to other methods of attenuating 
or eliminating market failure vitiates any presumption of such harm, 
even when the seller possesses market power. 
Here it is important to recall that, according to Traditionalists, 
the mere presence of "coercive forcing" establishes such harm, with-
out regard to any actual anticompetitive effects. The superiority and 
lower cost of ties, however, suggests that these contracts are unrelated 
to forcing and are instead devices for minimizing the joint costs and 
maximizing the joint benefits of the parties.352 The negotiation of 
such contracts, of course, does not require any exercise of market 
power, but instead takes the form of the purely voluntary process of 
contract formation described earlier, whereby cost-based price differ-
entials induce the purchaser to agree to the most cost-effective 
method of attenuating market failure.353 Because this process does 
not involve forcing, even when the seller possesses market power, the 
case for the sort of balancing advocated by Traditionalists collapses. 
Without forcing, consumers are not "coerced," and any exclusion of 
independent sellers from the market is unrelated to "leverage," with 
the result that, even within the Traditional paradigm, there is no 
competitive harm in the first place. 
C. Abandoning the Per Se Rule 
Not all agreements that have a potential to harm competition are 
per se illegal. Instead, according to the Supreme Court, such con-
tracts are per se illegal only if they are "manifestly anticompetitive"354 
or are of the sort "that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
sst See Jacobs, supra note 23, at 259-65 (arguing that beliefs about the relative effi-
cacy of markets and government intervention are not supported by empirical proof 
and thus, by necessity, are political in nature). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Whats So SpecialAbout]udges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 773, 779-82 (1990). 
ss
2 See supra notes 282-88. 
sss See supra notes 282-88 and accompanying text. 
ss. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977). 
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competition and decrease output. "355 Put another way, the Court will 
place a type of contract in the per se category when "experience with 
[the] restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the 
rule of reason will condemn it."356 
Where tying contracts are concerned, both the Traditional and 
the Modem analyses begin with the normative premise that the mere 
existence of forcing, without more, establishes a harm sufficient to 
invoke the per se rule.357 Beginning with this major premise, then, 
each approach has constructed its own method for identifying those 
instances in which forcing is present and thus invoking the per se 
rule. The Traditional method is straightforward: All ties are pre-
sumed "forced" through an exercise of market power. The Modem 
approach is slightly more sophisticated: All ties obtained by a firm 
with market power are deemed the result of forcing. 
It bears emphasis that neither method for identifying the exis-
tence of forcing rests upon any empirical evidence. Traditionalists, 
for instance, have never adduced any evidence that all ties, in fact, are 
the result of market power. Similarly, the judicial opinions adopting 
the Modem position are devoid of any evidence, empirical or other-
wise, that all, or even "almost all," ties adopted by firms with market 
power are the result of forcing.358 Instead, as explained earlier, each 
version of the per se rule rests upon a presumption grounded solely 
in economic theory: The Traditional presumption holds that all ties 
are forced through an exercise of market power, while the Modem 
one asserts that any tie obtained by a firm with market power has 
been so forced. Neither presumption, it will be seen, is supportable 
in light of the standards generally applicable to antitrust presump-
tions, with the result that the per se rule, in its Traditional or Modem 
form, must be abandoned. 
,;s Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (quoting 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
289-90 (1985) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)) ); 
see also Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (practice is deemed per se illegal only when it 
"facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competi-
tion and decrease output"); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 
(1963). 
,;
6 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279 (1997) (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982)); see also FfC v. Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990); White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263. 
,;
7 See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. 
,;s See Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 723 (noting that only contracts that "always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output" can be declared per se 
unlawful). 
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Like all presumptions, antitrust presumptions must bear some re-
lationship to reality. As the Supreme Court recently put it, "[l]egal 
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual 
market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. "359 The Tra-
ditional presumption, that all ties are the result of coercive forcing, 
falls far short of satisfying this test. Not only have Traditionalists 
failed to adduce any evidence in support of this assertion, but eco-
nomic theory, in the form of the NIE, demonstrates that ties can, in 
fact, arise absent any exercise of market power by the seller. 
The presumption supporting Modem tying doctrine fares no bet-
ter. Nel.ther the Supreme Court nor supporters of the Modem posi-
tion have attempted to show that th~ possession of market power, 
without more, establishes that such power has been exercised to co-
erce a tie.360 Although it is certainly true that a seller with market 
power is able to induce acceptance of a tie through the exercise of 
market power, such ability, without more, does not establish that this 
power has been exercised. Instead, proof that a seller possesses mar-
ket power and has obtained agreement to a tie is as consistent with 
purely voluntary integration as it is with any use of market power to 
coerce its acceptance, and thus cannot, by itself, support an inference 
that a tie has been forced. 361 A fortiori, such proof cannot give rise to a 
presumption, rebuttable or not. Even monopolists sometimes write 
contracts that are beneficial, exercising their market power by raising 
the price of the monopolized product.362 As the Court held in East-
!5
9 Easunan Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 46~H>1-(1992). 
!60 Seejefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-17 (1984) (noting 
that per se prohibition is appropriate only if anticompetitive forcing probably exists 
and that existence of market power establishes the existence of such forcing). 
SGJ See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 
(1986) (noting that evidence that is as consistent with procompetitive as with anti-
competitive objectives cannot, without more, support an inference of anticompetitive 
conduct); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite, 465 U.S. 752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'l 
Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968) (same). Similar reasoning un-
dermines the assertion by some that vertical restraints generally are the result of seller 
"paternalism" that does not account for the "collective rationality" of seller and pur-
chaser. See Flynn, supra note 119, at 292. By definition, a bargaining process with low 
transaction costs and no externalities produces results that will reflect such collective 
rationality. Of course, there may be some instances in which the expectation of mar-
ket power will produce externalities. See infra note 392. The mere possession of market 
power, however, does not establish that such externalities take the fQrm of anticom-
petitive contracts. . 
so
2 This fact has, of course, been recognized elsewhere, often outside the antitrust 
context, though not as often as one might expect. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 53, at 
680 ("[M]ost sellers with market power will do better to exercise that power by raising 
the basic price rather than by changing the other terms of the purchase agreement."); 
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man Kodak, merely enunciating the economic theory that a contract 
could have a particular origin or consequence is not sufficient to es-
tablish the existence of that effect.363 Per se rules cannot be estab-
lished by exemplifying theories. 
This is not to say that the Traditional and Modem approaches 
must be rejected once and for all. It is certainly conceivable that one 
of these approaches could be rehabilitated. This rehabilitation would 
consist of an empirical showing that, despite the logical possibility 
that ties are voluntary contractual integration, all ties, or, at least all 
those obtained by a firm with market power, are the result of forcing. 
Such an empirical showing, it seems, would be difficult. The long 
history of the per se rule has, ironically, deprived economists and 
lawyers of the judicial records necessary to determine the economic 
origins of tying contracts.364 What evidence there is, however, suggests 
that, far from always producing anticompetitive effects, many ties are 
instead "designed 'to increase economic efficiency and render mar-
Schwartz, supra note 346, at 1071-75; see also Epstein, supra note 346, at 293 (arguing 
that courts should invalidate contracts only if the process of contract formation was 
defective or the party against whom the agreement is to be enforced is incompetent). 
Advocates of the Traditional approach have failed to grasp this economic truism. One 
scholar, for instance, asserts that, whenever a manufacturer possesses market power, 
any vertical restraint that it imposes is "not an expression of a competitive process at 
work," but instead the result of a market "distorted by an imbalance of power." Flynn, 
supra note 119, at 293; see also William B. Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the 
Sherman Act: Populism and Relational Power, 53 TEX. L. REv. 1180, 1203-04 (1975) 
(arguing that, in the franchise context, "disparity in bargaining power" man~fests itself 
in various vertical arrangements, including tying contracts); Curran, supra note 29, at 
362 ("Vertically restrained dealers ... must capitulate to manufacturers to secure and 
retain a source of supply."). This assertion, of course, is inconsistent with the Coase 
Theorem, which demonstrates that bargaining in concentrated markets can lead to 
efficient contracts. See COASE, supra note 242, at 158-59; see also WILUAMSON, supra 
note 35, at 180-82 (taking issue with notion that vertical distribution contracts are the 
result of manufacturer "power"); Meese, supra note 75, at 184-89 (demonstrating that 
vertical distribution restraints can be the result of voluntary contractual integration). 
S63 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 468-69. Similarly, any assumption that forcing is 
present whenever each seller in the market offers the same contractual terms, see supra 
note 42, should be abandoned. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 53, at 680-81 n.81 
(arguing that uniformity of contractual terms is as consistent with a hypothesis that 
such terms are efficient as it is with the hypothesis that they are unconscionable). 
u. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 71, at 436-37 (noting that the per se rule against 
vertical restraints has deprived the courts of evidence about the effects of such ar-
rangements and calling upon courts to adopt a Rule of Reason approach because 
"policy makers and economists learn a great deal from studying the records of busi-
ness litigation"); Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 6-7 (arguing that, once a court declares 
a practice per se illegal, the practice will disappear, and courts and scholars will have 
little opportunity to reconsider it). 
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kets more, rather than less, competitive,"'365 thus justifying Rule of 
Reason treatment. Professor Louis Kaplow, for instance, in discussing 
tying cases that have reached the Supreme Court, argues that "the 
most plausible explanations for the defendants' behavior were those 
understood and argued about at the time" and then notes that, be-
tween 1912 and 1947, four separate defendants argued in the Su-
preme Court that challenged ties were designed to protect goodwill.366 
Professor Kaplow omits to mention two other cases in whiCh the 
Court, in an era when ties were not per se illegal, found ties that ap-
parently eliminated market failures to be, on balance, procompetitive: 
Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp.,367 and Federal Trade 
Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co. 368 
Professor Kaplow's conclusion is consistent with decisions 
reached in the lower courts. Although the Supreme Court has never 
approved the assertion of affirmative defenses to tying contracts 
deemed per se illegal, some firms have continued to engage in tying, 
and many have successfully asserted businessjustification defenses in 
the lower courts.369 Such successes, it should be noted, often come 
despite standards-the less restrictive alternative requirement and the 
like-that are more onerous than necessary to distinguish instances of 
365 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (quoting United States 
v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)). 
S66 Kaplow, supra note 41, at 545-56 & n.121; see also Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in 
Doctrine, supra note 22, at 275 ("The Court has twice expressly entertained the defense 
of protection of goodwill.") • 
.,;
7 299 U.S. 3 (1936); see also Brief for Respondent at 23-40, Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641, 642 (7th Cir. 1935) (arguing that contract protected 
General Motors's goodwill). 
S68 261 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1923) (finding that a tie did not lessen competition be-
cause, in part, the agreement protected the defendant's goodwill) . 
.,;
9 See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz ofN. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (finding substantial evidence "to support the jury's finding that the only 
feasible method for maintaining quality control is the use of the tying arrangement"); 
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 515 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding that soft ice cream 
franchisor's requirement that no product not produced by it be sold was reasonably 
necessary for the protection of its goodwill); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 466-
69 (1st Cir. 1962) (finding that the requirement that motels displaying a mattress 
manufacturer's signs use only that manufacturer's mattresses was justified by the con-
cern that customers could be unfairly surprised by inferior mattresses); Dehydrating 
Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1961) (concluding that 
manufacturer's policy of refusing to sell its unloaders unless they were to be installed 
in silos of its own manufacture was justified when 50% of manufacturer's customers 
using unloaders with other silos were dissatisfied); see also Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 
Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 799-800 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding tie-in legal due to legitimate, pro-
competitive reasons supporting its use). 
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forcing from purely voluntary integration.370 Were current law better 
calibrated toward identifying instances of voluntary integration, there 
is little doubt that the number of examples of successful justifications 
would multiply. The various successful attempts to justify ties, even in 
an environment hostile to them, suggests that it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, for adherents to the Traditional or Modem ap-
proaches to prove that ties meet the requirements for per se treat-
ment, whether or not the seller possesses market power over the tying 
product. Thus, unlike other per se rules, a per se rule against tying 
would apparently sweep within its ambit a significant amount of con-
duct that is unabashedly procompetitive, even if, it should be empha-
sized, one accepts the Traditionalist premise animating current law to 
the effect that mere forcing, without more, should be condemned.371 
It should be emphasized that the abandonment of the Modem 
per se rule is entirely consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis. As 
the Supreme Court has held on many occasions, the standards for 
determining whether a contract "restrains trade" under the Sherman 
Act are not fixed and unmoving. Instead, "the Act has a generality 
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu-
tional provisions,"372 empowering the federal courts to fashion a 
common law of trade restraints. As the Court has recently put it, 
"[t]he Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along with 
its dynamic potential. "373 
Just as common-law courts did before the Sherman Act was 
passed, the Supreme Court has always seen fit to adjust the definition 
of "restraint of trade" in light of new understandings of the economic 
origins and effects of commercial conduct.374 The New Institutional 
570 See Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1349-51 (finding for defendant despite application of less 
restrictive alternative test); Susser, 332 F.2d at 520-21 (same); see also supra note 74. 
571 See FfC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432 n.15 (1990) 
(noting that overinclusive per se rules are only appropriate where the conduct prohib-
ited is always anticompetitive or otherwise without redeeming virtue). 
572 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); see also 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978); cf Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis has less 
force when constitutional provisions are involved); Commissioner v. Coronado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (making the same ar-
gument). 
m Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). 
m See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 284 (1997) ("[T]he general presump-
tion that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to 
the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to 
give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.'" 
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Economics has undermined the purely economic premises behind 
the Traditional and Modem approaches: Tying doctrine should be 
refashioned to reflect that new understanding, despite the doctrine of 
stare decisis.375 Any other approach would leave the Court continually 
affirming and applying a rule inconsistent with economic reality and 
theory, and thus diminish respect for the law and the Court itself.376 
Such a result would not require the Court to question the Traditional 
normative premises that have informed tying law for several decades, 
but would, instead, simply implement those premises in light of the 
revised account of such contracts mandated by the NIE.377 
Of course, this conclusion that the per se rule should be aban-
doned rests upon the assumption that ties that are not the result of 
forcing are less suspect as a competitive matter than those that are. 
(quoting National Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S: 679, 688 (1978))); 
Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 723-31; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 47-59 (1977); Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 361-78;see alsoHOVENKAMP, supra note 
104, at 268-69 (discussing the relationship between the Sherman Act and the common 
law of trade restraints). Various judicial decisions predating the Sherman Act applied 
this interpretive approach to the common law of trade restraints. See, e.g., Gibbs v. 
Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (noting the evolution of the common-
law rule); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 525 (1880) ("It is not that 
contracts in restraint of trade are any more legal or enforceable now than they were at 
any former period, but that the courts look differently at the question as to what is a 
restraint of trade."); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 (N.Y. 1887) 
(endorsing modification of the common law of trade restraints in light of changed 
circumstances); Kelloggv. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-41 (Wis. 1851) (same). 
s
7
s This, of course, is analogous to the approach taken by the Supreme Court in 
the area of economic substantive due process. In W~t Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 ( 1937), for instance, the Court overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospita~ 261 U.S. 
525 (1923), on the ground that "recent economic experience" had "brought in to a 
strong light" the fact that protection of liberty of contract resulted in wages below the 
subsistence level and thus placed strains on state budgets. 300 U.S. at 399-400; see also 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862 (1992) (arguing that in W~t Coast 
Hote~ the Court was crnnpelled to overrule Adkins because "the clear demonstration that 
the facts of economic life were different from those previously assumed warranted the 
repudiation of the old law"); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 460-61 (1995) (arguing that changed understandings 
of the workings of the economy justified repudiation of Lochner and its progeny). 
s
76 See State Oi~ 118 S. Ct. at 283 (holding that adherence to the per se rule against 
maximum resale price maintenance "lack[ed] adequate justification" in light of re-
vised economic understandings of the effects of the practice); Continental T.V., 433 
U.S. at 47-48 (reconsidering an earlier ruling because, in part, significant scholarly 
criticisms had led lower courts to avoid or narrow the decision in various ways); cJ. 
Lessig, supra note 375, at 441 (arguing that "[a]s an institution, a court cannot resist 
'reality' as it appears to all"). 
m See Lessig, supra note 27, at 1247-50 (distinguishing, in antitrust context, be-
tween changed readings that merely apply original values to new factual understand-
ings and those that result from (inappropriate) changes in original values). 
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One could respond, however, that the distinction bet\veen price dif-
ferentials resulting from forcing and those that are cost-justified is 
really a distinction without a difference. After all, a cost-based price 
differential, in some sense, still "coerces" customers to accept the tie, 
and the tie, as a binding contract, forecloses competitors from the 
market just as much as a tie coerced through the exercise of market 
power does. Should not the mere existence of a tie, even if not 
"coerced" via market power, establish a prima facie case of illegality? 
Whatever the force of this argument, Traditionalists have gener-
ally abjured any objection to tying contracts based solely on their 
foreclosing and/ or binding effects. Professor Turner, for instance, 
acknowledges that purely voluntary ties-that is, ties not required by 
contract-foreclose competitors from the market, but concludes that 
they should not be deemed illegal because "[t]he competing sellers 
deserve no protection against a wholly uninhibited buyer's choice."378 
He then goes on to conclude that, when a cost-justified price differen-
tial, and not market power, induces acceptance of the tie, there is no 
antitrust concern.!!79 If, as Traditionalists argue, ties are suspect be-
cause they offend "traditional antitrust values that protect access to 
markets on the basis of merits, not leverage,"380 then a tying contract 
that is not the result of an exercise of market power does not pose a 
prima facie problem under the Traditional analysis.381 
This result is consistent with-indeed, compelled by-the struc-
ture of antitrust law generally. On its face, the Sherman Act forbids 
all contracts "in restraint of trade. "382 Yet, as Justice Brandeis put it, 
"[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, re-
strains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."383 Thus, for over 
878 Turner, supra note 22, at 61. 
879 See id. at 67; see also Slawson, Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 275-76 
(discussing the Court's purported acceptance of affirmative defenses to the per se rule 
for tie-ins); Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler Tie-in Doctrine, supra note 22, at 695-96 (arguing 
that the Court has implicitly permitted the costjustification of tie-in practices). 
sso Fox, supra note 23, at 1189; see also Fox, supra note 32, at 766-67 (arguing that 
the Eastman Kodak decision was based, sub silentio, on the concern that Kodak used its 
"power" to abuse independent service organizations). 
ss• It should be noted that this result is consistent with decisions in the lower fed-
eral courts holding that, as long as the tying product is offered separately, there is no 
"conditioning" and hence no tie, even when the tying product is priced higher if 
offered separately, as long as any resulting price differential is costjustified. See, e.g., 
Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 638 
F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1981). 
SS
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), 
sss Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 {1918). 
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eighty years, the Supreme Court consistently has held that only un-
reasonable restraints of trade are illegal.384 A contrary antitrust policy, 
one that prohibits contracts merely because of their restraining effect, 
or merely because they interfered with a firm's access to the market, 
would literally explode the economy into constituent atoms. Exclu-
sive dealing contracts, requirements contracts, covenants not to com-
pete, vertical mergers-all would be prima facie unlawful, justified 
only if they represented the least restrictive means of attaining their 
objects.385 Yet no Traditionalist has taken this position, and some 
explicitly repudiate decisions that do.386 As Justice Holmes noted, 
"bellum omnium contra omnes" ("the war of all against all") is no way to 
run an economic system.387 Tying contracts should be treated no dif-
ferently than other "restraining" agreements, so long as they are not 
imposed through an exercise of market power or designed to en-
hance that power. 
D. Toward a New Antitrust Policy for Tying Contracts 
This Article has demonstrated that the Traditional approach to ty-
ing contracts, as well as current law, is premised upon a misapprehen-
sion of the economic origin of such contracts, that is, an assumption 
that "forcing" is present in many instances when it actually is not. 
Despite considerations of stare decisis, such a demonstration, it 
seems, would require the Supreme Court to abandon the per se rule 
articulated in Jefferson Parish and to reject Traditionalist demands that 
the Court reinstate tying doctrine as explicated in cases such as Stan-
ss• See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984);see 
also ChicagoBd. ofTrade, 246 U.S. at 238; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
58 (1911) (discussing the evolution of the Rule of Reason). 
sss See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) 
(finding that the mere fact that a contract restrains a trader's freedom does not ren-
der it suspect); Craswell, supra note 53, at 667 ("[A]ny long term contract restricts a 
purchaser's freedom of choice once the contract has been signed .... "); see also 
Meese, supra note 75, at 189 (arguing that the enforcement of vertical restraints can 
enhance trade freedom). 
ssG Professor Fox, for instance, disputes the populist holding in Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), and endorses the results in Continental T.V., Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and United States v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). Continental T.V., of course, involved a restraint that im-
pinged upon the freedom of a dealer to sell where it wanted, foreclosing it from access 
to certain markets, while the vertical merger in Brown Shoe prevented shoe manufac-
turers from selling to newly integrated outlets. See Fox, supra note 23, at 1188-90. 
ss
7 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
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dard Oil and Northern Pacific Railway Co. This much is easy. The more 
difficult question, of course, is what doctrine should be put in its 
place? 
Obviously, the reconstruction of tying doctrine is beyond the 
scope of this Article. As shown throughout, the content of the ap-
propriate policy toward such contracts depends heavily upon the 
normative premises chosen to animate antitrust law generally. For 
instance, despite the economic conclusions mandated by the NIE, 
acceptance of Traditionalist normative premises might still lead one 
to scrutinize such contracts carefully. After all, the NIE does not show 
that forcing is never possible; it instead simply suggests that it is not as 
likely as was once suspected. Diehard Traditionalists, then, may opt 
for a rule whereby a plaintiff can prevail by proving the existence of 
forcing directly, by, for instance, showing that the defendant pos-
sesses market power and that the tied product has been priced above 
cost. 388 Those affiliated with the Chicago School, of course, would 
demand proof that such forcing had an independent anticompetitive 
effect.389 
Moreover, it should be noted that, even if one adopts the norma-
tive premises of the Chicago School, the analysis offered here does 
not, like some Chicagoans, suggest that ties should be deemed per se 
legal.390 Nor does it suggest that, in the absence of forcing, ties should 
be beyond antitrust scrutiny.391 To the contrary, the recognition that 
ties can eliminate externalities suggests that such contracts can, in 
some circumstances, implement anticompetitive strategies, even when 
the seller does not possess preexisting power in the market for the 
tying product. For, the externalities that result from failure to adopt 
a tie, that is, reliance upon the market, include not only the failure to 
eliminate the various market failures discussed here, but also the fail-
ure to reap the benefits of enhanced market power that can flow from 
such contracts. It is theoretically possible, for instance, that a seller 
could employ a tie to facilitate cartelization of the market for the tied 
sss Cf. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52 (9th Cir. 1971) (applying law 
requiring private plaintiffs to prove "upcharge" on tied product to obtain money 
damages). 
589 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. 
590 See supra notes 23-28. 
591 Cf. Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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product, thus raising the costs faced by its rivals and conferring upon 
itself power in the market for the tying product. 392 
When such a "raising rivals' costs" strategy is possible, a seller will 
view the failure to adopt such a contract as a cost, much like the costs 
that flow from failure to adopt a contract that eliminates market fail-
ure.393 This cost, of course, will lead the seller to offer the tying prod-
uct at two different prices: one (low) price reflecting the benefits to 
the seller of the buyer's agreement to a tying contract, and one 
(high) price reflecting the cost to the seller of the buyer's failure to 
cooperate in such a strategy.394 Despite the anticompetitive effect of 
such a scheme, any acceptance by the buyer of the low-priced tying 
term would be entirely voluntary, analogous to an agreement to par-
ticipate in a cartel.395 The presence or absence of "forcing" simply 
would not be relevant to a determination of the contract's legality. 
CONCLUSION 
The content of antitrust law has always rested, at least in part1 
upon economic assumptions. Tying doctrine is no exception. The 
Traditional.approach to tying arrangements is based on an economic 
assumption that all such contracts are necessarily "forced" on pur-
chasers through the exercise of market power. This assumption, 
when combined with the normative premise that such forcing should 
be condemned, had at one time resulted in the extraordinarily hostile 
treatment of ties by the Supreme Court in the form of a rule of per se 
392 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rais-
ing Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 223-30 (1986) (discussing 
"exclusionary rights contracts" and their ability to give the purchaser power to raise 
prices in the output market); Meese, supra note 73, at 145-46 (discussing the theoreti-
cal possibility of such a strategy in the franchise context). Such strategies, of course, 
are not limited to those instances where the seller is seeking to confer market power 
on itself. A franchisor's supplier, for instance, could pay the franchisor to require its 
franchisees only to stock the supplier's products, thus raising the distribution costs 
faced by the supplier's rivals. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); 
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
595 Of course, these ·costs will only be present in those instances in which high 
transaction costs prevent those who will be harmed by such contracts, that is, consum-
ers, from bribing the seller not to engage in such an anticompetitive strategy. See 
generally Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A 
Comment, llj.L. & ECON. 67, 70 (1968). 
,,. Cf Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1369, 1376-77 (1991) 
(explaining the incentives of customers and suppliers to cooperate to create and share 
supra-competitive profits). 
595 Cf OLSON, supra note 263, at 6-7 (describing how the creation and enforcement 
of a cartel is in the collective interest of its participants). 
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illegality, even when the seller possessed no significant power in the 
market for the tying product. 
Modern law is less hostile to such contracts. While the Supreme 
Court continues to adhere to the Traditional normative premise that 
forcing, without more, should be condemned, the Court requires 
some demonstration that the seller possesses substantial market 
power before it will conclude that a seller has the ability to coerce a 
purchaser into accepting such a contract. Where market power is 
present, however, Modern doctrine conclusively presumes that the tie 
in question has been "forced" on the purchaser through an exercise 
of that power and thus should be deemed per se illegal. 
For decades, the Chicago School of antitrust analysis has offered 
alternatives to both Traditional and Modern doctrine: per se legality 
or, perhaps, Rule of Reason treatment. While Chicagoans have at-
tempted to portray their attack on the Traditional and Modern ap-
proaches as simply an application of price theory, that application 
nonetheless begins with controversial normative premises about the 
purposes of the antitrust laws. Unlike Traditionalists, for instance, 
Chicagoans believe that "allocative efficiency" is the sole goal pro-
moted by the antitrust laws. This assumption in turn leads the Chi-
cago School to treat forcing with indifference, and to view price 
discrimination as beneficial, even though such discrimination leads to 
higher prices for many consumers. 
Indeed, as an economic matter, Chicagoans have added very little 
to the Traditional account of how such contracts are formed, an ac-
count that, like Chicago's, rests upon a purely price-theoretic model. 
To be sure, Chicagoans have reminded the Supreme Court that some 
market power is necessary before a seller can "force" a purchaser to 
agree to a tie. Still, this realization is not overly important in light of 
the pervasive product differentiation and resulting market power that 
characterizes the modern economy, differentiation apparently recog-
nized in the Court's recent Eastman Kodak decision. Moreover, while 
the Chicago assertion that many such contracts are vehicles for price 
discrimination is an advance over the Traditional learning, such an 
advance does not suggest a departure from the Traditional or Mod-
ern doctrines. Indeed, insofar as such discrimination is admittedly 
the result of "forcing" as defined by Traditionalists, Chicago's more 
complete account of such contracts only serves to buttress the Tradi-
tional case against them in light of the view, which the Supreme 
Court still holds, that such forcing should be condemned. 
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This Article has offered a critique of Traditional and Modem ty-
ing doctrine that does not depend upon the sort of controversial 
normative assumptions that animate the Chicago approach. Instead, 
this Article has assumed for the sake of argument that an exercise of 
market power in the form of coercive forcing should, without more, 
be condemned. Similarly, this Article has assumed that allocative 
efficiency is not the sole goal of the antitrust laws, but that such laws 
should also be deemed to protect other economic values, as well as 
social and political ones. Although these assumptions are certainly 
controversial, they still exert substantial influence over the Supreme 
Court, which has steadfastly refused to abandon them in the tying 
context. 
Even if one adopts these controversial normative assumptions 
about the purposes of the antitrust laws, however, Modem tying doc-
trine, as well as that advocated by Traditionalists, should be aban-
doned. For, each of these approaches, while beginning with purely 
normative premises, are also contingent upon explicit assumptions 
about the economic origins of such contracts. These assumptions, 
while consistent with a price-theoretic view of the world that domi-
nated antitrust for so long, cannot survive in light of the New Institu-
tional Economics. To be precise, the NIE, which expressly accounts 
for transaction costs and product differentiation, suggests that many 
ties are, in fact, partial vertical integration designed to overcome 
market failures that would result from complete reliance on the mar-
ket. Although, as Traditionalists have pointed out, there are alterna-
tive means of overcoming such failures, such means are more costly 
and less effective than outright ties, often due, ironically, to the same 
sort of information and bargaining costs that the Supreme Court em-
phasized in Eastman Kodak, a decision applauded by Traditionalists. 
The realization that ties can be methods for overcoming such 
market failures undermines the purely economic premises upon 
which the Traditional and Modem approaches are based. Faced with 
the possibility of market failure, sellers of tying products will induce 
potential purchasers to internalize the costs of that failure by refusing 
to sell the tying product separately, except at a price differential that 
reflects the costs of such failure. This differential, in tum, will induce 
agreement to a tie and thus lead to the elimination of the market 
failure in question. Such a differential, while facially similar to that 
involved where forcing is present, is costjustified, and thus does not 
constitute coercion in any meaningful economic sense. Where a tie 
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does, in fact, serve to eliminate market failure, such a contract can 
arise through purely voluntary contractual integration. 
Because ties can arise without any exercise of market power, the 
mere presence of a tie, even when coupled with the existence of mar-
ket power, does not logically give rise to a presumption that forcing is 
present. As a result, both Modem law, which presumes that forcing is 
present whenever the seller possesses market power, and the Tradi-
tional approach, which deems coercive forcing necessary to the for-
mation of ties, must be abandoned, despite the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Only an empirical showing that nearly all ties-or, at least, all 
involving a seller with market power-are the result of forcing can 
possibly rehabilitate the Traditional approach or, alternatively, Mod-
em law. Neither Traditionalists nor advocates of the Modem ap-
proach, however, have attempted to discharge this burden, and casual 
empiricism suggests that such a showing would be extremely difficult. 
Tying doctrine, then, must be reconstituted from the ground up. 
